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A FEW
BRIEF MEMORANDA

OF SOME OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICES

RENDERED BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL OUTRAM, C.B.

“The Bayard of India—‘*Sans peur et sans reproche*’—Major James Outram, of the Bombay Army.”

SPEECH OF LIEUT.-GEN. SIR C. J. NAPIER, NOV. 5TH, 1842.

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TO
MRS. JAMES OUTRAM,
THESE
Memoranda
OF
SOME OF THE SERVICES
RENDERED
BY HER HUSBAND,
ARE AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED
BY
THE COMPILER.

P R E F A C E .

COLONEL OUTRAM'S friends have frequently requested him to publish a narrative of his eventful career in the East. To these requests he has invariably turned a deaf ear ; but, in deference to the strongly expressed opinions of those to whose judgment it was his duty to defer, he at length gave his consent to the preparation, for private circulation, of a few Memoranda of some of his more important services. And he was induced to submit to the Compiler of the following pages a mass of documents, consisting of copies of the official records of his public proceedings during the last thirty years, which have, from time to time, been furnished to him by the authorities, and of his correspondence with eminent Indian functionaries.

Beyond giving his sanction to the general plan of this little book, Colonel Outram is answerable for none of the statements or opinions it contains. The Compiler studiously avoided submitting it to him either in manuscript or proof. And though the proofs of two sheets were placed in his hands by a gentleman to whom they had been submitted, the final corrections had been made, ere this circumstance became known to the Compiler.

London, March 1853.

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The following pages have been in type for many weeks. The delay has been caused by the preparation of the appendices—certain recent discussions having led the Compiler to believe that it would be his duty to enter at some length into the questions of Bombay and Baroda corruption. He is advised that this is unnecessary. No time, therefore, will be lost in preparing the appendices; when completed copies will be forwarded to the recipients of the present (thus partially incomplete) volume.

March 8th, 1853.

MEMORANDA OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES

OF

LIEUT.-COLONEL OUTRAM, C.B.

I.

SERVICES AS A REGIMENTAL OFFICER.

1819—1825.

IN April 1819, Mr. James Outram was appointed to the Military Service of the Hon. East India Company, on their Bombay Establishment.

On his arrival in India, in the following August, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. And when, in 1820, the Twenty-third Regiment of Native Infantry was raised, he was entrusted with the Adjutancy of the new Corps.

Soon after their enrolment at Poona, in the winter of 1820, the Twenty-third were sent overland to Baroda. After spending a monsoon at that hot and sickly station, where a fever, of almost unexampled severity, prostrated nine-tenths of their number, they were ordered into the Mye Caunta on field service. On the satisfactory completion of the operations there entrusted to them, they were marched across to

Kattywar: and thence, after the performance of various harassing duties, they were, early in 1824, despatched to the turbulent Province of Candeish.

It was Lieutenant Outram's good fortune to be placed in temporary command of his Regiment for some months during its service in Kattywar. And, while holding this responsible position, he was, on the occasion of the annual review, very highly complimented by the Reviewing Officer, on his merits, both as an Adjutant and as a Commander. Before leaving Kattywar, the Twenty-third were again reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir C. Colville, who, in glowing terms, eulogized their high state of efficiency and discipline, extolled the merits of their Commanding Officer, Major Bagnold, and conferred on their Adjutant the most gratifying compliment he had it in his power to bestow. The Regiment had been ordered to move on Candeish by wings; and to the command of one of these, Sir Charles specially nominated Lieutenant Outram, though junior by many years to several other officers then present with the Corps.

After a few months' residence in Candeish, his medical advisers deeming a change of climate necessary for his health, Lieutenant Outram proceeded to Bombay, where an expedition was being organized against the Fort of Kittoor, in the Southern Mahratta Country. He accompanied the force as a volunteer; and, on its arrival at the scene of operations, sought and obtained from the General Commanding, permission to lead the storming party. But the opportunity so earnestly desired, of displaying that undaunted courage and military ardour which at a

later period of his career became proverbial, was denied him on this occasion—the garrison having capitulated just as preparations were being made for the assault.

On the return of the Kittoor Expedition, Lieutenant Outram rejoined his regiment. And ere long, an opportunity was afforded him of earning distinction in the field.

Towards the end of March 1825, an insurrection suddenly broke out in the Western Districts of Candesh, which threatened to extend throughout the Province. The rebel leader, at the head of 800 men, attacked and plundered Untapoor, carrying off his spoil to the Hill Fortress of Moolair. He there established his Head-Quarters; and, raising the seductive banner of the Peishwa, he vauntingly proclaimed his intention to revive the glories of the Mahratta Confederacy.

The British Troops at Surat, Jaulnah, Ahmednuggur, &c., were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate service; and, in the mean time, the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Graham) was instructed to lose no time in procuring from the local authorities such military assistance as could be spared for the defence of Zye Keira, the chief town of the Moolair District—the seat of the district Treasury—and situated only twelve miles distant from the rebel stronghold.

Two hundred men of the 11th and 23rd Regiments were accordingly despatched from Malligaum, on the evening of the 5th of April, under the command of Lieutenant Outram, who, after effecting a forced

march of thirty-five miles, reached Zye Keira early next morning. In the course of the day, he received information which led him to believe that, though the enemy were more formidable in point of numbers than previous accounts represented them to be, the works on the further side of their fortress were susceptible of escalade. And he, therefore, proposed to carry the place by a *coup-de-main*—to rout the insurgents under the panic of a sudden surprise—and, by thus destroying the prestige they had already acquired, to dishearten the allies that were flocking to their standard. This proposition was enthusiastically received by his companions, Ensigns Whitmore and Paul of the 11th Regiment; but it so far exceeded the discretionary powers which their written instructions vested either in Graham or Outram, that it was a matter of serious deliberation with the former whether he was justified in giving his consent. The result of his inquiries, however, satisfied him that a rapid and alarming extension of the insurrection could only be prevented by offering a prompt check to the rebels. He accordingly sanctioned the proposed measures; and, soon after nightfall, Outram marched forth to carry them into execution.

As he neared the hill on which the fortress was situated, he sent Ensigns Whitmore and Paul, with 150 men, to make a false attack in front; while he, himself, with the remaining fifty sepoy of his detachment, turning off to the left, proceeded to assail the rear.

The operation was completely successful. Both parties effected the ascent before day-break. And

while the rebels had their attention drawn to their front, by the assault of an enemy whose strength it was impossible to ascertain in the dark, Outram dashed in upon them from behind. The panic-stricken garrison fled with scarcely an attempt at resistance. And at the head of his reunited detachment, and some horsemen whom Mr. Graham had in the mean time collected, Outram followed them up so closely that they could neither rally, nor discover the weakness of their assailants. Their leader was cut down; many of his adherents shared his fate; and the rest made for the neighbouring hills, in a state of complete disorganization.

As the Infantry had now marched upwards of fifty miles, in little more than thirty-six hours, Outram found it necessary to halt them soon after dawn. But the horsemen continued the pursuit so far as the nature of the ground permitted; scouts were despatched to ascertain the point of rendezvous selected by the scattered foe; and, at night, the chase was resumed. The insurgents were a second time surprised; many were slain; numbers were taken prisoners; and the rest, throwing down their arms, fled to their respective villages. A rebellion which had caused much anxiety to the authorities was thus crushed, ere the troops intended for its suppression had been put in motion. And the plunder of Unta-poor was restored to its lawful owners.

For these services, cordial thanks and commendations were bestowed on Lieutenant Outram and his gallant companions, as well by the Government, as by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Divisional General.

And these were the last services that Outram was called on to render as a Regimental Officer. For the Governor of Bombay—the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone—had in the mean time resolved on instituting a grand moral experiment which required, for its successful conduct, more than ordinary zeal, energy, and tact. And in the young Adjutant of the Twenty-third, he had discerned the man specially qualified to give effect to his views. *

On resigning his Adjutancy, to enter on his new sphere of action, Lieutenant Outram received a warmly expressed and publicly recorded eulogy from his Commanding Officer, Colonel Deschampes, who was pleased to attribute the high estimation in which the new regiment was then held at Army Headquarters, in a great measure to the merits and exertions of its Adjutant.

II.

SERVICES AMONGST THE BHEELS OF CANDEISH.

1825—1835.

OF the various provinces which, on the subjugation of the Peishwa, were annexed to the Anglo-Indian Empire, one of the most important, but decidedly the least promising, was Candeish. Once populous and fertile, “Mahrattas, Arabs, Bheels, and Pindarries, had combined to desolate it. And it came into our hands a desert—its towns in ruins, its villages destroyed, its soil uncultivated, its roads broken up, and myriads of its populations swept off by famines, plagues, and battles.”* Nor, for long, did it seem that the British supremacy was destined to bring repose to this stricken land.

The Pindarries were no more; the power of the Mahrattas had been dissolved; the marauding Arabs had been driven out; and the mild sway of a paternal Government had taken the place of misrule, and rapacious tyranny. But the inhabitants of Candeish found not peace. Their plains were still ravaged by the wild Bheels who occupied the neighbouring mountains. And in vain did they invoke the protection of

* History of the British Conquests in India, vol. ii. p. 79.
By Horace St. John, Esq. Colburn and Co., 1852.

their new masters against these ruthless Caterans, who, secure in their rocky defiles and dense pestilential jungles, continued, for seven long years, to baffle the political sagacity of the British Government, and to deride its military resources.*

From 1818 till 1825, Candeish stood to Western India in the relation which Ireland still bears to Britain. It was "*the difficulty*" of the Government. It was a difficulty which all regarded as insuperable, till the genius of Elphinstone discovered its solution. And it was one which even an Elphinstone might have failed to solve, had not an Outram and an Ovens been at hand, to give effect to his conceptions, under the able surveillance of Colonel Robertson, the Commissioner for Candeish.

To appreciate these conceptions, and the merits of the officers by whom they were realized, it is

* "Candeish is nearly surrounded by broad chains of mountains, whose sides are clothed in noxious vegetation, where, for many months of the year, none but the hardy denizen of the hill can exist. . . . The tabular trap hills of the Saat-pooras, which form the northern boundary of the province, are separated from each other by ravines of vast magnitude, and are covered with splendid forests, which afford amidst the most romantic scenery, unbounded shelter to the outlaw. On the west the great Sukhein range rises steep and stony; these Ghauts, however, are not broken but sustain tangled masses of Bamboo, which is found nowhere else in greater luxuriance or more difficult of access, whilst the continuous ranges of Chandore, Saatmulla, and Ajunta, bound the province to the South, and the thick Bauble jungle which shrouds their thousand dark dells, presents equal difficulties to the pursuit of the offender, as do the low sterile hillocks which, to the eastward, separate Khandesh from the rich plains of Berar." — *Historical Sketch of the Bheel Tribes*, by Capt. Graham.

necessary that we should call to mind the character and antecedents of the people that were taken in hand.

The Bheels “had from the most remote ages been recognized as a distinct race, insulated in their abodes, and separated by their habits and usages from the other tribes of India.”* They regarded robbery as a sacred institution, and engaged in it with the spirit of men who ply their calling under divine sanction. Taught to divide their spiritual allegiance between the minor Infernal Deities, they were accustomed to propitiate these Evil Powers with sanguinary sacrifices. In addition to other debasing vices they were greatly addicted to drunkenness; “and all their evil propensities,” we are told, “burst into a flaming fire when roused by the effects of ardent spirits.” By their neighbours they were looked on with horror, as social and religious outcasts, whom it was pollution to associate with, and righteousness to slay; and as every man’s hand was lifted against them, so the measure of wrath was fully returned by the tribe.

Like most savages they were suspicious—had an instinctive sense of danger—were full of cunning and evasion—and rarely attacked the strong while victims were to be found amongst the weak and unprotected. But they were no cowards. When peril presented itself, they met it with manly fortitude, and heroic devotion; and, as Sir John Malcolm has recorded, “to kill another when the Turvee (Chief) desired, or to suffer death themselves, appeared to them equally a matter of indifference.”

* Sir John Malcolm.

In peaceful times, and under the powerful rule of the Mahomedan Government, certain of these wild savages had become so far civilized as to settle in the plains. And while their brethren in the hills (to use the words of Sir John Malcolm) “passed their time between crime and debauchery,” these men had been induced to take service as village watchmen, and, more rarely, to engage in agriculture. But, for many years antecedent to the British occupation of Candeish, the “village” and “cultivating” Bheels, had returned to their predatory pursuits.

This retrogression, which had proceeded almost *pari passu* with the decadence of the Mahomedan sway, was complete in 1803. In that year, the scourge of war was succeeded by a most unusual and withering famine, which extended from the Vindhya Hills to the City of Hyderabad. Candeish became for a time deserted; many of its cultivators fled to Berar and Guzerat; the few remaining Bheels abandoned the plains, and returned not again. “And now,” to quote the words of Major Douglas Graham:—

“Commenced the Bundumul—that period of utter anarchy and confusion which so long reigned throughout this unhappy land. Organized gangs (of Bheels) started up in every direction; and the mountain-ridges were quickly studded with Hutties, from the tiny hamlet of the freebooter, to the grand encampments of the powerful Naicks, who, assuming the state of petty princes, despatched their armies of a thousand men to sack and lay waste the surrounding country.

“ On the occupation of the Province of Candeish by the British Government in 1818, anarchy and lawless oppression had reached a fearful height, and murder and rapine stalked openly and unrestrainedly through the land. Fifty notorious leaders infested this once flourishing ‘ Garden of the West ;’ and their every command was implicitly obeyed by upwards of 5,000 ruthless followers, whose sole occupation was pillage and robbery, whose delight alone consisted in the murderous foray, and whose subsistence depended entirely on the fruits of their unlawful spoil. Smarting under the repeatedly broken pledges of the former Native Government, and rendered savage from the wholesale slaughter of their families and relations, the Bheels were more than usually suspicious of a new Government of foreigners, and less than ever inclined to submit to the bonds of order and restraint.

“ From Kokurmunda to Booranpoor, the whole range of the Sathpoora mountains teemed with the disaffected. The Sathmalla and Ajunta Bheels, under thirty-two leaders, were in arms in numerous parties, carrying fire and sword over the Southern parts of the Province ; and the petty Rajahs of Peint and Abhena having united with the powerful Naick, Govinda, the work of desolation was urged with a bloody hand through the entire range of the Western Ghauts. The roads were impassable ; villages in every direction were plundered ; and murders daily committed. Cattle and hostages were driven off from the very centre of the Province ; and these ravages

rose to such a height that the Ryots refused to receive Tuccavee, whilst their property was thus insecure.*

“ The first plan adopted by Colonel Briggs, on the occupation of Candeish by the British Government, was to stop the supplies of food, which were chiefly drawn from the plains—to cut off any parties of Bheels that attempted to issue for plunder—and to make vigorous attacks on the points within the hills to which the Chiefs had retired.

“ During the second year of British Administration, many of the Chiefs, by the prompt decision and praiseworthy efforts of the British Troops, were either seized or killed in battle; but these chiefs were, in most cases, succeeded by others equally powerful and ferocious with themselves; and beyond the immediate influence of the British Troops there was little protection for life and property in Candeish. Proclamations were in vain issued that former crimes would be forgotten, and that in future those Bheels who returned to the plains should be fed at the expense of the village. The amnesty was unheeded and rejected, and not one of the tribe repaired to take advantage of the liberal offer.

“ No regular Police existed at this time. The Bheels, who formerly had been the village watchmen, were in arms against the State. And reports daily arrived of robberies, murders, and house-breakings,—

* “ Ryot ” means “ cultivator.” “ Tuccavee,” is the advance made by Government to enable the cultivators to purchase seed, prepare the soil, &c.

upwards of one hundred complaints of this nature being made, during the course of one month, from the single district of Nundooabar. An Irregular Corps of Turree Bheels was at length attempted, on the principle of confirming hereditary Naicks as the superiors of the legion; but the experiment entirely failed, the men being constantly in a state of intoxication. And their grovelling habits proving incapable of restraint by native officers, who were equally licentious with themselves, this body was ultimately disbanded as totally useless.

“Amongst the many plans which were agitated to restore peace to the Province, the Political Agent proposed to pension every marauding Bheel in Candeish on a monthly allowance of two rupees, together with a certain quantity of grain. Military operations were, however, finally resorted to; and parties of Sebundies* and regular troops were despatched to protect the passes. But they were shortly obliged to quit, leaving two-thirds of their number victims to the malaria; and the charge of these outlets were again handed over to the loose control of the hereditary Naicks on double their former allowances; but with no happier effect than before.

“During the four succeeding years, the same successive arrangements were pursued, with equally unsuccessful results. Conciliatory measures were first adopted; settlements of the most liberal nature were entered into with many. And, these entirely failing, recourse was had to arms, which only for a time and in the immediate vicinity of the force, had the

* “Sebundies” are irregular foot.

temporary effect of apparently subduing these untameable spirits.”*

Avoiding, as far as possible, any general engagement with the troops sent to attack them, the Bheels waited till the invaders, baffled in their object, commenced their homeward march; and then, hanging on their flanks and rear, cut off their stragglers, harassed and often plundered their baggage trains. To the troops employed against them, the service was one of fatigue, hardship, and peril. Independent of the casualties of warfare, vast numbers annually fell victims to the deadly miasms of the jungle; and of those who escaped with their lives, more than a third had their constitutions irreparably injured. We learn from Captain Graham that every Regiment of the Line, at the close of its usual tour of three years in the Bheel districts, was compelled “to discharge to their homes upwards of a hundred men as unfit (from the effects of climate) for further (active) service; whilst a like number, entirely disabled, swelled the list of Government pensioners.”

Such a state of matters as has just been sketched was felt to be intolerable. But how was it to be remedied?

Mr. Elphinstone’s predecessor in the Government of Bombay had looked to the utter extermination of the Bheels as the only measure by which peace could be re-established in Candeish.† But, so far as past ex-

* “A Brief Historical Sketch of the Bheel Tribes inhabiting Candeish,” prepared by Capt D. C. Graham, Sept. 1843, and printed by order of the Hon. Court of Directors, pp. 4-5.

† Vide Mr. Giberne’s Report on Bheel Civilization, subsequently quoted.

perience enabled men to judge, this gubernatorial dictum must have seemed to imply little more, than that one impossibility could only be effected through the performance of another.

Very different from those of his predecessor, were the views entertained by Mr. Elphinstone, who recognized in the wild and degraded Bheel a brother man, in whom dwelt affections that might be won, and were worth the winning—sympathies through the skilful management of which, he might be guided within the pale of civilized life—and faculties that would repay culture. To elevate the proscribed race in the scale of moral being appeared to him a feat of easier accomplishment, and far more glorious than their extirpation. And he resolved that it should be done. Nor was it enough that the Bheels should be gained over from their habits of crime, debauchery, and brigandage—taught the arts of civilization—and made to appreciate the blessings which civilization bestows. He was determined to render them “*the protectors of the peace they had so long disturbed*” !

For the achievement of these noble objects, he devised two schemes. One was the establishment of Agricultural Colonies of Bheels ; the other, the organization of a Regiment of Bheel Soldiers to be armed and disciplined like the Battalions of the Line, and commanded by a British officer. To most men the proposed plan appeared an inversion of the natural order of things—to imply the pre-existence of that very reform it was designed to effect ; but Mr. Elphinstone knew better. The “Colony” experiment he confided to Captain (now Colonel) Ovans ; the organization

of the "Bheel Corps" was assigned to Lieutenant Outram. Both schemes were sneered at by the "practical" men of the day as visionary and absurd; both were, however, gloriously successful; and it was hardly necessary for Sir John Malcolm to record that the success of both "depended on the selection of the officers to whom the execution was confided."*

The nature, extent, and value of Colonel Ovens' philanthropic services—the difficulties he surmounted—the consummate skill and knowledge of human nature he displayed—and the peaceful triumphs he achieved, are well known to the Indian authorities, and to all who have carefully studied the history of Modern India. And they are deeply engraved on the memories of those reclaimed savages amongst whom he toiled. But they are not understood as they ought to be, by the general public. And to sketch them is a pleasure which the compiler of these "Memoranda" promises to himself at an early date, should he not be anticipated by some one better qualified for the task. But, in the mean time, he has to deal, exclusively, with the services of Lieut. Outram.

The organization of a Bheel Corps, under a European officer, had been frequently proposed by Mr. Elphin-

* The anticipations of failure so generally and so confidently expressed, in reference to Mr. Elphinstone's schemes, were the less justifiable, from the fact, that the superiority of a conciliatory over a coercive policy had been already demonstrated by Mr. Willoughby, in respect of the wild tribes inhabiting the Rajpeemla hills; whom he had pacified by gentleness, and equitable measures, without firing a musket, or drawing a sabre.

stone. But so great was the disfavour with which the scheme was received; so many were the objections started to it; and so full of hazard to the officer who should be entrusted with its accomplishment was it on all hands allowed to be, that, up to the date of the Moolair rebellion, it was not enforced. On the occurrence of that insurrection, however, Mr. Elphinstone resolved that, if he could find an officer to take it in hand, his plan should be no longer delayed.

Outram's friends strongly remonstrated with him against sacrificing his professional position and prospects, and, almost to a certainty, his life, by entering on so insane a project. But the very dangers with which the proffered appointment was beset tended to enhance its value in his eyes. And, requesting Colonel Robertson to communicate to Mr. Elphinstone his glad acceptance of the hazardous commission, he made haste to enter on its exciting duties.

Proceeding to the Head Quarters of his Regiment, he obtained permission to lead a detachment against the Bheels of the Sathmalla Hills, who had, for some months, been playing at bo-peep with his commanding officer. He attacked and routed them with considerable slaughter; and followed them up, from fastness to fastness, till all had submitted—services for which he received high commendation from the Government, and the Commander-in-Chief.

Having thus satisfied the Bheels that their jungles, and rocky defiles, were not impregnable, he sent back his detachment, and throwing himself amongst his recent foes, unarmed and unattended, and therefore completely at their mercy, he claimed and received a

reciprocity of the confidence thus reposed in them. He accepted their hospitality, which he repaid with feasts and entertainments. He listened with profound attention to their wild tales and mythological legends; taught them many simple but useful mechanical devices; dressed their wounds; prescribed for their ailments; joined in their pastimes; and, accompanying them in pursuit of the tigers, and other large game, with which their mountains abounded, won their admiration by showing in the chase, as he had previously displayed in battle, his superiority in those very qualities which they valued most highly in themselves.*

After a while, he persuaded some high-caste Native non-commissioned officers and privates of his own regiment, to co-operate with him in his undertaking. And such was the devotion of these noble soldiers to their late Adjutant that, grievously as it shocked their prejudices, they associated on terms of equality with the abhorred, and hitherto contumeliously treated Bheels, joined in their rude sports, and accompanied them in their hunting expeditions.

Many English gentlemen afterwards stepped forward to aid him in a similar manner. Whenever, in the course of his migrations round the province, his rough levies came in contact with Native Regiments of the Line, the European officers were readily induced to give them a warm and cordial reception, and to treat them with the respect shown, under ordinary circumstances, only to high-caste Hindoos. And, to the honour of the Bombay Army

* Vide Mr. Giberne's, Major Douglas Graham's, and other official reports on Bheel Reform

be it said, that the conduct of the officers was imitated by the men, who, not satisfied with displaying mere negative civility, presented their “out-caste” visitors with betel-nut and sweetmeats, and gave entertainments in their honour. The violence they thus rendered to their own feelings, from affection for their officers, can be appreciated by those who understand the Hindoo system—and by them only.*

Persevering in the course which he had originally sketched out, Lieutenant Outram contrived to en-throne himself in the affections of his uncouth associates; to establish over their minds a moral ascendancy which was a source of profound astonishment to all who witnessed it; to inspire them with sentiments of self-respect; and to imbue them with an earnest desire to become participators in the civilization with which, from time to time, they were confronted.

In less than two years from the date of its adoption, the philanthropic and farsighted policy of Mr. Elphinstone had been completely vindicated. The Bheel recruits had ceased to “pass their time between crime and debauchery.” Sober, gentle, obliging, and

* Conspicuous amongst the regiments who thus co-operated with Government in the elevation of the Bheels, and the first to do so, was Outram’s own corps. Captain Graham thus writes:—“The reception of these wild recruits by the 23rd Regt. Bombay Native Infantry, in the camp at Malligaum, was greatly conducive to the good cause. Men of the highest caste behaved in a manner most flattering to the feelings of the mountaineers, visiting and presenting them with betel-nut, to the no small amazement of the guests, and to the gratification of Government, who complimented the regiment on their conduct.” The 23rd was composed *exclusively* of HIGH-CASTE HINDOSTANNEES.

well-behaved, they had won the esteem of every English gentleman who had seen them; *and they had shed their blood freely in the cause of order, and in conflict with insurgent bandits of their own tribe!*

But though these gratifying results were obtained with a celerity that excited marvel, their accomplishment had been no easy matter. Numerous were the discouragements that beset Outram's path; often did his schemes seem on the eve of frustration; many times was his life in peril.

“Inveterate habits were not to be changed in a day; and, in addition to the natural repugnance to restraint and subjection to law, strange rumours and reports were afloat throughout the Province, regarding the intentions of Government in thus forming the Bheels into a Corps. They were told by the evil-disposed that the object was to link them in a line, like galley-slaves, and then to extirpate their race; that their blood was in high demand as a medicine in the country of their masters; that assemblage of the Bheels in the Corps would be followed by massacre as of yore, &c. &c. &c.”*

They were reminded that, at the very place where their head-quarters were fixed, there had been a most treacherous and cruel slaughter of their tribe under a former Government. And, pondering on these things, they could not but deem it strange that an English officer should leave the comforts of a settled home, and the society of his countrymen, to rove through pestilential jungles and lead a life of hardship and fatigue, from no more credible motive than love for

* Mr. Giberne's Report on Bheel Civilization.

loathed and despised outcasts, whose kinsmen he had slain in battle. It was not in human nature—still less in the nature of suspicious savages against whom, for generations, every hand had been raised—to resist altogether the influences thus brought to bear on their minds, or to maintain undeviating fidelity to the man who, they were told, beguiled their affections only to secure their destruction.

It is not within the scope of these “Memoranda” to narrate the progress of the formation of the Bheel Corps, or to recite the numerous startling and romantic incidents which marked the career of its young Commandant, and discovered in him a presence of mind that never faltered, and a promptitude of action equal to all emergencies. Such details must be deferred to a future and more fitting occasion. But it will not be out of place, and may not be altogether uninteresting to the readers of this volume, if I briefly notice a few leading passages in the history of the Corps, and some of its more remarkable services.

In March 1826—that is, in less than eleven months after Outram commenced the “conciliation” of his Bheels, by attacking them in their haunts, and following them up to their fastnesses—Mr. Bax, Colonel Robertson’s successor in the Chief Magistracy of Candesh, reported to Government that the recruits amounted to 255 in number; that “rapid progress had been made in disciplining them;” that desertions were becoming “extremely rare;” and “that no complaints whatever had been preferred against any individual of the Corps, by the townspeople, since their arrival” at Malligaum.

In the following July, the same gentleman intimated that he should be “wanting in justice to Lieutenant Outram, and remiss in the performance of a gratifying duty, if he neglected to record the very great merit attaching to him in bringing the Corps to its present state.”

“This,” he added, “has been principally effected by great personal kindness, combined with decision on all proper occasions, whereby the Bheels (and I speak from personal observation) have learned to consider their Commanding Officer as the best guardian of their individual welfare.”

In December of the same year, that is, within twenty months from the date on which he undertook its organization, Lieutenant Outram reported the Corps as fit to be entrusted, to a certain extent, with the maintenance of order in the Province. And, in handing up his report, Mr. Bax observed as follows:—

“I have great satisfaction in adding my testimony to the efficient and orderly state of the Bheel Corps; and in congratulating the Hon. the Governor in Council on the complete success of a system which, however difficult in operation originally, and doubtful in result, has been achieved by the indefatigable exertion and excellent management of Lieutenant Outram, assisted by a few meritorious Native officers, and sepoy of the Line.

“As to the progress of the Corps in military exercises, . . . I have the authority of Captain Ovans, who was also present at their parades, for stating that, in this respect, they were remarkably steady and accurate. But although this circumstance is, no doubt, a source

of much gratification to Lieut. Outram, the Hon. the Governor in Council will probably derive greater satisfaction from reflecting on the alteration which this submission to a mild system of military discipline is calculated to produce on the habits and feelings of the men of the Corps, and the advantage to which their reformation may be progressively turned, by creating an extended interest on the part of the Bheels and their connections, in supporting peace and good order throughout the Province."

And in the following month, the same functionary, after alluding to "the eminent success that had attended the plan under the able management of Lieutenant Outram," announced that the Corps was "already becoming an efficient arm of Police, and highly useful in presenting an established point of union and confidence for the unsettled and scattered Bheels of the Province."

On the 22nd April 1827, "the first opportunity was offered to these reformed Bheels of shedding their blood for their new masters ; and they freely risked it, and fought boldly, though opposed to their own caste, and probably relations." And in reporting this interesting action, in which "a small detachment of Bheel recruits" had routed with loss "a considerable gang of Bheels," Captain Hodges, then officiating as Chief Magistrate, expressed his conviction that while Government would derive much gratification from "the gallant and admirable conduct of the young Bheel recruits, . . . the high spirit and exertions of Lieutenant Outram himself, to whose example the meritorious conduct of his small detachment may be

fairly attributed, would be no less appreciated." Nor was he mistaken. Lieutenant Outram and his gallant band received the most gratifying and cordially expressed commendations of Government.

In the following September, on the eve of Mr. Elphinstone's departure from India, Mr. Giberne, Mr. Bax's successor as Chief Magistrate in Candeish, deemed it his duty to furnish to the benevolent and venerated author of "Bheel Civilization," a special report, on the subject of the new Corps. And as a proof of its success, he mentioned that 200 regulars were about to be relieved by Bheel soldiers—"men who once carried dread and terror in their very name throughout the country were now to become its defenders and supporters."

The Bheel Corps had, for wise and obvious reasons, been placed by Mr. Elphinstone under the exclusive control of the Civil authorities. But the latter, diffident of their own judgment in such matters, requested the General, commanding the Division, to have the military efficiency of the Regiment (now 600 strong) fairly tested, and fully reported on. Sir Lionel Smith accordingly deputed Colonel Campbell, the Brigadier commanding in Candeish, to review the Corps.

He did so on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd of September 1827; and reported that their performances were "such as would claim a favourable comparison with many of the best Native Regiments of the Line." That his eulogium was not unmerited will be readily granted by any one who may take the trouble to refer to Colonel Campbell's report contained in Appendix 1.

On the receipt of that Report, Sir John Malcolm,

who had succeeded Mr. Elphinstone in the Government of Bombay, issued a General Order expressive of the great satisfaction he derived from the success of “an experiment instituted with the view of reclaiming the Bheels from their wild and hitherto intractable habits.” “The Governor in Council,” the Order proceeded to state:—

“Has marked with peculiar interest the progress of this Corps to its present state of efficiency; for the prejudices, mistrust, and uncivilized habits of the Bheels, opposed no ordinary obstacle to its formation and organization, especially in the earliest stage of recruiting. But the able manner in which these obstacles have been surmounted by Lieutenant Outram, who raised and commands the Corps, has amply justified the confidence reposed in him by the Governor in Council, in selecting him to undertake this task, which could only have been brought to its present successful result by a peculiar combination of firmness and kindness of temper, and perseverance on the part of the officer to whom so important and delicate a charge was assigned.

“The valuable testimony contained in Colonel Campbell’s report, with regard to the discipline, interior arrangements, and general efficiency of the Bheel Corps, affords the Governor in Council the highest satisfaction; and he cannot give a fuller proof of the confidence he reposes in this singularly-formed Corps, than in now authorizing its details to be employed in relieving the regular troops from some of the numerous and important outposts throughout Candeish, in such manner and to such extent as may

be considered expedient by the local authority of the district."

But, prior to the promulgation of this order, the Candeish authorities had, on their own responsibility, given effect to the measures which it sanctioned. Writing on the 18th January 1828, Mr. Giberne reported that, "immediately after the Review, the Corps broke up into detachments, and marched to relieve many of the posts occupied by the regulars." "Their extreme readiness" (he added) "and good-will to proceed upon this duty was truly gratifying; 360 are now on detachment and escort duty. Many of the unhealthy posts have been taken by them, thus rendering the force at the head-quarters of the district much more efficient. . . . The suspicion of what was to be their destiny, which, until lately, appeared to hang like a cloud on many a willing mind, has passed away, on their now finding themselves employed in a trustworthy and honourable duty. The most pleasing accounts have been received from the outposts; Bheels, who not long ago shunned and feared the idea of enlisting, are now most ready and anxious to come forward. . . . The deserving merits of Lieutenant Outram," &c. &c.

And on the 1st of January 1829, the same functionary reported of the Corps that:—

"Its services have, during the past year, been actively and continually employed either in pursuing these foreign marauders, or escorting prisoners, and on outpost duty in many of the wildest of our borders, opposing a front for the purpose of checking foreign aggressions. They have invariably shown a willing-

ness and readiness to act when called upon—ever on the alert—and anxious to obey the commands of their officers. In introducing *the discipline of a regular Corps*, a remedy has been at once applied to the root of all their evil, wild, and lawless habits, by which the latter have been completely arrested. Intoxication—a state they envied—has now, I may state, been thoroughly overcome; not an instance has occurred for a length of time. Not even the most trifling complaint against any one member of the Corps has been made to me during the past year. Government has thus obtained the services and labours of a body of men who had troubled the repose of the former as well as of the present administration. And to such lengths were their excesses carried, that the former Government looked alone to their extermination for repose, whereas the present, by their reformation, have added a strength to their executive power which few could have anticipated. Lieutenant Outram is respected, admired, and loved by the Bheels under him; at any future time, should a breach of the peace be attempted by the turbulent, I am satisfied that the services of this officer and his Corps will be of the greatest benefit.”

Nor were the anticipations of this warm friend and energetic promoter of Bheel reform destined to remain long unfulfilled. For, early in 1830, the Bheel Corps had an opportunity of displaying its soldierly qualities in the field; and it surpassed the expectations of even its most ardent friends.

“The DAUNG” is the name given to a strong, mountainous, and jungly country, dividing Candeish

from the Surat districts, and inhabited by a wild and, up to the date just specified, unsubdued race of Bheels, who preyed on the neighbouring British territory. Detachments of our Troops had, for years, been maintained on the frontier of the Daung;* but no effort had been made to conquer the tribes that occupied it; and any attempt to penetrate to their fastnesses had been avoided by Government, on account of the uncertain nature of the enterprise, and the proverbial unhealthiness of the country.

Lieutenant Outram, pledging the professional reputation he had already earned, and risking his future prospects on the success of his scheme, obtained permission to lead a force into the Daung. The expedition consisted of the Bheel Corps, detachments from four Native Regiments of the Line, a portion of the Poona Horse, and other Native auxiliaries. Within one month, all the Rajahs of the Daung (seven in number) were captured; their followers subdued; their whole country explored. And, in the achievement of these triumphs, the Bheel Corps took no slight or undistinguished part.

Sir John Malcolm was pleased publicly to record his thanks to Lieutenant Outram "for the zeal, activity, and judgment he had displayed on this occasion, to which is to be attributed the fortunate conclusion of the harassing service he has had to encounter." In a subsequent General Order, alluding to "the operations of Lieutenant Outram amid the wilds of Candeish," he observed that that officer "had

* On the Surat frontier, below the Ghauts; on the Candeish frontier above them.

had to encounter many difficulties which his local influence and personal character could alone have overcome ;” and he directed the attention of the Army to him and his friend Captain Mackintosh (of the Ahmednugger Local Corps) as “ examples of what may be effected by officers who add to knowledge of their duty as soldiers, acquaintance with the habits, prejudices, and languages of the natives ; and who, by conciliatory conduct to all ranks, secure their confidence, and are thus enabled to effect objects which, by military force alone, they could never accomplish.”*

The Bheel Corps continued steadily to increase in efficiency and reputation. And on the 1st of January 1831, Mr. Boyd, Mr. Giberne’s successor in the Civil control of Candeish, reported that it had “ within itself such a number of influential persons connected, or intimately acquainted with, every Chief, or Tribe of any importance in Candeish, that (provided a Bheel culprit remains in the Province) his name and

* The thanks of Government were communicated to “ the officers and troops serving under Lieut. Outram ” in the Daung expedition. There were thirteen officers ; their names I have, unfortunately, been unable to obtain. But the nature of the country in which they operated may be surmised, when it is mentioned that *everyone was seized with jungle fever*. Three or four died ; and the rest were obliged to fly from Candeish,—some to England, some to the Cape, some to the Neilgherries. Outram alone, of all the Europeans, escaped ; and it may be of use to some of the readers of this volume, to mention that his immunity on this, as on other occasions when he alone, of his party, resisted the malaria, seems attributable to his having made a point of covering his head and face with fine gauze, whenever he slept in jungly countries. His companions in the Daung could not bear the irksomeness of the “ fever guard,” and they had to put up with a grievous alternative.

village only being made known to the Commandant of the Corps, his apprehension follows, almost to a certainty."

During the hot weather of 1831, "most alarming atrocities" were committed by the Turree Bheels and Pardies in the north-eastern districts of Candeish, instigated by bandit insurgents from the territories of Holcar and Scindia. Mr. Boyd accordingly requested Lieutenant Outram "to exert his endeavours to suppress the gangs;" and thus did he report to Government the manner in which the Bheel Commandant had acquitted himself of the task:—

"Lieutenant Outram proceeded with a small detachment of the Bheel Corps, only twenty-five in number, and with their sole assistance (together with the few district Police and Horse), in the course of one month, *ascertained, apprehended, and guarded those concerned to the number of four hundred and sixty-nine generally desperate characters—Turree Bheels and Pardies; selected one hundred and fifty-eight of the most guilty for punishment, and committed them for trial, for thirty gang robberies, with such full and clear evidence, that all but eight were convicted and sentenced.*"

It is probably no exaggeration to say that these feats have been rarely paralleled; and it would seem that they were the means of averting the necessity of extensive military operations. For, in another communication to Government, the Chief Magistrate, after alluding to "the complete and satisfactory success of Lieutenant Outram's measures,"—"the judgment with which they were taken,"—and "the singular prompti-

tude and decision with which they were executed,"—proceeded to express his opinion that :—

“ If the numerous gangs, now apprehended and dispersed, had succeeded in baffling Lieutenant Outram’s exertions, they would no doubt have collected in the Vindhya Mountains, and have been certainly joined by more discontented persons from the Dhaung, Nimar, &c. than, even with considerable military assistance, in such a country, we would have found it easy to subdue.”*

As the pacification of Candeish advanced, fewer opportunities of distinguishing themselves were afforded to the Bheel Corps. And the last occasion of displaying their qualities as soldiers occurred in May 1833, when the Bheels of the Vindhya range broke out into insurrection, and commenced depredations, of a formidable character, on both sides of

* The compiler has taken the liberty of altering the name of the mountains alluded to in this and one or two of the following despatches from *Sathpoora* to *Vindhya*, at the suggestion of an eminent oriental scholar and geographer, to whom he is indebted for the following note :—“ The three great ranges of hills, separating Malwa from the Deccan, are collectively called, in the Puranas, Vindhya. But the term is specifically applied to the greatest of the ranges—that which separates the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda — Candeish (which means a clift, or hollow, or great valley), lying south of the Vindhya range and the Nerbudda, and being bounded on the south by the Ajunta range. The range of the right bank, and therefore to the north of the Nerbudda, is not the Vindhya proper, and, in fact, is nothing more than the flank of the table-land of Malwa. The central range, or real Vindhya, you call Sathpoora, which is a modern name. All three ranges converge towards Booranpoor, and are then continued in the Govedghur range, or Gondwana.”

the mountains—in Candeish and in the valley of the Nerbudda.

The subjugation of the insurgents was confided to Lieutenant (who had now become Captain) Outram. With a portion of the Bheel Corps, aided by detachments of Bengal troops from Mhow, and Bombay troops from Malligaum (all of whom were placed under his command), he drove the enemy from their haunts in the Vindhya Mountains; chased them across the Nerbudda; compelled their submission; and captured their chief.

On receiving a report of these proceedings from the Chief Magistrate of Candeish, Government instructed their Secretary to write as follows :—

“ I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, with its enclosure, and in expressing to you the great satisfaction of Government at the successful termination of the expedition undertaken against the insurgent Bheels, between the Vindhya and the Nerbudda, to request you will communicate to Captain Outram the high sense which Government entertain of his ability and judgment in concerting,—and of his zeal and activity in executing,—those measures by which the insurrection has been suppressed, and the neighbouring parts of the province of Candeish, preserved from plunder.” *

From this date, Candeish remained so tranquil under the able Civil and Political officers entrusted with its administration, that the Bheel Corps were not

* The thanks of Government were also communicated to the officers who served under Captain Outram,—Lieutenants Hart and Partridge, Ensigns Morris and Renny, and Jemadar Alliar Khan.

again called on to perform any military services of a striking nature. And their commandant's labours were thenceforth of a routine character. But it may not be amiss to observe that his "routine" duties were neither few nor trivial. Besides having to maintain the efficiency and discipline of the Bheel Corps—which was scattered over the country on outpost service and in expeditionary and convoy detachments—he was entrusted with the command of the division of the Poona Horse then stationed in Candeish. He had much to do in his capacity of magistrate. He was further invested with important functions as "Bheel Agent," and "Thug Agent." And, in the discharge of these multifarious duties, his presence was in requisition, and his influence exerted, in every district of the province; often far beyond its limits.

Towards the end of September in 1835, his services were required by Government for the pacification of another troubled country. He accordingly bade adieu to the singular corps which it had been his privilege and pride to organize and command; and he handed it over, 900 strong, and in a state of high efficiency, to his friend Captain Graham, in whose (and his successors') hands it has continued to maintain the reputation it so early, and worthily achieved. Outram's Bheel Corps has served as the model on which many others have been subsequently organized in India. And the present writer has reason to believe that,—had the suggestions of Sir George Arthur received that attention which seems due to the opinions of one of the most experienced and distinguished Colonial Administrators that England possesses,—the courage, sagacity, firmness and

conciliatory skill which converted the Bheels of Can-deish into "the protectors of that peace they had so long disturbed," would in all probability, long ere this, have given tranquillity to the Cape settlements, and provided the Colonists with an efficient frontier Police, organized from amongst the savages who now perplex and scourge them.

The nature of these "Memoranda" has necessarily precluded their compiler from noticing the valuable assistance rendered to the cause of Bheel Civilization by Colonel Ovans, Mr. Graham, Majors Graham, Rigby, Morris, and others. The services of these gentlemen will find their due recognition in every faithful history of "the Civilization of the Bheels." But the foregoing pages profess to contain no more than a rapid and very brief sketch of some of the successful efforts of one who bore no unimportant, or undistinguished part, in that wonderful reformation. It is not, however, superfluous to add that Outram himself has, at all times, been prompt to acknowledge the merits and services of the officers above enumerated; and that he has ever retained in grateful recollection the generous encouragement, and the moral and official aid he received from Colonel Robertson, Messrs. Bax, Giberne, and Boyd, but for whom his difficulties would have been of a truly disheartening nature.

III.

SERVICES IN THE MAHEE KANTA.

1835—1838.

THE distracted condition of the Mahee Kânta,—a province of Guzerat bordering on Malwa and Meywar,—had, for fifteen years, been a source of much anxiety both to the Bombay Government and the Court of Directors. Continuous mismanagement, on the part of its local officers, had at length brought it into a state of almost universal insurrection; and the British troops had sustained reverses which, in so strong a country, and amidst so warlike a population, it had been found difficult to retrieve. To quote the words of the Court of Directors :—

“Disorder had progressively increased, instead of diminishing, until at length, by the confession of all the local authorities, neither natives nor British officers could travel between Deesa and Ahmedabad without a strong escort. Our officers were subject to continual insult and ill-treatment, for which no reparation could be obtained; and the respect for the British name and character in that part of Guzerat was lower than at any former period.”*

* “Deesa” is evidently a clerical mistake. “Sadra” is pro-

Such was the country for the pacification of which Sir Robert Grant, who had now succeeded to the government of Bombay, put Captain Outram's services in requisition. That officer was directed to proceed to the theatre of outrage, and to report on the steps by which peace and order could best be re-established, and permanently maintained. And so urgent was this duty considered, that, deadly as were the jungles that lay in his way, he was obliged to start on his mission in the beginning of October—the sickliest season of the year.

Crossing the pestiferous Vindhya range, following the course of the Nerbudda, and traversing the Barriah jungle, through which no European had been known to pass in autumn without paying the forfeit of his life, he reached his destination; visited Hursole, and the petty courts of the Rajahs of Edur and Ahmednuggur; and, returning by Deesa and

bably the town indicated in the foregoing quotation. But as “Deesa” occurs in the copy of the Court's Despatch lying before him, the compiler has not ventured to make any hypothetical alteration in the text. In the Despatch here quoted from, the Court of Directors, while condemning the local officers who had successively (for fifteen years) mismanaged the Mahee Kânta, made special and honourable exemption of Mr. John Pollard Willoughby. But that able Indian functionary had been removed, by promotion, to a high appointment in the Government Secretariate ere time was afforded him to make any decided impression on the country; and the good he effected had been more than neutralized by the subsequent mismanagement of six years, which preceded Captain Outram's mission. Such readers as may not have been in India, are informed that the Mahee Kânta (or the littoral of the River Mahee) is pronounced as if it were written Mye-Caunta.

Ahmedabad, arrived in Bombay in December, when he proceeded to submit his views to Government.

That many of the insurgent chiefs laboured under real, and very serious grievances, he had little doubt. And he was desirous that every complaint should be patiently investigated; that ample redress should be afforded, wherever wrong had been sustained; and that the harsh and coercive policy, hitherto pursued with such signal unsuccess, should be replaced by one of gentleness and conciliation. But, at the same time, he deemed it of the utmost consequence to satisfy the rebels that the conciliatory measures which he advised were not inspired by fear, or by a sense of our inability to enforce obedience. Keeping in view the disastrous results of the efforts that had hitherto been made to reduce the insurgents, and the daring and unchastised insolence with which our troops had been treated, he was of opinion that submission should be demanded as a preliminary to the investigation of alleged grievances. And by the adoption of energetic and decisive military measures against the most powerful of the chiefs who might obstinately refuse to lay down their arms, he proposed to awe the rest into obedience, to restore our tarnished military prestige, and thus to place the Government in a position to display clemency, without incurring the suspicion of weakness.

These views were not fully concurred in by the Government. Sir Robert Grant was—if the expression may be used consistently with the profound respect due to the memory of so great and good a man—an exaggerated embodiment of the “Peace” principle;

and tender-hearted to excess. Full of sympathy for men whom harsh measures, and a denial of inquiry into their claims had driven to arms, he took not into account the demoralization which a decade and a half of lawlessness had effected in them. He had seen a purely conciliatory policy successful in another province of Guzerat; and, overlooking the difference in the condition of the two countries, he assumed that the measures which, under the masterly management of Major Walker, Captain Barnewell, and Mr. Willoughby, had given peace to Kattywar and Rajpeempla, must necessarily suffice for the tranquillization of the Mahee Kânta. He relied on professions of love, and promises of justice, to pacify semi-barbarians, who, exasperated by severity, and weary of making vain appeals for justice, had for years been in a state of open insurrection—devastating the country with fire and sword, assailing and insulting British officers with impunity, and mocking the military efforts made for their coercion. Nay, so confident was this estimable and benevolent governor of the omnipotence of gentle speech and singleness of purpose, that he actually diminished the strength of the force which had already found itself inadequate to control the insurgents; though Captain Outram had recommended that it should be temporarily increased, not necessarily for employment, but for purposes of demonstration.*

* That the Government of Sir Robert Grant failed to recognize the difference between the condition of Kattywar, and that of the Mahee Kânta, was distinctly implied by the Court of Directors, in the despatch in which they informed him that they gave a pre-

In January 1836, Captain Outram was again despatched to the Mahee Kânta, charged with the duty of re-establishing order, but instructed to modify his original plans so as to meet the more pacific views of Government.

Earnestly did he endeavour to fulfil these incompatible requirements. But, despite his anxiety to avoid the application of force, he found himself constrained to employ it. The arrogance and audacity of the Rebel Chiefs (whom our past failures had fully satisfied of our inability to coerce them) derived increased force from the policy which aspired to miti-

ference to the views of Captain Outram, who objected to the introduction into the latter country of the judicial machinery which had been found suitable for the former. That the excessive lenity of Sir Robert Grant, and his undue application to all men of that Christian charity of which he was himself a "living epistle,"—"thinking no evil . . . believing all things, hoping all things, enduring all things"—led to serious and lamentable consequences, will be readily admitted by all who may take the trouble to read the earlier portion of Colonel Outram's "KHUTPUT REPORT," contained in the Baroda Blue Book, page 1340 to 1484. That Sir Robert's ultra-peace policy went beyond the wishes of the Court of Directors, was practically admitted by that body, who subsequently observed that they "never thought the pacification of the Mahee Kânta a thing to be accomplished without the exhibition, and occasional employment of force." "We wished," they observed, "that persuasion should be first employed ; but, that while terms were offered, troops should be also set in motion ; that not our power alone, nor our justice alone, but both at once, should be made manifest ; while even when it became necessary to use force, all due allowances should be made for the refractory — when taken, they should be treated with lenity rather than severity." As will be seen, such were the maxims on which Outram sought to base his policy and proceedings.

gate their hostility by diminishing the military resources available for their control. And, after vain attempts to bring one of the most influential of them to reason—but not till he had warned him of the certain results of his contumacy—Outram proclaimed him an outlaw, and called in the aid of his friend Captain (now Colonel) David Forbes, the gallant and able soldier then in command of the Mahee Kânta Field Detachments.

Following the outlawed Sooruj-Mull into the mountains which divide Guzerat from Meywar, these officers established their Head-Quarters in the very centre of the strongholds which the Rebels had hitherto deemed impregnable. And, penetrating fastness after fastness, till their wearied and disheartened foe submitted, they gave a new and salutary complexion to our military relations with the country. The clemency and proffered redress of all his grievances, which Sooruj-Mull had scorned, as begot of conscious weakness, he now gratefully accepted as the offspring of his victor's generosity. And his brother chiefs read in his abasement, and subsequent reception into favour, a lesson which they were not slow to profit by.

But, gratifying, beyond even Outram's anticipations, as were the results of his energetic measures, and truly merciful as events proved this early application of force to have been, it was viewed with disfavour by the Government. They deemed it inconsistent with the purely conciliatory policy they had prescribed; and they characterized it as unnecessarily severe.

They, however, congratulated Outram "on so for-

fortunate a result of his spirited, though, in their opinion, somewhat harsh proceedings ;” and they admitted that “ the plan had been executed with a skill and decision worthy of Captains Outram and Forbes.” Expressing their “ hope that good might arise out of evil,” they declared their willingness “ that Captain Outram’s success should be ascribed not to his instructions but to his departure from them, provided only that the spirit of the instructions were henceforth carried into effect.” And, in modification of their censure, they added that, “ with the exception of the outlawry of Sooruj-Mull, the whole of Captain Outram’s proceedings reflect on him the highest credit, and entitle him to the warmest commendation of Government.”

But Outram, conscious that he had, throughout, acted in the *spirit* of his instructions, and with an earnest desire to reduce the application of force to the lowest practicable minimum, respectfully remonstrated against a reproof which, though slight, he felt to be unjust. And the Political Commissioner, to whom was confided the general superintendence and control of Guzerat, thus expressed himself, in handing up the remonstrance :—

“ In the situation I now fill,—both with reference to the talented officer whose despatch I now forward and the Government,—I cannot hesitate to state my opinion that I consider his conduct, under circumstances of great difficulty, as peculiarly adapted to the end in view. His firm and active measures combined (be it said, with all deference to the opinions of superior authority) with *conduct conciliatory to the very verge of excess*, entitle him to the warmest commendation.”

In reply to this communication, the Political Commissioner was directed to assure Captain Outram that he greatly erred if he supposed that he had lost the confidence of Government; that “the confidence of Government as it was not lightly given would not be lightly withdrawn.” “And,”—thus proceeded the letter:—

“The Right Hon. the Governor in Council trusts that Captain Outram will go on cheerfully under the conviction that, though Government may dissent from his judgment in some points, it entertains the firmest general reliance on his zeal, enterprise, and sagacity; and confidently anticipates from his efforts under Providence, the ultimate achievement of one of its most important and favourite objects—the civilization of the Mahee Kânta.”

In a few days, the Government again addressed the Political Commissioner, directing him to inform Captain Outram that the fuller information of which they were then possessed, induced them to qualify materially the opinions they had previously expressed regarding the outlawry of Sooruj-Mull. They characterized as “*very remarkable*” the success with which Outram had gained the confidence of his defeated foe; “*and still more remarkable*” did they pronounce the impression which his combination of energetic and conciliatory measures had “produced on the minds of the people in general.” They viewed with satisfaction, and bright auguries of the future, “his efforts to pacify and conciliate the troubled and long mismanaged country in which he was serving;” and they begged to assure him that “the Govern-

ment which had declaredly selected him for his present post on account of the qualifications displayed by him in Candeish, was of opinion that, so far as his opportunities had allowed, the selection had already been in no small degree justified."

This letter was dated the 26th May 1836; just four months after he had been called on to give repose to a land that, for fifteen years, had been the theatre of outrage. On the 16th of June, the Government had again occasion to express their approbation of the manner in which Captain Outram acquitted himself of his difficult duties,—“strictly fulfilling his instructions, while, at the same time, maintaining the consistency of his own proceedings.” And, from time to time, they continued to render most gratifying tributes to his “judicious proceedings”—the “characteristic energy and effect” of his measures—his “judgment and discretion”—the “merciful” spirit of his arrangements—his “humane and judicious orders,” &c. &c. &c. To only one of his undertakings did they strongly object. And it may not be amiss to describe the censured measure, illustrating, as its sequel does, a singular feature in Outram’s career—the facility with which he invariably gains the confidence and affection of his conquered enemies, and the total absence of animosity displayed towards him by those—princes or people—whom he has found himself compelled to coerce, or punish. The circumstances were these:—

Early in 1837, the Chieftain of Aglore, a Guicowar subject in successful rebellion against his own Sovereign, established his head-quarters at the fortified

village of Runseepoor, situated on the very line of the British border. Separated from the Mahee Kânta only by the river Saburmuttee, he sent his emissaries among the Kholis of that province; and a rapid extension of the rebellion throughout our own territories was only averted by the promptitude with which Captain Outram proceeded to the frontier, and taking up a strong position within his own boundaries, adopted measures to prevent further intercourse between the insurgents and the people of the Mahee Kânta. In reporting to Government the precautionary arrangements he had made, he announced that the Commander-in-Chief of the Guicowar Army, feeling himself inadequate to the subjugation of the rebels, had earnestly implored our assistance. He solicited the early instructions of Government as to compliance or non-compliance with this request; intimating, at the same time, that while a successful insurrection was extending along our frontier, he could not calculate on the continuance of tranquillity amongst the still unsettled inhabitants of the Mahee Kânta, who were related to the insurgents by tribe—many of them by consanguinity. And he described the difficulties of his position to be such that, if by a certain date (which afforded sufficient time for an answer to his despatch), he was not prohibited from doing so, he would deem it his duty to co-operate with the Guicowar General, for the suppression of the outbreak.

Owing to some official accident, never satisfactorily explained, a delay occurred in placing this letter before Council. No answer, therefore, was received; and as the Political Commissioner had negatively sanctioned the

measure, Outram arranged with the Commander-in-Chief of the Guicowar Army, to make a combined attack on Runseepoor. After a stout resistance on the part of the insurgents, their position was carried; many were slain; the rest were dispersed; their leaders were captured; and the tranquillity of the Mahee Kânta was preserved.

The measure was however condemned by the Bombay Government. They considered that it was wrong to aid our ally in coercing his subjects, while we had no guarantee that their grievances would be investigated, or redressed. They did not feel inclined to make much allowance for the difficult position of the officer whom they held responsible for maintaining the peace of an imperfectly tranquillized, and highly inflammable country, and who saw all his efforts in risk of frustration, from the inducements to revolt held out to his people by the successful frontier outrages of their relatives, and tribal friends—men, who, whatever may have been their grievances, were self-constituted outlaws, spreading terror and desolation over the land. And, in reporting the circumstance to the Court of Directors, the Government, through their Chief Secretary, wrote as follows;—

“Capt. Outram, I am desired to observe, is regarded by Government as one of the first military officers under this Presidency. Being full of courage, resource, activity, and intelligence, at those periods when the British power was struggling for existence or for empire, he would have acted a brilliant part; but his fault is, that, *though perfectly fitted for the performance of civil duties*, he is essentially warlike. The capture of

Runseepoor was of easy accomplishment ; yet, so far as was compatible with operations on so minute a scale, those of Capt. Outram were, in the opinion of Government, perfect both in conception and execution ; and deeply do they regret that his great military talents should have been exercised on such a field."

On receiving the Despatch from which the foregoing quotation is taken, the Court of Directors deemed it their duty to prohibit the further employment of Captain Outram in the Mahee Kânta—"under the belief that his longer presence would keep alive feelings of mutual distrust and animosity amongst the parties concerned in these unfortunate transactions." But ampler information led the Court of Directors to modify their opinions.* On "*the earnest recommendation*" of the Indian authorities, and influenced by "the ample evidence now added to that already possessed of Captain Outram's extraordinary fitness for at least the executive part of the duty of re-establishing order and tranquillity in a country like the Mahee Kânta,"—the Directors withdrew their prohibition. And, in doing so, they acknowledged that NO "feelings of mutual distrust and animosity" had been excited "*even while the transactions were recent*"; and that the reports of the Government contained satisfactory evidence "*of the great confidence reposed in Captain*

* The Court, indeed, declared that "of Captain Outram's views they still entertained the same opinion." But on reference to the note at the foot of page 39, it will be seen that the views of the Court were, in reality, much more in harmony with those of Outram, than with those of Sir R. Grant.

Outram by all classes in the Mahee Kânta, and of the general feeling of respect which, through his exertions, is now entertained in that country for the British Government." The despatch proceeded :—

"That your disposition to grant terms to the outlaws was at first misconstrued, and imputed to inability to coerce them, is a result which might have been expected from former experience. The false impression it is admitted is now at an end. To have removed it so speedily is honourable, in the highest degree, to Captain Outram's talents and energy ; nor do we doubt that it could only have been effected (as he states) by most arduous personal exertions on his own part, and on that of his able assistant Lieut. Wallace."*

So successful had been these exertions that, in June 1838—little more than two years after undertaking the pacification of the province—Captain Outram was, to "the high satisfaction of Government . . . *enabled to dispense with the services of the Troops in the Mahee Kânta.*"

This reformation had been effected, as the Court of Directors subsequently observed, "*without taking a single life—except in the field, or depriving a single person of his estate.*" And its beneficial effects were experienced far beyond the sphere of Captain Outram's official authority. Thus in March 1839, the Judicial

* Now Captain Wallace, of the 18th Regt. N. I. This valuable officer afterwards earned high distinction in the Political department of Sind ; subsequently he became Political Agent in the Mahee Kânta ; and recently his services have been obtained for the general superintendence of the magisterial and Police arrangements of Western India.

Commissioner, in reporting to Government “the highly satisfactory and surprisingly tranquil and peaceable” state of the Ahmedabad districts during the preceding year, and their unwonted freedom from plunderers, remarked that he could not—

“Ascribe this to any improvement in the Police, for its stipendiary and hereditary servants are the same, and their inefficiency has lately been reported, and a radical change proposed by Mr. Jackson. . . . It is, then, to other causes we must turn; and there can be little doubt that these may be traced to the excellent arrangements, and judicious proceedings of Captain Outram, Political Agent in the Mahee Kânta.”

The officer who could point to such results of his administration, was doubtless well entitled to the following eulogium from his superiors;—

“On the occasions on which he acted on his own responsibility, and received the commendation of Government, he has shown how judicious was the selection which placed him, from the experience of his most valuable services in Candeish, in the office of Political Agent for the Mahee Kânta. But if his energy and prompt decision have been often important in their consequences, *not less have his execution of instructions varying from his own impressions of what was best, and his scrupulous obedience, when unexpected events did not call for his assuming the responsibility of action.* The confidence of Government in the influence of this principle, not unfrequently recorded, . . . will be particularly pointed out to the Honourable Court as showing the very high opinion entertained of Captain Outram’s military and political character.”

Little do the people of England understand the multiform, onerous, and incessant duties that devolve on Indian officials—the amount of miscellaneous but accurate information they are required to gather and apply—the versatility of talent demanded of them. Extensive as are the requirements made on all our Indian functionaries, those exacted from the class of officers designated “Political Agents,” are such as almost to surpass belief. And the compiler of these “Memoranda” hopes, at no distant date, by a narrative of the progress of Civilization in the Provinces of Candeish, Kattywar, and the Mahee Kânta, to draw attention to the amount of administrative industry, energy, and talent, that is lost to this country and the colonies, by the disinclination of Her Majesty’s Government to employ the retired political officers of the East India Company, on Imperial services.

In the mean time, he can but briefly glance at a few of the more important of the functions discharged by Captain Outram, during the two and a half years he was engaged (to borrow the words of the Court of Directors) “in tranquillizing a country so long in a state of disorder—establishing a sense both of the power and of the justice of the British Government—and removing evils which length of time had rendered almost inveterate.”

As a magistrate, he had an amount of work to perform, the recital of which would cause surprise to all whose ideas of magisterial duties are derived from attendance on the police courts of this country. And for “the unremitting and laborious exertions” which

he made in this department of the public service, he received the warm commendations of Government.

Faithful to his promise to examine into and redress the wrongs of the Mahee Kânta chiefs, he undertook many delicate and intricate judicial investigations. And it was intimated to him by Government, that “the eminently successful results of these labours—the temper, skill, and patience of his investigation of claims and grievances—had often been brought to the favourable notice of the Honourable Court.”

Not satisfied with redressing the wrongs of those whom he had prohibited from taking the law into their own hands, he applied himself to their extrication from those pecuniary embarrassments which, originating in their former lawless habits, still kept them in bondage to usurers, and tempted them to oppress their subjects. Ere this could be effected, it was necessary to institute many intricate financial inquiries, and to elucidate the origin, trace the history, and investigate the practical results of several mischievous financial arrangements. And the Political Commissioner was directed, in 1838, to “convey to Captain Outram the high approbation of Government for the attention he had bestowed on this subject, and for the ability he had displayed in bringing to notice the ruinous effects of the present Nisha system.”

The establishment in the Mahee Kânta of regular tribunals for the administration of justice was another subject that occupied his attention. His views in reference to this matter differed somewhat from those of the Government, and were honoured with the preference of the Court of Directors.

In co-operation with Colonel Spiers, the active and able Political Agent for the neighbouring provinces of Meywar and Malwa, he applied himself to the settlement of the border feuds which had for long rendered that part of the country impassable to merchants and travellers. And by the conjoint labours of these two earnest officers, the roads were re-opened—arrangements were made with the various chiefs for the encouragement of traffic—full protection was secured to caravans—the transit duties were reduced—and a great annual Fair was established. For these not unimportant contributions to the cause of commerce, and the extension of civilization, Colonel Spiers and Captain Outram were warmly praised, and cordially thanked, by the Bombay Government, the Governor-General, and the Court of Directors.

As this little volume professes to give only a few “memoranda,” and not a detailed account of his services, it were out of place to enter into a more minute recital of Captain Outram’s performances in the Mahee Kânta ; but it may not be amiss to observe that, during his brief career in that province, his activity and persuasive abilities were called into requisition for the benefit of districts lying beyond his jurisdiction. One example shall suffice :—

The success of the Bheel Corps had suggested to Government the propriety of raising an analogous body from amongst the Kholis of Guzerat—a race that had hitherto proved nearly as intractable as the Bheels of Candeish—and Captain Leckie, who has since earned distinction as a political officer, was nominated as its Commandant. But though the corps was

destined for service in the Ahmedabad and Kaira districts, its organization was directed to be effected under Captain Outram's superintendence, from amongst the recently rebellious Kholis of the Mahee Kânta. And the latter officer received the cordial acknowledgments of Government for the manner in which he had promoted and facilitated the formation of the corps, and for the success with which he had influenced his own Kholi chiefs to persuade their kinsmen and clansmen, not merely to enlist, but to submit to discipline.

Not satisfied with having, from time to time, given utterance to his appreciation of Captain Outram's merits, Sir Robert Grant expressed himself as follows, in a Minute in Council, recorded on the 17th July 1838:—

“There is an exhibition of talent, and energy, and devotion to the service, in Captain Outram, which will not fail to be justly estimated by the Honourable Court; and in an officer who can appeal to the consequences of his measures, is creditable to the feelings which have actuated him in all his arduous duties. The success which has attended him in the pacification of the Mahee Kânta, he truly urges, has been effected by these exertions, ‘under the blessing of Heaven, on the humane intentions of the British Government.’”

And Sir Robert's colleague in Council, Mr. (now Sir George) Anderson, the present Governor of Ceylon, endorsed these remarks with the following additional minute:—

“I would beg to record that, in the short time I have been in the Government, I have observed in the despatches of Captain Outram great talent, and a mind

evidently earnestly engaged in carrying out measures for the welfare and tranquillization of the disturbed country committed to his charge."

Circumstances had occurred which gave unusual value to these testimonials.

In the course of his Judicial investigations, Captain Outram discovered the general prevalence of a system, which, under the designation of "KHUTPUT," has recently excited considerable sensation and scandal in Western India.*

He ascertained that a general belief pervaded all classes of the community that, by means of intrigues at the Presidency, the arrangements of the local officers could be upset—their judgments reversed—corrupt or incompetent native officials restored to the situations of which they had been deprived—and even convicted criminals released from punishment. He found that every post in the Political establishments of Guzerat, had become filled by members of the Nagur (or Snake) division of Brahmins, who, trading on this dishonouring and mischievous belief, had a direct interest in exciting discontent—in stimulating litigation—and in perpetuating those feuds which had spread terror, rapine, and bloodshed, over the land. And what grieved him most was the conviction, which could not be set aside, that the Government had itself, by a mistaken lenity, rivetted the belief in "Khutput" on the minds of the people. Over and over again had they discouraged inquiry into the alleged misconduct of native officials; over and over again had they set aside, as inconclusive,

* "*Making Khutput (illicit action) in Bombay.*" The term is a Mahratta one.

evidence which their Political and Judicial Officers deemed completely satisfactory ; often had they put in extenuatory pleas in behalf of the accused ; and when, at length, compelled to convict, they awarded punishments singularly mild.

Earnestly did Outram struggle against the monstrous system of corruption, by which the Chiefs and their subjects were plundered, under the pretence that the money which they paid to the native harpies of the Political offices, reached the hands of the Bombay Authorities. Urgently and forcibly did he plead with the Government for a reversal of the lenient policy which, by giving an air of verisimilitude to the boasts made by the corruptionists of their secret understanding with high functionaries, brought unmerited dishonour on the rulers, and demoralized the people of the country. And he ceased not from his efforts till he had, by a laborious accumulation of evidence, left the Government no alternative but to convict and dismiss the leading Nagurs, whose guilt they had been so slow to admit.

In the course of these services, led away by the warmth of his zeal, and wielding a pen that had not been trained to euphuistic exercises, he not unfrequently employed language which some men might perhaps have felt inclined to resent as “disrespectful.” But it was Outram’s privilege to serve under statesmen who could appreciate him. The matter not the manner,—the gold and not “the guinea stamp,”—were looked at in those days. And the Government never dreamed of taking offence at the plain speaking of their subordinates, while satisfied that their words were the utter-

ances of full, and generous, and truthful hearts, and that they drew their inspiration from a jealous tenderness for the honour of the British name. Strong as was the language in which Captain Outram addressed his superiors, embarrassing the *facts* he pressed on their attention, and uncomplimentary the logical conclusions he drew from these facts, the Government continued, as has been seen, to place on public record the esteem and confidence they reposed in him ; and they honoured him in private with their friendship.*

In October 1838, Captain Outram having fully accomplished the task assigned to him in January 1836, requested permission to relinquish his political appointment, that he might (at a pecuniary sacrifice of upwards of £700 per annum) join the military expedition that was then being organized for the purpose of deposing Dost Mahommed, and restoring Shah Soojah to the throne of Affghanistan. The Government acceded to his request, and directed their Chief Secretary to address him as follows :—

“In complying with your application, however, Government cannot help feeling the great loss to the public service which your temporary absence from your present important duties in the Mahee Kânta will occasion, but being impressed with the high qualifications which you possess for rendering the most valuable services on an occasion like the present for which your zeal has now prompted you to offer yourself, the Go-

* A reference to Colonel Outram's Khutput Report, in the Baroda Blue Book, will show how much stronger was the language employed by him in 1838, than that which was assigned as a cause for his removal from the office of Resident at Baroda in 1851.

vernor in Council has not thought it right to withhold his acquiescence in your wishes.

“I am further desired to inform you that your application has been brought to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, who, it is doubted not, will duly appreciate the laudable motives which have actuated you on this occasion.”*

And the Political Commissioner, under whose eye Captain Outram had more immediately served, and through whom this communication was transmitted, wrote in the following terms :—

“It is with feelings of unfeigned concern that I learn we are to lose the benefit of your most valuable services in the Mahee Kânta; particularly so, when, after a highly judicious management of a country in complete disorder at the time of your taking charge, your measures for its prosperity are coming to maturity. Much as I regret your departure, I beg you will accept of my best wishes for the promotion of your views in the new sphere of action into which your zeal for the service has led you; and where I feel confident the exercise of these qualifications for Government will ensure you the respect and esteem of those under whom you may be called upon to serve.”

* October 27th, 1838. In consequence of the death of Sir R. Grant, the Government of Bombay had then devolved on the Honourable Mr. Farish.

III.

SERVICES DURING THE INVASION OF
AFFGHANISTAN.

1838--1839.

ON the 21st November, 1838, the Bombay Division of the Army destined for the invasion of Affghanistan under Sir John Keane,* sailed from Bombay *en route* to Sind; and on the 27th it reached the Hujamry mouth of the Indus, in the confident expectation of being able, without delay, to prosecute its onward march. But it was doomed to disappointment. The nature of its embarrassments, and the manner in which it was extricated from them, are explained in the following passage from Dr. Kennedy's interesting narrative:—†

“Our halt on the banks of the Indus was prolonged to December 24th, solely from the want of camels and boats, which had been promised to be ready against our arrival. These were not only not ready, but the local authorities at Kurrachee had prevented the merchants from sending 800 camels which they had

* On whose staff Outram occupied the post of Honorary Aide-de-camp.

† “Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Sind and Cabool, in 1838.” By Richard Hartley Kennedy, M.D.; late Chief of the Medical Staff of the Bombay Division of the Army of the Indus. Bentley, 1840.—pp. 63—64.

engaged. . . . The unparalleled activity and energies of Captain Outram had, however, been devoted in aid of those who ought to have foreseen and provided against these difficulties. He left the anchorage at the Hujamry, and proceeded to Mandavie, whence he travelled to Bhooj, and laboured at the Cutch Durbar to carry points which should neither have been left to this late hour, nor yet left to his management. Having surpassed all expectation in what he was able to effect, he re-embarked at Mandavie, and sailed to Kurrachee, where he landed; and, travelling across the country, rejoined us at Tatta.

“To him chiefly, if not entirely, was it to be attributed that on the 22nd (December), it was reported that a sufficient number of camels had been collected; and orders were given for the Army to advance, in two divisions.”*

The Army was, however, soon brought to a temporary stand-still; for the Ameers of Hydrabad viewed with natural irritation and alarm the intrusion on their soil of an imposing British force, and hesitated to accept the harsh and oppressive treaty which, regardless of existing solemn compacts, their unwelcome visitors now proffered to them at the point of the bayonet. But until the ratification of that treaty, the army could not advance beyond the Capital of Lower Sind; and as we were too conscious of our strength to waste much time in arguing on the justice of our requirements, an

* See also Kaye's "History of the War in Affghanistan," Vol. I., p. 395; and the "History of the War in Affghanistan," by an Officer of High Rank in the Indian Army, edited by Charles Nash, Esq., p. 122.

ultimatum was, on the 16th of January, communicated to the Sindian Princes, by Captain William Eastwick, as the Deputy of Sir Henry Pottinger, the British Representative at their Highnesses' Court.* It was deemed fitting that, on such an occasion, the diplomatist should be accompanied by a representative of the military chief, who was at hand to enforce his demands; and on Captain Outram it devolved to stand sponsor for the warlike resolves of Sir John Keane.

Powerless to resist, the intimidated Ameers signed the treaty; and on the 10th of February the Army resumed its march, to effect a junction with the two columns that were advancing from the north—the one under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton,—the other (the rabble “Contingent” of His Majesty Shah Sooja), ostensibly led by the King himself.

All three forces had many difficulties to contend with; their progress was slow, their privations numerous. And the hardships and sufferings of the Bombay Troops were greatly aggravated by the dishonesty of a native official, till Captain Outram brought him before a Military Court, and thus put a stop to malpractices that “fell heavily on the juniors of the officers, and ruinously on the native soldiers.”†

Though Outram had, to quote the words of Dr. Kennedy, “set the Army in motion,” by the energy and success with which he provided it with “car-

* Captain Eastwick is now an E. I. Director, and to his immortal honour, has availed himself of every opportunity of denouncing the wrongs of the unfortunate Ameers, and of urging their strong claims on us for sympathy and redress.

† Kennedy's Narrative, Vol I., p. 157.

riage,"* he could not prevent the camels from dying ; and such had been the mortality among these animals during the march, that, on reaching Upper Sind, Sir John Keane found it would be impossible for him to move his entire column up the Bolan Pass without an additional supply. This, it was supposed, could only be obtained by influencing the British Envoy (Sir William Macnaghten), who was in attendance on the King, to keep back a portion of Shah Sooja's highly-prized "Contingent," and transfer their camels to the Bombay Division. Such an arrangement, however, was only to be effected by adroit diplomacy ; for the self-complacency of His Majesty, and the official dignity of the Envoy, had been so seriously offended by the contempt for their unsoldierly levy, which Sir Willoughby Cotton undisguisedly evinced, and Sir John Keane barely affected to conceal, that Sir William Macnaghten, assuming a high tone, had insisted on a prominent place being given to the Shah, in the approaching operations.† And the Commander-in-Chief had cogent reasons for avoiding a rupture with the British Plenipotentiary. He therefore resolved to go through the form of offering a thousand of his own insufficient herd of camels for the use of the Contingent ; but he determined, at the same time, that the reverse arrangement should be carried out, if by skilful management it could be effected.

Shah Sooja and Sir William Macnaghten were 90

* The term used in India to designate the means of transporting stores and ammunition, whether carts, elephants, camels, horses, &c. &c.

† Vide Kaye's War in Affghanistan, Vol. I. p. 412.

miles off. And even if the delicate negotiations contemplated could have been conducted by letter, they brooked neither the delay, nor the risk of interruption attendant on epistolary correspondence, in a country utterly destitute of postal establishments, and overrun by marauders. It was necessary, therefore, that Sir John Keane should detach to the Shah's camp some officer in whose zeal, tact, and conciliatory talents he could repose confidence; and Captain Outram was selected for the service.

The duty confided to him he performed with a success beyond even the anticipations of his chief, who received, from Sir W. Macnaghten, a supply of camels more than double in number those he had offered for the use of the Shah's Contingent. And so favourable an impression did Outram make on the Envoy, that the latter invited him to take office on the Political Staff of the Expedition. But though grateful for Sir William's offer, Outram declined withdrawing himself from the Military Department while there remained a prospect of active operations in the field.

No sooner had he rejoined the Head Quarters of the Army, than he was called on to release Sir John Keane from another, and somewhat uncomfortable, embarrassment. On reaching Larkhana, the Cutch camelmen—between two and three thousand in number—had struck work. Threats, promises, expostulations, and entreaties, were all equally in vain. They positively refused to march another stage; and those who have campaigned in the East require not to be told what it is to have to deal with recusant camel-drivers in an unfriendly country. For four days were these refractory

characters, on whose aid and fidelity so much depended, unsuccessfully appealed to,—now in tones of intimidation, now in terms of cajolery. Matters became serious; and, at last, Outram was called in to quell the mutiny. By his stern determination, he did so effectually; and the camelmen did not again venture to dispute orders. They found they had one to deal with who never indulged in a threat which he was not prepared to execute.

Tedious continued to be the advance towards the Bolan Pass. Further negotiations had from time to time to be conducted with the Envoy; and to Outram were they entrusted, until he met with an accident, which it was, at one time, feared might permanently incapacitate him for the active duties of his profession.

“On the morning of the 21st (March 1839),” writes Dr. Kennedy, “I had the melancholy satisfaction of thinking that I was not the most unlucky wight in the Bombay Column. On riding towards the new encampment, I was met by Captain Outram, who told me, in the most consolatory tone and terms he could devise, that one of my Camels, with all its load of baggage, had been carried off by thieves. This was no jest. . . Great indeed was my vexation; but before it was half digested, a clamour and rumour, as of some accident, were heard; and I soon discovered that poor Outram, as I galloped one way to inquire into the extent of my disaster, and he the other, had met with a most serious accident, his horse rolling headlong and crushing him in the fall. He was dashed to the ground with the hilt of his sword under him, and had suffered the very unusual injury of a fracture of the pelvis bone, at

the crest of the ilium. And thus in a moment, and in the midst of a distinguished career of important usefulness, was this valuable officer to be a bed-ridden cripple, and the Army to be deprived of his energetic virtues, and profound knowledge. I felt ashamed to have repined at the loss of some paltry property when, at the instant, a calamity so much more distressing was occurring to one so peculiarly situated."

Borne on a litter, Captain Outram proceeded with the Army; and after a month's confinement, he resumed his duties.

Sir John Keane met with no opposition till he reached Ghiznee. On the 23rd of July that Fortress was taken; and on the evening preceding its capture, Captain Outram had an opportunity of rendering some good service, which is thus alluded to by one of the Historians of the Affghan war:—

"While arrangements connected with the coming night's proceedings were occupying the mind of the Commander-in-Chief, a spirited affair was going on in another part of the field. About noon, the enemy was observed mustering in considerable strength upon the heights to the southward of the camp, and displaying several banners. They were a body of fanatical Mussulmen, termed 'Ghazees,' or Defenders of the Faith, whose enthusiasm had been enlisted by Dost Mahomed against the Kaffir, or infidel English, and their renegade king, as the Shah was represented to them. Their position commanded his Majesty's camp; and it was evident from their movements that they were about to pour down in that direction, as if

their animosity were chiefly directed against him. The whole of the Shah's horse, supported by the lancers, and a regiment of Bengal cavalry, moved out immediately with two guns to oppose them. The enemy had already begun to descend into the plain, when they were met by the Shah's cavalry, under Captain Nicolson, and driven back with some loss, leaving one of their standards in our hands.

“Capt. Outram, one of the bravest and most active officers in the service, who, whenever any out-of-the-way duty was to be performed, seemed always ready in a moment to undertake it, and has since gained so much distinction in connection with the affairs of Sind, arrived at the scene of action just previous to the occurrence of this incident. Finding no other European officer on the spot, he prevailed on a body of the Shah's horse to accompany him round the hills in the enemy's rear, where he stationed them, so as to prevent the latter retreating. Intimidated by this manoeuvre, and the repulse they had met with, the Ghazees ascended the heights beyond the reach of the horse; and Capt. Outram meeting at this moment a small detachment of native infantry and matchlockmen under an English officer, proposed to him an immediate attempt to force the enemy from their new position. They ascended the rocks in gallant style, Capt. Outram at their head, advancing steadily under a galling fire; and at length, step by step, attained the topmost peak, over which floated the Ghazee consecrated banner of green and white, which was supposed to confer invincibility upon its followers. At sight of this, the whole party rushed forward, cheering vociferously. The

standard-bearer was brought to the ground by a chance shot; the sacred standard itself fell into our hands; and the hopeless Ghazees fled panic-stricken at the loss of their charmed banner, and its inefficacy to protect them. The loss on our part in this affray was about 20 killed and wounded; the Affghans lost between 30 and 40, and about 50 of them were made prisoners.”*

On the 30th of July, the Army resumed its march towards Cabool, elate with the prospect of giving and receiving some hard blows; for it was generally believed that Dost Mahommed would venture battle. But the Ameer, discovering that his troops had been tampered with,† saw that resistance would be vain; and at the head of about 3,000 followers, who still clung to him in his adversity, he fled in the direction of Bameean. His flight was reported in Camp on the 3rd August: “and,”—writes the “Officer of high rank in the Indian Army,” “the intelligence being fully confirmed, it was resolved to send in immediate pursuit of him; and the service being one requiring both talent

* “History of the War in Affghanistan, Edited by C. Nash, Esq., p. 162.” See also “Kennedy’s Narrative,” “Kaye’s History”—the “Narrative of the March and Operations of the Army of the Indus, by Colonel Hough, Judge Advocate General of the Bengal Column,” &c., &c. To save unnecessary annotation, the compiler will henceforth abstain from citing more than the authorities actually quoted. Suffice it to say, that every writer who has undertaken to illustrate our operations in Affghanistan has, more or less fully, adverted to the services rendered by Outram. In addition to the writers cited may be added Colonel Havelock, in his “Narrative of the Affghanistan War.” Dr. James Atkinson, the Medical Chief of the Bengal Division in his “Expedition into Affghanistan,” &c.

† By Shah Sooja.

and daring, Captain Outram seemed, as a matter of course, the officer to be selected to command the pursuing party."

Five hundred Affghan horsemen, and a small party of our own Hindostanee Cavalry, were placed under Outram's command; and twelve officers volunteered to accompany him,—all, as Mr. Kaye truly designates them, "bold riders and dashing soldiers." "And if," adds the same historian, "the success of this expedition had depended on the zeal of the officers, Dost Mahommed would have been brought back a prisoner to the British Camp; for never did a finer set of men leap into their saddles flushed with the thought of the stirring work before them. But when they set out in pursuit of the fallen Ameer, a traitor rode with them, intent on turning to very nothingness all their chivalry and devotion."*

This traitor was "Hadjee Khan Kakur, a man notorious throughout the country for his unparalleled treachery. In early life he had been nothing more than a humble melon-vender; but he was a man of enterprise and courage, and had raised himself to the highest rank by his crafty talents—invariably changing sides, when his interest prompted him to do so. He had intrigued even in favour of the heretic Sikhs during their hostilities with Dost Mahommed, and afterwards

* Vol. I., p. 455. The following is a list of the gallant little band:—Captains Wheler, Troup, Lawrence, Backhouse, Christie, Erskine, Tayler, and Trevor; Lieutenants Broadfoot, Hogg, and Ryves; and Dr. Worrall, men most of whom were destined, ere long, to signalize themselves, some by feats of military prowess, others by their administrative and diplomatic talents, some both as soldiers and as diplomatists.

quitted the service of that chief to join the rulers of Candahar against him. Upon the approach of our armies to Candahar, he again changed sides, and deserted with all his followers to the cause of Shah Shooja, for which piece of well-timed service he received a thousand pounds from us. But nothing could secure the fidelity of this designing chief, who seemed to love treachery for its very sake; and upon our march to Ghiznee he hung aloof in the most suspicious manner, evidently waiting, as was afterwards proved, to see the result of our operations upon that fortress, in the hope that our defeat would give him another opportunity of changing his party. Our glorious success, however, confirmed his wavering fidelity for the moment, and the day after the fall of Ghiznee, he arrived at the British camp with congratulations, and protestations of his earnest attachment to our cause.”*

“How,” writes Dr. Kennedy,—“how it fell that he was allowed to remain in the rear at so critical a moment, I know not; but had he been served as the sixty-five prisoners had been on the evening of the 22nd, there seems every reason to believe that Captain Outram, who set the Army in motion by procuring at Bhooj and Kurrachee the camels requisite for our move from the Hujamry, would have closed the campaign by the capture of Dost Mahommed.”

But Hadjee Khan, instead of “being served as the sixty-five prisoners,”† had been taken again into the royal favour; and to give him an opportunity of

* History of the War in Affghanistan, by an Officer of high rank, p. 188.

† *i. e.*, put to death.

proving his fidelity, he was directed to act as Outram's guide : a duty for which the King conceived him to be peculiarly qualified, from his having once been Governor of Bameean.

“The pursuit of Outram was bold, active, and persevering. He followed the fugitive from the 3rd to the 9th August, on which day the Ameer crossed in his flight the Affghan frontier at Syghan, thirty miles beyond Bamian. The British troops endured the greatest privations, having lived on parched corn for several days, their horses picking up, at the same time, scanty and indifferent forage, in the small spots of cultivation in a mountainous tract. Holding cheap these difficulties, Captain Outram pursued his arduous course from Sheikhabad, across the Pughman range, to Goda, Soofyd Kadir, Joort, and Kurzar ; thence he tracked the footsteps of the Ameer by Kaloo, up the tremendous passes of Hajee Guk and Shootur Gurdun to Bamian, leaving close on his right the awful eminences of Kohi Baber, twenty thousand feet in height.

“But all his laudable endeavours and intentions were frustrated by the tricks and subterfuges of Hadjee Khan. It very soon became evident that nothing was further from the thoughts of this accomplished traitor than to aid in the capture of his former master. His excuses were varied and endless. At one time he urged the inability of his troops to proceed at so rapid a pace ; at another, he permitted them to roam over the country in search of plunder, and then lamented their absence. Perpetually he urged upon the consideration of the bold leader of the chase the formidable

force, amounting to full fifteen hundred men, which Dost Mahommed Khan, after seeing his ranks thinned by desertion, still retained about him. Though believed to be intimately acquainted with the roads, yet, between Soofyd Kadir and Joort, he suffered the detachment to be led into a defile in the mountains, from which there was no egress, and where they were obliged to dismount on a frosty night, and sit by their horses until the dawn enabled them to retrace their footsteps. He encouraged Captain Outram to believe that it was his intention to effect the detention of the Barukzye by raising the Hazaru tribes in his rear, and under this pretext, urged him to slacken his pace. But when he found that Outram's sagacity and determination were proof against privations, fatigue, entreaties, and every artifice, he at length threw off the mask so far as to tell him that he must not reckon on the aid of his Affghan troops if he attacked Dost Mahommed contrary to the advice of his guide, and that it would not be surprising if they should turn against the British in the *melée*. In one of the numerous altercations between Captain Outram and the Hadjee, the latter used the remarkable expressions which will be long remembered against him. 'I am hated in Affghanistan on account of my friendship for the English. *I am, next to the king, the most unpopular man in the country.*'"*

"Again and again," writes Mr. Kaye, "there was the same contention between the chivalrous earnestness of the British Officer, and the foul treachery of the Affghan

* Colonel Havelock's "Narrative of the Affghanistan War," p. 155.

Chief. At last, on the 9th August, they reached Bameean, where Hadjee Khan had repeatedly declared that Dost Mahommed would halt, only to learn that the fugitives were that morning to be at Syghan, nearly thirty miles in advance. The Ameer was pushing on with increased rapidity; for the sick Prince,* who had been carried in a litter, was transferred to the back of an elephant; and his escape was now almost certain. The treachery of Hadjee Khan had done ^{its} work. *Outram had been restricted in his operations to the limits of the Shah's dominions,—and the Ameer had now passed the borders.* Further pursuit, indeed, would have been hopeless. The horses of our cavalry were exhausted by over-fatigue, and want of food. They were unable any longer to continue their forced marches. The game, therefore, was up. Dost Mahommed had escaped. Hadjee Khan Kakur had saved the Ameer, but he had sacrificed himself. He had over-reached himself in his career of treachery, and was now to pay the penalty of detection. Outram officially reported the circumstance of the Hadjee's conduct, which had baffled all his best efforts—efforts which he believed would have been crowned with success; and the traitor, on his return to Cabool, was arrested by orders of the Shah. Other proofs of his treason were readily found, and he was sentenced to end a life of adventurous vicissitude, as a state prisoner in the provinces of Hindostan.”†

Though unsuccessful, the pursuit of Dost Mahommed

* His son, the subsequently famous Akbar Khan.

† Kaye's "History of the War in Affghanistan," vol. i. pp. 458—9.

has generally been regarded as one of the most brilliant and chivalric passages in the Affghan War. And rarely has a nobler instance of heroism and devotion been afforded than when, on the sixth evening of the chase, in the belief that they were close on the heels of the fugitive King, the thirteen British Officers—with a self-convicted traitor for their guide, and surrounded by 500 Affghan horsemen ready to obey his treacherous behests—in calm council agreed to unite their efforts on the morrow; and, charging in the centre of their small body of Hindostanee followers, each to direct his individual attack against the person of Dost Mahomed. “It being evident,”—thus runs the entry in Outram’s diary,—“it being evident that all the Affghans, on both sides, will turn against us, unless we are immediately successful, this plan of attack appears to afford the only chance of escape to those who may survive; and it is an object of paramount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer, rather than to permit his escape.”*

“*Those who may survive!*” Not one of the gallant band but must have felt assured that the sun which was to light him on the morrow’s journey would shed its setting beams on his mangled corpse. Yet, “they passed the night cheerfully and merrily, though they had little to eat, nothing whatever to drink, and no other bed to lie on than their sheep-skin cloaks.”†

* Vide Diary in Outram’s “*Rough Notes of the Campaign in Sind and Affghanistan*,” p. 130.

† “*History of the War in Affghanistan*,” by an Officer of high rank in the Indian Army, p. 190.

On his return to Cabool, Captain Outram, seeing that the war was virtually terminated for the present, accepted the Envoy's renewed offer of Political employment, on the understanding that, in the event of further military operations taking place, he should be permitted to participate in them. And it was not long till—

“The active services of the gallant Captain Outram had been again called into request. Shortly after the arrival of the Shah at Cabool, certain insurrectionary movements among the Ghilzie tribes attracted his attention, and an expedition was resolved on, to attempt their reduction. A cold-blooded murder had also been perpetrated upon the person of a British officer, Colonel Herring, of the 37th Native Infantry, by a party of these desperate marauders. Capt. Outram was, therefore, placed in command of a body of troops, British and Affghan, and commissioned to depose the refractory Ghilzie Chiefs,—to punish the people of Maroof for their horrible and wanton destruction of a Kafila of Hindoos in the previous May,—and to avenge the assassination of Colonel Herring. He started on this expedition on the 7th of September, and after several days of indefatigable exertion, he discovered that the perpetrators of the last-named atrocity belonged to a tribe of freebooters, called Kaujuks, whose stronghold was situated some distance to the north-east of Ghuznee.

“On the 21st Captain Outram made a night march, in order to surprise these banditti, and arrived at break of day at a deep dell occupied by the gang. His dispositions were made so skilfully that he succeeded in

completely surrounding them ; but they defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and maintained their position until all their ammunition was nearly expended, when, upon our men rushing in upon them from every quarter, they were compelled to throw down their arms. Sixteen of their number were left dead upon the spot, and one hundred and twelve were taken prisoners. Not one was permitted to escape ; and forty-six of the most ferocious were immediately transmitted to Cabul for execution.

“All their camels and property also fell into the hands of Captain Outram’s party, the former bearing marks by which they were discovered to have been stolen from our troops. He fulfilled his other instructions with equal celerity and success, blowing up the fort of Maroof, which was found to be a place of remarkable strength, and taking several of the people prisoners.”*

For these services the British Plenipotentiary, from time to time, communicated to Captain Outram the warm commendations of Shah Sooja.

Thus, on the 6th October, he conveyed “his Majesty’s unqualified approbation, evincing as they (Captain Outram’s operations) do, the highest degree of zeal, energy, and prudence.”† On the 17th of the same month, his Majesty was “pleased to express

* History of the War in Affghanistan, edited by C. Nash, Esq., p. 204.

† Captain Outram was, at the same time, instructed to express his Majesty’s admiration of the spirit of the officers who co-operated with them—special commendation being bestowed on “the gallant conduct of Major McLaren and his detachment.”

himself in terms of high gratification at the energy and zeal displayed by Captain Outram, in operations by which the power and influence of the rebel Ghilzie Chiefs have been completely and for ever destroyed." In reference to the destruction of Maroof, Shah Sooja, on the 7th November, desired the British Envoy to signify his Majesty's "entire approbation of Captain Outram's conduct, and to convey his warmest thanks for this additional instance of zeal and devotion displayed in his cause." And soon after, in transmitting to Captain Outram, by his Majesty's order, the decoration of the Dourannee Order of Knighthood, the Envoy wrote as follows:—

"I am desired by his Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, to convey to you his acknowledgment of the zeal, gallantry, and judgment displayed by you in several instances during the past year, whilst employed in his Majesty's immediate service.

"His Majesty desires to specify three instances in which your merit and exertions were particularly conspicuous.

"First, on the occasion of your gallantly placing yourself at the head of his Majesty's troops engaged in dispersing a large body of rebels, who had taken up a threatening position immediately above his Majesty's encampment, on the day previous to the storm of Ghiznee.

"Secondly, on the occasion of your commanding the party sent in pursuit of Dost Mahommed Khan, when your zealous exertions would in all probability have been crowned with success, but for the treachery of your Affghan associates.

“ And, thirdly, for the series of able and successful operations conducted under your superintendence, which ended in the subjection or dispersion of certain rebel Ghilzie and other tribes, and which have had the effect of tranquillizing the whole line of country between Cabul and Candahar, where plunder and anarchy had before prevailed,” &c. &c.

Nor did the Governor-General of India fail to express his cordial approbation of each of Captain Outram's proceedings.

Having fulfilled the duties assigned to him, Outram hastened, by permission of the Envoy, to join the column under General (now Sir Thomas) Willshire, then proceeding to punish Mihrab Khan of Khelat, for certain acts of hostility imputed to him and his subjects during the advance of Sir John Keane's Army. On the 30th October, he arrived in General Willshire's Camp; and offering his services, in the capacity of Aide-de-camp, to that distinguished Officer, accompanied him to Khelat, which was carried by storm, on the 13th of November. The following account of Outram's performances on this occasion is derived from Mr. Nash's interesting volume:—

“ Everything now being in readiness, the three columns of attack steadily advanced, preceded by the artillery, which opened a cannonade upon the enemy with such admirable precision, that they were driven from their position long before the Infantry had reached the heights. The Khelatees were observed endeavouring to draw off their guns; and General Willshire sent Captain Outram, who had bravely volunteered upon the expedition, with orders to the

column which was nearest to the gate, to pursue the fugitives, and, if possible, to enter the fort with them—but, at all events, to prevent their taking in the guns. The Captain overtook the advancing column, and galloping on, reached the redoubt just at the moment that the enemy were vacating it, and engaged in attempting to carry off one of their pieces of ordnance. He dashed forward, calling upon Captain Raitt, of the Queen's Royals, to accompany him with his party, and succeeded in compelling the enemy to abandon their gun, although they were too late to enter the fort with them. The whole of our troops were now upon the heights, and the guns were in process of being dragged up. As soon as the latter could be got into position, two of them were directed to play upon the towers commanding the gateway; two others opened fire upon the gate itself; while the remaining two were stationed upon the road leading direct to the gate, for the purpose of blowing it in, which was effected in the course of a few discharges. Upon observing this, General Willshire rode down the hill, and gave the signal for the advance of the storming party. The troops instantly rose from their cover, and rushed in; those under command of Major Pennycuick, being the nearest, were the first to gain an entrance, headed by their gallant leader. They were quickly followed by the rest of the column, who pushed in to their support under a heavy fire from the works, and from the interior, the enemy making a most determined resistance, and disputing every inch of ground up to the walls of the inner citadel. Meanwhile the General despatched Captain Outram, who had been actively employed the whole time in

various parts of the scene, with a Company of Her Majesty's 17th Foot,* and a portion of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry,† to storm the heights, and secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. This movement was most spiritedly performed. They ascended the rocks, dispersed a party of matchlockmen occupying their summit, then rushed down again to the fort, driving in a party of the enemy with such precipitation, that they had not time to secure the gate behind them, possession of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off. At this moment they were joined by another party, under Major Deshon, who had been sent by the eastern face of the fort with two guns, to blow open this gate also, if necessary, as well as the gate of the inner citadel. The first having been gained as described, the guns were placed in position for bombarding the latter, and their fire was kept up with destructive effect until our soldiers forced an entrance into the place. A furious contest now ensued between the besiegers and the besieged. Mihrab Khan himself headed his men, and fought with desperate valour, although he had previously attempted to make his escape; but he was at length slain by a shot in the neck, from an unknown hand. Many of his chiefs fell with him, and about four hundred of the garrison. In a few minutes more, the British flag was waving above the ramparts of the captured fortress of Khelat."

General Willshire, when acknowledging the services rendered by Captain Outram, expressed himself

* Under Captain Darby.

† Commanded by Major Western.

as “greatly indebted to that officer for the zeal and ability with which he has performed various duties that I (Gen. W.) have required of him, upon other occasions as well as the present.”

“Immediately after the fall of Khelat, Captain Outram was commissioned to carry the glorious tidings to Bombay, in doing which he undertook one of those daring adventures which, from their very danger, give so much interest and excitement to Indian warfare. He resolved to disguise himself, and make his way, by the most direct route, which lay through the heart of the enemy’s country, to Sonmeanee, the seaport of Lus, and proceed thence by water to Kurrachee, and so on to his destination.

“Having accordingly disguised himself as a holy man, he left the British camp in the dead of the night, accompanied by two Syuds, who had agreed to go with him, together with two armed attendants of theirs, and one servant of his own. They overtook on their route many of the fugitives from Khelat, one party of whom, consisting of the families of Mihrab Khan’s brother, and his principal minister, Mahommed Hoosain Khan, recognized the two Syuds as old acquaintances. It happened, unfortunately, that Captain Outram was actually arrayed in a dress taken from Mahommed Khan’s own wardrobe ; but by a skilful preservation of his assumed character, he managed to escape detection. On another occasion, his companions having reason to suspect they should meet with certain persons it would be most prudent to avoid, at Nal, a village in their route, the party refrained from halting there, and rested in a jungle some distance beyond,

while one of the Syuds, with the two armed attendants, went into the village to procure grain for their horses. On the return of this party, however, they unfortunately missed Captain Outram's place of concealment, and he waited in anxious expectation till evening without seeing them. The other Syud then became so uneasy, that he went to the village to endeavour to learn some tidings of the absent party, leaving the Captain alone with his servant to await their return. Time passed away, and Captain Outram began to be apprehensive that his presence in the neighbourhood had been discovered, and that his companions were detained on purpose to induce him to come in search of them. He had now to consider what was best to be done. The whole of his money and provisions were with the absentees, and destitute as he was, ignorant, too, of the language, and without a guide, he felt his murder was inevitable at the hands of the very first Beloochee who should fall in with him, and detect his disguise. He therefore resolved to proceed to the village, and take the chance of his character as a British Officer protecting him from injury, or, if that should fail, he hoped that the influence of his Syud friends might be of some benefit to him. He sallied forth accordingly, from his hiding-place, but had not proceeded far, when he fortunately fell in with the second Syud, who, having also missed their place of concealment, had been a long while hunting for him. He brought the welcome news that the first party was safe; but they having likewise missed the locality, had gone, under the impression that their companions had preceded them. At length, after a two hours' search

from village to village, the whole party met again; and Captain Outram, anxious to be the first to communicate to Government the news of the brilliant affair of Khelat, they continued their journey throughout the night, without once halting. At length, after escaping numerous dangers, and undergoing various fatigues, now urging forward their steeds to escape some impending evil, frequently remaining all day and night in the saddle, now lying down to snatch an hour or two of sleep, with their little property beneath them, and their horses' bridles in their hands, to be prepared for a surprise, the gallant Outram and his little party reached Sonmeanee. He then took boat for Kurrachee, whence he proceeded to Bombay, and afterwards learned that he had had a most narrow escape; for he had been discovered and pursued by the son of one of the chiefs slain at Khelat, who only missed him at Sonmeanee by a few hours."*

Captain Outram received the thanks, both of the Bombay and of the Supreme Government, for "the very interesting and valuable documents" which he placed before them, "being a sketch and description of the route, and narrative of that officer's Journey through Beloochistan, from Khelat to Sonmeanee;"—a route "the practicability or otherwise of which for the passage of troops, General Willshire had deemed it a great object to ascertain."

* War in Affghanistan, edited by C. Nash, Esq., p. 210. This journey of 360 miles, Outram (who with his saddle bags weighed 16 stone) performed on an Affghan pony, under 13 hands, in seven and a half days. During this period, he was 111 hours on the hardy little creature's back.

For his services at Khelat, Captain Outram received the brevet rank of Major, in November, 1839. But as he shared this honour with others, who had not had the good fortune to enjoy so many opportunities of distinguishing themselves as fell to his lot, the Secret Committee intimated to the Bombay Government that they had recommended his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.* This arrangement was understood to be so definitely fixed, that the Bombay Government, in expressing to Major Outram their “gratification in perceiving that the Honourable the Secret Committee so highly appreciated his past services” addressed him officially as “Lieutenant-Colonel Outram,”† and Lord Auckland, in an autograph letter dated 30th July, 1840, wrote as follows:—

“I am glad to know by my letters from England, that your promotion (to Lieut.-Colonel), though not yet announced on the 2nd June, was determined upon; and I heartily rejoice in your well-earned honour, and congratulate you on it.”

Had the “well-earned” promotion in question been bestowed on Major Outram, that Officer would now have been entitled to command a Division of the Bombay Army. For, in accordance with the rule observed in distributing honours for the Sind battles, he would in 1843 have been made a full (instead of a Lieut.) Colonel, an Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, &c. &c. And owing to the exhaustion of the list of Bombay Major-Generals, at least one Colonel whose commission dates

* Despatch to Bombay Government, dated 29th Feb. 1840.

† Letter dated 17th April, 1840.

later than 1843, is in command of a Division, with the rank of Brigadier General.

There cannot be a doubt that the non-fulfilment of the promise, was the result of oversight. And Major Outram has been repeatedly urged by his friends to apply for the honour which it is obvious his Sovereign intended to bestow, and the intended bestowal of which had been communicated by her Majesty's Ministers to her Representative in the East.

V.

SERVICES AS POLITICAL AGENT FOR LOWER SIND.

1840—1841.

IN January 1840, the Governor-General of India (Lord Auckland), in recognition of Major Outram's past services, nominated him Political Agent for Lower Sind, in succession to Sir Henry Pottinger. And the nomination received the expressed approbation of the Secret Committee, who recorded their entire "concurrence in the praises bestowed on Major Outram."

Many and important objects occupied Major Outram's attention, during the first few months of his intercourse with the Court of Hyderabad. These it is unnecessary to detail; but that he satisfactorily performed what was required of him is sufficiently proved by the fact that, on the 2nd October 1840, Lord Auckland intimated to him that, should the failing health of Mr. Ross Bell "incapacitate him for the discharge of the important duties attached to his office, it was his Lordship's desire that Major Outram should assume charge of them, with the full authority that has been committed to that officer."

The compliment thus paid him, derived increased value from the circumstance of Lord Auckland being fully aware that Major Outram had, from the first,

strongly condemned his Affghan Policy, and predicted its disastrous issue. Mr. Ross Bell, as Political Agent for Beloochistan and Upper Sind, was vested with vast powers and responsibilities ; but to Major Outram it was resolved to confide even a wider jurisdiction than that over which Mr. Bell's authority had extended. For, in addition to that gentleman's appointment, he was to retain the Political control of Lower Sind.

Within two months from the date of this gratifying proof of the Governor-General's confidence, Major Outram had an opportunity of affording his Lordship an affecting illustration of the success which had attended his firm but conciliatory diplomacy at Hyderabad.

Until it suited the purposes of the Indian Government to encourage jealousies amongst the Princes of Lower Sind, Meer Noor Mahommed had always been regarded and treated as the principal Ameer. And, up to the day of his death (1st December, 1840), he remained the virtual Ruler of Sind : the other Ameers deferring to his judgment, in all matters of general and foreign policy. It was, therefore, but natural that the feelings of resentment with which he viewed the abrupt and invasive entrance into his country, of a British Army, should be enhanced by the marked manner in which the British officials (in obedience to their instructions) were compelled to avoid any recognition of his status, as "Chief Ameer." And nothing was more calculated to exasperate this Prince than the demission to his Court, as British Representative, of the Officer who, one short year

before, had appeared before him to certify Sir John Keane's determination to storm and sack his capital, unless prompt acceptance were given to a harsh, and spoliative arrangement, in utter violation of those solemn compacts in virtue of which we had obtained permission to establish a "Residency" in Sind.

But so successful was the conciliatory demeanour of Major Outram, that Noor Mahommed soon recognized in him a friend, worthy of a brother's love. The Ameer, Mr. Lushington writes, "had of late (that is for some time previous to his death) identified his own interests with those of the British; and the last act of his life (affectingly told in the correspondence), was to commend his two sons and successors to the protection of the British Resident (Major Outram), for whom he felt a strong personal friendship: a commission which that noble soldier fulfilled, and more than fulfilled. 'You are to me as my brother Nusseer Khan,' said the Ameer to him in words stamped with the sincerity of death. . . 'From the days of Adam, no one has known so great truth and friendship as I have found in you.'—To have merited this touching testimony from the rude and distrustful chieftain, was more than to be called by the Conqueror of Sind, '*the Bayard of the Indian Army*'!"*

"His Highness"—thus Outram officially reported a previous interview—"hailing me as a brother, put his arms round me, and held me in his embrace a few minutes, until I laid him quietly down. So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exer-

* "A Great Country's little Wars," by C. Lushington, Esq., p. 213.

tion quite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards, before he could speak, when beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer Khan, and his youngest son Meer Hoossein Ali, to the bedside, he took a hand of each and placed them in mine saying, ‘You are their father and brother : you will protect them’ ; to which I replied in general, but warm terms of personal friendship, and that I trusted his Highness himself would long live to guide and support them. But this the Ameer had evidently given up all hope of : for he appeared to regret that he had given Dr. Owen the trouble of coming so far, though very grateful for the prompt manner in which his wishes had been attended to.”

A second visit was paid the same evening to the dying Prince. In the mean time the affecting incident of the morning had been communicated to the ladies of the Harem ; “and,”—thus reported Outram—

“In the course of the interview, Meer Hoossein Ali, the Ameer’s younger son, came from the inner apartments and whispered in the ear of his father, who smiled, and informed me that the Khanum (the mother of his sons) sent to say she hailed me as her brother with much gratification, to which I made a suitable acknowledgment. On inquiry, afterwards I learned that this is considered an extraordinary proof of friendship, such as has never heretofore been displayed except to the nearest relations.”*

Outram requested permission to accept the guardianship of the boy Hoossein Ali thus solemnly confided to his protection by the dying Prince. Lord

* 1st Sind Blue Book, p. 267.

Auckland, ever swift to obey his generous impulses, sanctioned the arrangement; and of all the many distressing incidents connected with the Conquest of Sind, there is not one more painful than the violation of the obligations which this arrangement involved. Beyond being a spectator at the battle of Meanee, no charge of any kind could be brought against the youthful Hoossein, who was only sixteen years of age. Outram pleaded for him as his son by adoption; procured his release; and, as he and all who were present at the conference understood, his pardon also. But, soon after Outram's departure, the lad was torn from his aged mother, added to the number of the other Royal Captives, and sentenced to exile. "My mother,"—wrote the unhappy youth, in one of his fruitless petitions—"my mother, worn out with years, cannot have long to live, and the few remaining years of her life will be shortened by separation from me. My betrothed, too, and her parents will grieve for me." "When,"—thus did the broken-hearted mother appeal to Outram—"when Meer Noor Mahommed was alive . . he besought your favour on behalf of his sons; he regarded you as a brother; *and he assured me that in the hour of distress you would not withdraw your protection from me.* I have no one to look to but yourself. Whatever crime has been committed by my sons, I beseech your forgiveness for the sake of God and pity. I have nothing to hope for but through your compassion. I hope you will look to the tomb of Meer Noor Mahommed, and show mercy to his sons." How Outram responded to her call; and what the faithful per-

formance of his vow has caused him, in calumny, and persecution, and pecuniary loss, the readers of this little volume require not to be told. But this is a digression.

Prior to Noor Mahommed's death, an army was ordered to assemble in Upper Sind, in consequence of the unsettled state of the neighbouring countries. As active operations were anticipated, Major Outram had sought permission to tender his services in a military capacity, to the General commanding. And the Governor-General, "looking to Major Outram's local knowledge, and high personal character," thought that his services would be "of such infinite value as to compensate for the temporary loss of his presence in Lower Sind." But the Bombay Government deemed it "not expedient that he should leave Hyderabad, where his services at that moment were most useful." In this decision the Governor-General was induced to concur; the Secret Committee entertained a similar opinion; and Outram was, for the time, denied any further opportunity of earning distinction in the field.

But though himself precluded from participating in Military operations, he took, in concert with Brigadier Farquharson, prompt and successful measures for strengthening the hands of Major General Brookes, who commanded in Upper Sind. Both Major Outram and Brigadier Farquharson received gratifying commendations from the Indian authorities, and the Secret Committee, for the efforts they had made to reinforce General Brookes' Army. And it may not be superfluous to add that, in the prosecution of these efforts, Major Outram was the first to demonstrate the

practicability of bringing Troops into Sind by land. On his own responsibility, he drew cavalry from Guzerat, across the desert of the Thurr, by way of Jeysulmeer; and infantry and artillery from Kattywar, across the Runn of Cutch.

Amongst the duties which, in the opinion of the Government, had required the uninterrupted presence of Major Outram at Hyderabad, was the settlement of the conflicting claims of the sons of the late Meer Noor Mahommed. In reference to these, the Secret Committee pronounced Major Outram "to have acted with his usual sagacity." And, in the same despatch, they observed that "the documents relating to the renunciation by the Ameer of Meerpore, of the right to levy tolls on the Indus, furnished additional proofs of the zeal and ability with which Major Outram discharges his important functions."

The foregoing pages have borne ample testimony to the esteem and confidence in which Major Outram was held by the successive Governors of Bombay—Mr. Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, Sir Robert Grant, and Mr. Farish; and here may be appropriately introduced an extract from a farewell letter addressed to him, on the 20th April 1841, by Sir James Carnac, who was Mr. Farish's successor in the Government of Bombay:—

"I cannot bid adieu to this country, without bidding you, if you will allow me the expression, an *affectionate* farewell. I shall always hail the day when we became acquainted, as one of the brightest spots in my career of life. I entertain for you the most sincere sentiments of regard and respect; and

you will ever find me, I trust, when thinking or speaking of you and your valuable services, influenced strongly by these impressions. I foresee, please a kind Providence, a career before you which will give full scope for the display of all those eminent qualities with which you are endowed."

VI.

SERVICES AS POLITICAL AGENT FOR THE WHOLE
OF SIND AND BELOOCHISTAN.

1841—1842.

MR. ROSS BELL died in August, 1841. His death had been for some time expected; and as his office was in a state of great confusion, and our relations with Khelat pressed for immediate settlement, Major Outram had been requested to proceed to Quetta (in Northern Beloochistan, and at the top of the Bolan Pass) as soon after receiving intimation of Mr. Bell's demise as he could, consistently with personal safety.

The reader requires not to be told that, owing to the intensity of the heat, and the deadly Simoom which blows over the Deserts dividing Sind from Cutch Gundava, the journey from Sukkur to Dadur is one which not even the natives of the country will make between the beginning of May and the end of September, unless driven to it by absolute necessity. And equally unnecessary is it to say, that no one had ever dreamed of venturing among the wild tribes that occupy the Bolan Pass without the protection of a strong escort. But no sooner did Outram receive the tidings of Mr. Bell's death, than, regardless of every consideration but the interests of the public service,

he started off on a dromedary, attended by one hardy servant similarly mounted; and in five days he accomplished a journey which generally occupied troops three weeks, at a season of the year when most men would have regarded an order to undertake it as little short of sentence of death. The following extracts from Colonel Dennie's Journal, descriptive of a portion of the same journey, made in the beginning of April, ere yet the heats had nearly attained their maximum, will give the reader some idea of the nature of Outram's sufferings, and the extent of the risk he incurred :—

“ We ascended from Dadur to that place (Quetta), through the Bolan Pass, an elevation of between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, having previously traversed at its foot, a long, dreadful, desert plain from Shikarpore to Dadur, of about 150 miles.* As for the heat, God be praised you can form no conception of it; *I have escaped*, and can only tell you that I shudder to look back at what I and those with me underwent. Col. Thompson, who commanded one of the regiments of my Brigade, and who followed me a few days in the rear, died instantly in his tent; and Lieut. Brady, H. M. 17th Foot, fell dead in the same manner,—their bodies turning as black as charcoal. Between 50 and 60 persons of another convoy were suffocated by the breath of this same deadly Simoom, which sweeps across the desert at intervals during the hot season, dealing destruction to all within its influence. To give you a correct notion of the temperature, the thermometer stood, in the tent of a young Officer, my

* From Dadur, at the bottom, to Quetta, beyond the summit of the Bolan Pass, the distance is between 70 and 80 miles.

Aide-de-camp, a smaller one than mine, and termed a hill tent, at 125 degrees !”*

Major Outram's first duty, after his arrival at Quetta, was to conciliate Nusseer Khan of Khelat. This fine young Brahoosee, the son and heir of the Prince who fell in November, 1839, had himself experienced much harsh treatment from the British. A fugitive wanderer in his own territories, he had, until a week or two previous, resisted the advances of Colonel Stacy, the political officer to whom the affairs of Khelat had in the meantime been confided. And as he well knew the conspicuous part which Outram had taken in those operations which deprived him of a father, and gave

* P. 56. Should these pages meet the eye of any Officer of the 6th Regiment N. I., he will be ready to testify that when Major Outram passed through Dadur, Colonel Woodhouse and his Officers could only obtain a snatch of sleep by drenching their beds and shirts with water;—that they sat at dinner wet with towels round their heads, and only maintained existence by constant *punka-ing*, and an almost constant imbibition of weak wine and water. Colonel Green, Major Hutt, and the Officers of the 21st Regt. who were at Dadur in the following year, must remember well that, in spite of the admirable mud-houses they had in the mean time built for themselves, their sufferings were not much less severe than those of their predecessors. And if such was the deplorable condition of officers under cover, the reader may conceive what were the sensations experienced by Outram on his rapid journey. The Compiler of these Memoranda would sooner be blistered continuously for a fortnight from head to foot than again endure the *horrors* (no other word suffices) he underwent between 4 A. M. and 3 P. M. on the 3rd May, 1842, on rear-guard duty, in company with Captain Taylor and a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry, on the march from Dadur to the first halting-ground in the Bolan Pass. And yet we were assured we had had but a “ feeble imitation of the real Simoomish weather.”

him a dismembered territory and a plundered Capital as his inheritance, the probabilities were decidedly against his being speedily reconciled to the soldier in whose hands his destinies were now placed. But Outram's cordiality was irresistible. The Khan saw him, and loved him. His fears were allayed, his suspicions discarded. For in the new Political Agent he discovered one to whom he could unreservedly unbosom his sorrows, and freely communicate his wishes, in the full assurance that the former would receive genuine and soothing sympathy, and that the latter, if not gratified, would, at least, obtain considerate attention.

Taking the young Khan to Khelat, and doing his best to invest the "progress" to the Capital with regal pomp, by inviting Brigadier England to accompany them with his Staff and a large military escort, Outram formally placed him in the seat of his ancestors. And he executed a treaty with him, in the names of Shah Sooja and the British Government, which was cordially approved and applauded by Lord Auckland; as were all Outram's other measures for conciliating the Brahooees, whom the slaughter of 1839, and the sack of Khelat, had exasperated to the highest pitch. So successful were these measures, that the strongest personal attachment was soon felt towards Outram, not only by the Khan, but by all his Chiefs. And had it not been so, lamentable indeed would have been the position of England's and Nott's armies, in the dark days that were to follow.*

* Not the slightest reference to this treaty, or the correspondence regarding it, was suffered to appear in the Sind Blue Books.

By the condensation, under Major Outram, of offices previously independent of each other, the Government had effected a saving in salary of £370 *per mensem*. And by the reduction of his office establishments, as well as by the substitution of arrangements more favourable to Government for those which had obtained under his predecessor, Outram diminished the working expenses of his establishment by nearly £10,000 per annum.

“The zeal thus manifested for the interests of Government” was duly appreciated by the Governor-General; who applauded “the care and ability he had displayed, and the practical measures of economy he had effected, in the several arrangements considered and submitted.”

While reducing the cost of his office establishments, Major Outram succeeded in increasing their efficiency; and, aided by his zealous and able assistants, he promised himself the gratification of extending and consolidating the British influence in the Indus and trans-Indus States, and of securing to them peace, order, and good government, the development of their resources, and an enlargement of their commercial relations.

But ere effect could be given to his measures for the accomplishment of these objects, the Cabool Insurrection broke out; there ensued a crisis unparalleled in the history of the Anglo-Indian Empire; and on Major Outram and his assistants devolved labours and responsibilities which only those thoroughly conversant with the history of that eventful period can duly appreciate.

Emissaries poured forth from Cabool, proclaiming a religious war against the British. The ignorant and bigoted populations of Scinde and Beloochistan were called on, by the fealty they owed the Prophet, to enlist under his sacred banner against the enemies of the faith. And to neutralize the effects of these fanatical appeals ; to provide for the sustenance and safety of the weak and scattered military posts within their jurisdiction ; to inspire confidence in quarters wherein panic threatened to consummate the very evils it apprehended ; to aid in the retrieval of our tarnished honour by providing our generals with the means of prosecuting a war of retribution ; and to do so through the agency of those whom we had wronged, and who were incited to rise against us—such were the duties which Major Outram and his able staff were now called on to perform.

In the very depth of our disasters, Lord Auckland was compelled to leave India, his term of Government having expired. And the following passage is extracted from a letter which his Lordship addressed to Major Outram on the 20th of February 1842, on the eve of his departure :—

“ This is probably the last letter that I shall have to write to you, and I would take my leave of you with an assurance to you, that you have, from day to day, since your late appointment, added to that high estimate with which I have long regarded your character, and which led me to place confidence in you. It is mortifying and galling to me to feel that plans, which you had nearly brought to successful maturity, for great improvement, for the consolidation of secu-

rity and influence, for the happiness of the population of immense tracts, and for your own and our honor,—should be endangered by events of which our Military history has, happily, no parallel. You will, I know, do well in the storm ; and, I trust, that as far as the interests confided to you are concerned, you will enable us to weather it.”

Nor was his Lordship’s confidence misplaced. Major Outram was at that time in Sind, “earnest amongst the earnest to retrieve our lost position in Affghanistan, and active amongst the active to carry out the work of throwing troops into the country which had witnessed our abasement.”* And there are few, if any, who will take exception to the declaration made by Lord Auckland from his seat in Parliament that,—

“To no man in a public office was the public under greater obligations than to Major Outram. A more distinguished servant of the Government did not exist, nor one more eminent in a long career.”

Owing “to the promptitude and zeal with which Major Outram acted,” the stores of which the Candahar Army stood in need, together with 3,000 camels, were on the 10th of April pushed up the Bolan Pass. And unremitting exertions continued to be made by him, and his assistants, to collect such further supplies, and means of carriage, as might leave no excuse for a persistence in the resolution so long entertained by the Governor-General, of withdrawing the British troops from Affghanistan without making an effort to restore the prestige of our arms,

* Kaye’s history of the War in Affghanistan, Vol. II., p. 432.

or to rescue the British captives from the hands of the Affghans.

However much annoyed Lord Ellenborough may have been, at the earnest and energetic language in which Major Outram remonstrated against the "*immediate retirement*" policy, his Lordship could not fail to acknowledge the services that officer was rendering. And on the 22nd of May (1842), he caused intimation to be made to him that when, on the withdrawal of the British troops from above the Passes, it should become necessary to abolish the Political Agency for Beloochistan, the appointment of "Envoy to the States on the Lower Indus" would be bestowed on him.

On the 7th of June, Lord Ellenborough directed his Secretary to notify his Lordship's "high appreciation" of "the public zeal he had manifested by proceeding at much personal risk (from Sukkur) to Quetta, where his exertions were especially required in aid of General Nott's Army."* And on the 17th July, his Lordship, in an autograph letter to Major Outram, intimated his gratification at the amount of "carriage" which Outram had placed at the General's disposal, expressing a hope, at the same time, that through his "zealous and able exertions" the Candahar Army had at that date been "furnished with ample means of moving in any direction." His Lordship's hopes had been more than realized.

Not only did Major Outram, aided by his able assistants, provide General Nott with the means of ad-

* The nature and dangers of the journey thus performed in the hot weather of two successive years have been adverted to in page 91.

vancing on Ghizni and Cabool, and General England with those requisite for moving his sick-and-store-encumbered column down the Bolan Pass, but, by a happy combination of diplomatic negotiations and military arrangements, he averted from the latter General the extensive and formidable hostile operations which it had been in contemplation to direct against him, on his march from the Kojuck Pass to Quetta. And the value of the service thus rendered is well understood by those who are acquainted with the history of the Affghan Campaigns.

Outram's measures secured for the first two divisions of England's column, a safe and unopposed descent through the Bolan Pass. And though the Affghan Clan of KAKURS could not be prevented from taking a few parting shots, at the last division of the retreating Force, as it left their country, the opposition offered by them was very trifling. Such as it was, Sir Richard England received valuable assistance in repelling it, from Major Outram, who, tendering his services in a military capacity, aided in flanking the heights, and at the head of a band of Brahooes (Khelat subjects) dispersed the most formidable body of the enemy.

On the 10th of October the last division of General England's Army had reached the plains; and Sir C. Napier has recorded his opinion that to Major Outram was its safety due.*

Were not the compiler of these "Memoranda" re-

* "Lord Ellenborough, seeing everything going wrong, and very dangerously wrong too, had you not saved England's column," &c.
—Sir C. Napier's MS. correspondence, 25th January, 1843.

strained, by considerations which he deems it unnecessary to detail, from producing in this place certain correspondence to which he has been permitted access, he could prove that, in the estimation of the most distinguished Civil and Military functionaries employed in the North Western Frontier, Major Outram did more towards the retrieval of our tarnished honour in Affghanistan, than any single man—except the Generals in the field, and the heroic and chivalric GEORGE RUSSELL CLERK. And it is within the compiler's knowledge that this eminent public servant recognizes in Outram one whose acts and performances were *not* second to his own.

The following tribute to Outram's merits, extracted from the *Calcutta Review* for September 1845, is from the pen of one of the highest and most illustrious of our Indian functionaries, a distinguished soldier, a still more distinguished Civil Administrator, and one who has enjoyed the personal esteem, the profound respect, and the entire confidence as well of the present Governor-General of India, as of his predecessor, Lord Hardinge :—

“In the year 1838, Outram carried to Affghanistan a character such as could not be paralleled by any officer of his standing in India. His services during the first Affghan War were second to those of no officer then and there employed. And had he remained in the Ghilzee country, or at Khelat, many of our disasters might have been averted. But it is by his Civil Management, first of Lower Sind, and then of both the Upper and Lower Provinces and of all Beloochistan, that Outram has won our highest

admiration. When the European inhabitants of Calcutta trembled for our Indian Empire—when, in the highest places, men grew pale at the evil tidings from Affghanistan—Outram held his frontier post with a firm hand, a brave heart, and cheerful tone that *ought* to have been contagious. Vigilant, conciliatory, courageous, he managed with his handful of troops, not only to prevent the Ameers from taking advantage of our disasters, but to induce them to aid in furnishing supplies and carriage for the *relieving*, then considered the *retreating* Army. The merits of his exertions on that occasion are little understood. He obeyed as was his duty: but he did not the less clearly perceive the ruinous tendency of the Government Orders. He had the moral courage to sacrifice his own immediate interests by stemming the then prevalent tide of cowardly counsel. JAMES OUTRAM in one quarter, and GEORGE RUSSELL CLERK, a kindred spirit, in another, were the two men who then stood in the breach; who FORCED the authorities to listen to the fact against which they tried to close their ears, that the proposed abandonment of the British Prisoners in Affghanistan would be dangerous to the State, as it was base to the captives. These counsels were successfully followed; the British nation thanked our Indian Rulers, while of the two men, without whose persevering remonstrances and exertions, Nott and Pollock might have led back their armies, without being permitted to make an effort to retrieve our credit, CLERK was slighted, OUTRAM was superseded! As cheerfully as he had stepped forward did Outram now retire; and again when his

services were required, was he ready to act in the field, in willing subordination to the officer who had benefited by his supercession.”*

The opinions entertained by the highest living authority on Indian Affairs, regarding Major Outram’s services in that country, may be gathered from the following letter addressed by the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, to one of the East India Directors in the year 1843:—

“ Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such, as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy. We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute on Sind—we made open war on the Brahoes of Khelat—killed their Chief, and took their capital; and on these two powers all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures, would have been difficult even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram’s management, as to obtain their cordial co-operation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Affghanistan. Our move-

* It is not sufficiently known that Clerk and Outram were ably supported in their protests against the abandonment of our captive countrymen, by Mr. John Campbell Robertson, of the Bengal Civil Service, the Lieut.-Governor of the North-West Provinces during the period of our Affghan reverses. And he, like Clerk and Outram, was made to feel the effects of Lord Ellenborough’s displeasure, for urging on his Lordship measures which, tardily adopted as they were, procured for him the thanks of Parliament, and an elevation in the Peerage, and bestowed on his administration the highest illustration it received.

ments in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld, without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us, had they been disposed for more open enmity—General England's detachment could neither have retired or advanced, as it did, and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the opposition and privations he must have suffered in such case. In an advance towards Cabul, he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through the Sind and Khelat country.”*

And it may not be uninteresting to the reader to know, nor unimportant for our statesmen to be informed, that, low as is the estimate formed in these parts of the British good faith and generosity, there is an Englishman whose name still commands respect, and whose summons to arms in behalf of his nation's interests would be responded to by the Chiefs of the Moostung, Pisheen, and Shawl valleys. Dr. Stocks of the Bombay Army, one of the most zealous, accomplished, and enterprising members of the service to which he belongs, led by his love of science, and taste for adventure, to explore Beloochistan in 1849, found that “*Outram Sahib*” was held in undiminished honour and esteem by the rude people of that country. And he was asked by one of the Chiefs to convey to that officer an offer of service whenever circumstances might occur to render it desirable.†

* *i.e.* Beloochistan.

† Of which the following is a copy:—“Aldeenar (or Alleh Dineh Khoord Sirdar), presents his compliments to Outram Sahib,

The following is an extract from a note addressed by Dr. Stocks to the compiler of these memoranda, in April, 1852 :—

“Of all the English who went up to Khorassan, Outram seems to have commanded the respect and admiration of those rude tribes most; owing doubtless to the combination of English honesty, good feeling, and justice, with his acknowledged political and military ability. None of our other politicals were mentioned with credit; I mean those in Beloochistan. Alleh Dineh said he was ready at Outram's call, with his whole clan, to open the Bolan, and act according to orders. And indeed there is a good feeling towards us over all Beloochistan owing to our politic though tardy recognition of young Nusseer Khan, who is respected as the worthy representative of a long line (22) of Ahmedzie Chiefs, from A.D. 1500 to the present time.”

The appointment of “Envoy to the States on the Lower Indus,” which, on the 22nd May 1842, the Governor-General intimated his intention of bestowing on Major Outram, so soon as our Armies had been withdrawn from above the Passes, was *not* bestowed on him. Lord Ellenborough, without condescending and will be always ready, as in 1842, to perform any service that may be required of him, as witness his signet. Given at Ispenglee, near Meru, this 25th day of May, 1850. Seal of Alleh Dineh.” To this is added a postscript from one of the principal Syeds (holy men) of the country. “Syed Wais Shah (formerly of Keravi, now living at Moostung) desires remembrance of former passages and adventures of the road. Many others, be they greater or lesser note, hold yet good memory of Outram Sahib.” Signed Syed Wais Shah.

to offer any explanation, violated the pledge he had spontaneously made. But the cause was obvious. Major Outram had, in the mean time, seriously offended his Lordship. He had persevered in protesting against the retirement policy so long resolved on; and he had continued these protests after even Mr. CLERK had given up remonstrance as useless.* He had, further, presumed to defend one of his Assistants (Lieut. Hammersly) against what he regarded as a precipitate act of injustice on his Lordship's part—an injustice which sank deep into the heart of the noble-minded Hammersly, and ultimately brought him to the grave. Though not personally concerned in the matter, Major Outram deemed it his duty, as the Head of the department, to defend that gallant soldier. And the following extracts from his correspondence with a high Indian functionary will show that he was prepared to sacrifice his own interests and prospects rather than evade the duty :—

“ *Sukkur, May 23rd 1842.* See Hammersly's Defence, and my private correspondence with the Government of India on the subject. If the simple justice I solicit for him—of an *inquiry*, at least—be denied, I shall advise Hammersly to appeal against his Lordship's act; and I shall forward the appeal,

* Writing to a friend on the 24th of July, while yet ignorant of the secret authority which Lord Ellenborough had (on the 4th of July) given to General Nott to advance if he chose to do so on his own responsibility, he thus expressed himself:—“ I shame to look the natives of this country in the face after our cowardly demeanour to the Affghans. * * * It positively makes me sick to think of our degradation, and of the fate of our poor abandoned countrymen.”

through his Lordship, to the Court of Directors. For though, undoubtedly, the authority which confers political appointments can rescind them, still no authority can with propriety be so exercised as to blast the character and prospects of an officer, without some just or sufficient cause being assigned, and *proved*, if the accused party denies the existence of such cause.”*

Again on the 3rd August:—

“I hope I have rendered all secure for the delicate measure of withdrawing our Armies from above the Passes; and at any rate my disagreeable position shall not cause me to relax one iota in my zeal and endeavours to effect the best for our public interests, although little encouraged to exertion by his Lordship, who not only leaves me in entire ignorance of what is intended, but strikes off *five* of my assistants in General Orders, without even intimating, much less explaining, the circumstance to me. This, inclusive of Hammersly’s case, makes in all *six*. What would his Lordship think if I took no pains to counteract the consequences of having so many offices under me thus *suddenly* deprived of supervision? For instance, what confusion must have arisen, supposing I had allowed Hammersly to throw up his work from the day he appeared in Orders, and had transferred to the Military Commanding Officer, as was directed (whoever

* Under Lord Auckland’s administration the various heads of diplomatic offices were encouraged to communicate with each other, and seek each other’s counsel and advice, on the various public questions that came before them. And these letters were written before Lord Ellenborough had promulgated his prohibition against the practice.

he might be), a Treasury containing 7 Lacs (£70,000) with an outstanding balance of 14 Lacs to adjust; the command of the Bolan Rangers; the management of the Dawk communications through the Pass; the Revenue management and collection of the District of Shawl, &c., &c., &c., &c. Yet I have been reprimanded for allowing him to continue in office *a day after receipt of the Order placing him at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief*. Why! It would take the most able Civil Servant in India, with all the advantages of efficient establishments, three months to make up the accounts, and give over charge, of such an office. * * * However, his Lordship's will be done; and it *shall* be done by me so long as I *can* do it. But glad indeed should I be to rejoin my regiment, rather than continue a slave in so thankless an office, whatever be the dignity or salary appertaining thereto."

In reference to the offence given to Lord Ellenborough by Outram's persistent defence of Hammersly, it may not be amiss to adduce the following paragraph from the *Calcutta Review*, written by the distinguished contributor who has been already quoted.

"Outram's chivalrous defence of his Assistant, Lieut. Hammersly, is one of the many instances in which he advocated the right, at the peril of his own interests. Hammersly was as brave, as honest-hearted a young soldier as ever fell a victim to his duty. We knew him well; and no one who did so, need be ashamed to shed a tear over his fate. *He was literally sacrificed for telling the truth*—a truth, too, that was of

vital importance to the beleaguered Candahar Army—nay to the interests of British India! Peace be to the memory of this noble fellow!”

The present writer would gladly have abstained from all allusion to the circumstances which caused Lord Ellenborough to withhold from Major Outram the distinguished post that had been promised him, had not inaccurate statements been promulgated on the subject. Thus Sir W. Napier, in his “*Conquest of Scinde*,” writing under imperfect information, was induced to express himself as follows:—

“It was not Lord Ellenborough’s policy to divide power between political and military chiefs; nor to place the latter below the former when war was at hand. Hence the removal of Major Outram was a necessary consequence of Sind being placed under a General; but there were other causes for dismissing him. The Governor-General did not think highly of his talents, and had been forced to withdraw all confidence in him, on specific grounds of a serious and public nature, distinct from the offence he gave by urging his own opinions and views upon his superiors, against all reason. Sir C. Napier, a better man for war or policy, and of a surer judgment in what constitutes greatness, then took the entire charge of Sind and its troubled affairs.”

Respecting the “views and opinions” pertinaciously urged by Major Outram, enough has been already said. And it only remains to be stated that the sole discoverable public act of Major Outram, beyond those above enumerated, with which Lord Ellenborough found fault, was the restoration to the Khan of Khelat,

of the Valley of Shawl, of which we had despoiled his father, and which Lord Ellenborough would have left as a bone of contention between the Affghans, against whom we were prosecuting a war of retribution, and the Khelat subjects, on whose good services we were dependant for the safe descent to the plains of General England's Army !

Major Outram's suggestion to restore Shawl to its rightful owner, had already received the sanction of Lord Auckland. But, before carrying it out, he applied for a renewal of the sanction to Lord Ellenborough. Upwards of two months elapsed without any reply being received ; and, urged by important political considerations, Outram ventured to give effect to a measure which has since been complacently dilated on by Lord Ellenborough's most able and eloquent advocate, as reflecting the utmost credit on his Lordship. Mr. Charles Lushington, in his "Great Country's little Wars," has thus expressed himself :—

"The portion of his dominions taken from him (Khan of Khelat), has since been restored by Lord Ellenborough. It is worth observing that, *to this single act of justice we may attribute the subsequent tranquillity of the country !*"

Nay, Mr. Lushington singles out this measure of Lord Auckland, adopted at Major Outram's suggestion, and for giving effect to which, the latter officer was rebuked by Lord Ellenborough, *as almost the only "spot upon which the eye can dwell with pleasure, in the dark history of our four years' supremacy beyond the Indus !"*

Instead of receiving the appointment of "Envoy to

the States on the Lower Indus," Major Outram was remanded to his regiment, by an order issued on the 19th October, 1842—the day after Lord Ellenborough received intelligence of the safe descent to the plains of General England's Army, which, as Sir C. Napier has declared, and as the Indian authorities well know, owed its safety, in a great measure, if not entirely, to the exertions of Major Outram and his zealous assistants. By that order the Political Establishment was broken up. Some of its members returned to regimental duty: others, under the designation of *aides-de-camp*, were selected to perform political duty under Sir C. Napier, to whom was confided the supreme control of Sind, political and military. And all the honour or reward vouchsafed to Major Outram, and his assistants, in consideration of their past services, consisted in the following not very impassioned compliment, conveyed in a General Order dated the 20th of October:—

"The Governor-General also requests that Major-General Sir C. Napier will express to Major Outram and the other political officers, his thanks for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in their various transactions with the native Chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the Army."

The treatment received by Major Outram, naturally created a considerable sensation in the Indian Services; and letters containing the most gratifying expressions of admiration for his achievements, and sympathy for their unworthy requital, poured in on him from the

most distinguished Civil and Military servants of Government. His own feelings may be judged of by the following extract from a letter addressed by him to his personal friend and diplomatic instructor, Colonel John Sutherland, whose name is a cherished household word wherever the modern history of India is studied :—

“It is amusing to you and me, and those who know how much we owe to his Lordship, to see *him* pluming himself on *the retrieval of the honour of our arms at Cabool*. Had he had his own views carried out, what a different position we should now have been in ! I care not now what his Lordship does with me. I have lived to see our honour redeemed, and my personal welfare is a very secondary consideration. Affghan prowess is again estimated at its true value, which his Lordship would have left future ages to believe superior to ours !”

Again :—

“Thank God, I am again independent ; and I re-join my regiment with greater pleasure than I left it many years ago, elate with hope, and honourable ambition. This is no affectation. May his Lordship’s coming honours—‘*for the steadfast resolution with which he upheld our honour*’—sit as lightly on his conscience, as do his slights, or my degradation, on my own mind.”

The only regrets and anxieties experienced by Major Outram were on account of his able, zealous, and hard-working assistants. The following extract from a letter addressed to one of them, on the 21st September, will show the deep interest he took in their welfare :—

“ See how determined his Lordship is to adulate the military, and humble the politicals. He has written a most flattering letter to General England on the passage of the Kojuck, and so he will on that of the Bolan Pass; while we, who ward off opposition, and secure to the Army the means of moving, are looked upon as drones and dirt. Already have Bell and Hammersly died, and some half dozen more of our department sacrificed their constitutions in the service of Government; and Pontardent is likely to be another victim. Yet no sacrifice on our parts can give us consideration in his Lordship’s eyes. But what need we care for his applause, when we know that we have done our duty to our country, and moreover—*good service*. I shall not, however, allow Pontardent, Leckie, French, and yourself, to whom I am mainly indebted for keeping matters straight during the late crisis, to be overlooked. However, and whatever may be my own fate, I will take care that *your* services *shall* be acknowledged.”

VII.

SERVICES AS COMMISSIONER IN SIND.

1842—1843.

IT was Major Outram's duty, ere he left Sind, to place before Sir C. Napier a full and clear statement of our relations with the Princes of that country, and of the measures for the re-adjustment of those relations which had been, for some time, under consideration. How he acquitted himself of this duty is sufficiently indicated in the following extract from a letter addressed to him by Sir C. Napier on the 28th October 1842 :—

“ I cannot allow you to leave this command without expressing to you the high sense I entertain of your zeal and abilities in the public service, and of the obligations I personally feel towards you, for the great assistance you have so kindly and so diligently afforded me ; thereby diminishing in every way the difficulties that I have had to encounter, as your successor in the political department of Sind.”

Anxious to afford Major Outram a parting manifestation of their sympathy, esteem, and admiration, the Officers of the Force invited him to a public dinner on the 5th of November. Sir C. Napier presided ; and in proposing the toast of the evening, he paid its sub-

ject the highest compliment that one soldier could possibly render to another.

“Gentlemen”—said the veteran warrior—“I have told you that there are only to be two toasts drunk this evening. One, that of a lady (the Queen), you have already responded to; the other shall be for a gentleman. But, before I proceed any further, I must tell you a story. In the fourteenth century there was, in the French Army, a knight renowned for deeds of gallantry in war, and wisdom in council; indeed, so deservedly famous was he that, by general acclamation, he was called the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*. The name of this knight you may all know was the Chevalier Bayard. Gentlemen, I give you, ‘THE BAYARD OF INDIA, *sans peur et sans reproche*—MAJOR JAMES OUTRAM, OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.’”

This honourable and spontaneous tribute derived increased value from the fact that it was not rendered till after Sir C. Napier had perused Major Outram’s correspondence with the Government of India, on all questions relating to Sind and Beloochistan, wherein he had differed in opinion from Lord Ellenborough, as well as copies of the letters which he had addressed to his lordship’s secretaries, and other high functionaries, in reference to the originally contemplated Affghan policy, and to the case of Lieut. Hammersly.

His duty to Sir C. Napier being performed, Major Outram took his departure from Sind. On his arrival in Bombay, he received the congratulations of his own Government, on “the satisfactory terms under which he had made over his late important charge to Sir C. Napier,” as well as an assurance “of the high

gratification which they had derived from observing the eminent zeal and ability with which he had discharged the important duties confided to him during the three last eventful years." And, in the course of a few days, the Governor (the Right Hon. Sir G. Arthur) offered him the only appointment then in his gift, with an expression of regret that he had none at his disposal which, in point of responsibility and emolument, more nearly approached those which he had previously filled "with such distinguished advantage to the public service." Major Outram had, however, resolved on proceeding on a furlough to Europe ; and he declined availing himself of the Governor's kindness.

On the 13th of December, the general community of Bombay gave a public entertainment in his honour, which was described in the papers of the day, as the most remarkable demonstration that had taken place at the presidency for many years. It was certainly one of the most enthusiastic. Nor did the enthusiasm of his admirers exhaust itself in this demonstration. For in the course of a few days a second, and, if possible, a still more impressive public reception was given to him at the Club. And those who were present on that occasion will not readily forget the fervour with which the assembled company endorsed the eulogium passed on their guest by the Chairman—a gentleman recognized by successive Governors General, and by the Court of Directors, as one of the ablest and most distinguished members of the Civil Service of India.*

* "Early distinguished"—said Mr. Willoughby—"for intrepidity, judgment, and firmness, his name became soon known as a soldier of

Major Outram was compelled to forego for a time the pleasure he had anticipated from a visit to England. For Sir C. Napier had, intermediately, requested that he might be appointed "a Commissioner for the arrangement of the details of the Treaty which was to be proposed to the Ameers of Sind." Lord Ellenborough had directed him to return to Sind in that capacity. And Outram obeyed.

His proceedings as Commissioner in Sind, the opinions he expressed, and the recommendations he urged, are detailed in his Commentary.* They obtained the unanimous and cordial approbation of the Court of Directors. They have been supported and applauded in Parliament by many of the most distinguished members of all political sections.† And recent revela-

the first promise, and a sportsman with whom few could vie. . . . Well has he been compared by a gallant officer in another place, to the Knight who, above all, bore the character of being *sans peur et sans reproche*—the noble Bayard—the pride of chivalry—the glory of France. For, like him, bold in the field, wise in council, courteous and gentle in chambers, wherever he has moved he has been admired, respected, and beloved."

* "The Conquest of Sind: a Commentary, by Lieut.-Colonel Outram, C.B." Blackwood and Sons, 1846. This book is now out of print. Colonel Outram has been repeatedly urged to prepare a new edition; but unwilling to do aught which might appear to evince a wish to re-awaken the unhappy (and now nearly forgotten) *personal* controversy between Sir C. Napier and himself, he has hitherto resisted the solicitations of his friends.

† Amongst those who have prominently advocated the views of Major Outram in Parliament, may be mentioned, Lord Jocelyn, Earls Grey and Shaftesbury, Sir R. H. Inglis, Mr. T. B. Macaulay, Mr. Hume, Mr. Hawes, Mr. Vernon Smith, Mr. R. D. Mangles, Mr. Sharman Crawford, &c., &c., &c.

tions have lent to them additional and unexpected illustration and enforcement.* It is, therefore, unnecessary to allude to them in this place, further than to observe that, while he zealously applied himself to the task of pacifically carrying out the unjust and impolitic arrangements, with the execution of which he was charged, he did not shrink from protesting against their injustice, and predicting their disastrous results. Thus, on the 26th January, 1843, three weeks before the battle of Meeanee, he wrote as follows to Sir C. Napier:—

“It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical—positive robbery. And I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a *murder*.”

And so strongly was he impressed with a conviction of the impossibility of carrying out the details of the new arrangements in a satisfactory manner, that when, the day after despatching this letter, he received, through Sir C. Napier, a communication from Lord Ellenborough, assigning him a monthly allowance of £150 in remuneration of his services, he unhesitatingly declined to avail himself of his Lordship's liberality. “I have not”—he wrote to the General—“been able to effect anything as Commissioner yet, and see little prospect of doing so.” And thus he continued:—“Whatever may be my private objec-

* Vide the two series of Parliamentary Papers relative to Meer Ali Merad, moved for by the Earl of Shaftesbury and Viscount Jocelyn.

tions to receiving what might possibly be construed as a pecuniary favour,* I must, *without reference to any personal feelings whatever*, abstain from accepting public money which I have not earned. I beg, therefore, that you will not be annoyed with me for declining to take advantage of the authority to draw salary as Commissioner. Pray do not suppose that I intend officially objecting to receive the money, or that I purpose taking any notice whatever of the matter. I merely intend allowing the half-sheet of foolscap to remain a dead-letter; or, rather, I have destroyed it, that I might not hereafter be tempted to make use of it. I shall simply draw my Captain's 'pay in the field,' to which I have an undoubted right.†

"I am too glad of the honour of serving under you, and proud of your friendship and confidence, to require or wish for further advantage so long as I continue with you.

"I shall defer sending this letter, however, till you dispense with my services, lest it should induce you to do so one day sooner than you otherwise intended."‡

Sir C. Napier did not consider himself at liberty to modify the policy against which Major Outram had protested. And, believing that no value could be

* From Lord Ellenborough.

† Outram, though Brevet-Major, was only Regimental Captain.

‡ This letter was sealed in the presence of Captain Brown and Dr. Gibbon on the 27th of January, for delivery, by the first of these officers, to Sir C. Napier as soon as Outram left Scinde, or in the event of his falling. It was delivered on the 20th of February, 1843.

attached to the assurances and guarantees of the Ameers, he continued to advance on the capital of Lower Sind, notwithstanding that its Princes had acquiesced in all the terms proposed to them, and had appended their seals to the "Treaty." Exasperated by the spoliative character of that Treaty, more especially by the unparalled wrongs inflicted on Meer Noostum, the venerable Rais, or Lord Paramount of Sind, and still further incensed at the continued approach of the British Army, the Belooche feudatories that had hastened to the capital to offer their services to their menaced Sovereigns, vowed vengeance against Major Outram, who, attended by a small escort, had been deputed to Hydrabad by Sir C. Napier. The Ameers implored Outram to return to the Army, lest he should be made the object of an attack, from which they might be unable to protect him, and for which the General would hold them responsible. He declined to do so ; and on one occasion, when returning from the Durbar, he and his party were saved from the fury of the enraged Belooches only by the personal interposition of some of the Ameers, who, knowing their danger, insisted on acting as their escort. "Had we"—writes Outram—"Had we fallen victims, who shall say that our blood would have been justly chargeable on the men who spilt it? In what capital, even of Europe, could we, visiting it under similar circumstances, and after the occurrence of the events which had recently unhinged men's minds in Sind, have expected to pass in safety through the midst of an infuriated populace?"*

* "The Conquest of Sind : a Commentary," p. 357.

Outram's position as Commissioner had been most anomalous and painful. He had been constrained to take an active, and somewhat prominent part in an invasion which he had strongly deprecated, even when it was merely hinted at as a possible contingency. The invasion had been followed up by the infliction of still further injustice on the unhappy Princes of Sind; and, emphatically as Outram had denounced that injustice to Sir C. Napier, he was now bound to vindicate it in his communications with the victims. On the Ameers he had to urge a speedy settlement of their affairs, while he was engaged in demonstrating to the General that the terms insisted on, as the basis of the settlement, would ruin the Ameers, and revolutionize the country. He was required to obtain assent to demands against which he himself had protested as "*positive robbery*." And he had to warn the Sindian Princes against resistance, as a measure which would bring on them merited destruction, though he had himself recorded his solemn conviction that every life lost in the field, in consequence of our aggressive policy, would be chargeable on us as a murder.

"Had Outram"—writes the Calcutta Reviewer, previously quoted—"Had Outram, when deputed to Hyderabad, been permitted the *fair discretion* that his position demanded—had he been authorized definitely to promise any reasonable terms, his abilities and his character would have secured an honourable peace. But it was not in human nature that the Ameers should long continue to listen to an Envoy sent to demand everything, and offer nothing. This was not negotiating; it was dragooning. A British officer,

escorted by a single company, was not the proper delegate for such a mission. Sir C. Napier, at the head of his army, was the fitting ambassador."

Outram held three conferences with the Ameers, and made every effort to save them. But the continued advance of Sir C. Napier, who was now within sixteen miles of the capital, and certain circumstances connected with the advance, as reported by the representatives who had been sent to Sir C. Napier's camp, satisfied the Belooches that the General was bent on hostilities; that he meant to attack Hyderabad without any formal declaration of war, and in spite of the acquiescence of the Princes in all his demands.* And they resolved, at all hazards, to oppose a bold front to the unprovoked assault against which they had been warned to prepare. Afraid longer to resist the wild fury of their exasperated feudatories, a majority of the Ameers would appear to have given their assent to a determination they were powerless to overrule. And as it would have been in violation of the most elementary strategic principles to allow Outram's military escort (which had now been reinforced by a company of H. M.'s. 22nd Regt.) to remain at the Residency, and therefore in the rear of the army about to move out to meet Sir C. Napier, instructions were issued for dislodging them. Eight thousand Belooches were accordingly despatched to the Residency to effect this operation, with directions to avoid all unnecessary bloodshed. "If the British fight, kill them;—if they run away, never mind;"—was the order issued to the Belooche Army by Meer

* Vide Appendix.

Shadad, who, to restrain the exuberant zeal of his soldiery, had placed himself at their head, and who seems to have thought that the overwhelming force under his command would deter the escort from offering resistance. *

The British, however, did not “run away.” As a matter of course, and as a point of duty, the Belooches did their best to “kill them.” And Outram’s small but heroic band achieved one of the most memorable feats recorded in the military annals of India—the defence of the Hyderabad Residency.

So studious was Outram of the interests and reputation of his brethren in arms, that he desired Captain Conway of H. M.’s. 22nd Regt., the officer in command of his escort, to report this brilliant achievement, on the plea that he himself was only present in a diplomatic capacity. Captain Conway’s report was, however, returned by Sir C. Napier, who insisted on Outram reporting his cessation of his diplomatic functions on the first shot from the enemy, and consequently his assumption of the military command as the senior

* Vide Peer Budhodeen’s evidence in the Supplement to Parliamentary Papers on Scinde. Even Lord Ellenborough himself, while yet ignorant of the real merits of the case, inclined to the belief, that “had the Ameers been entirely masters of their own troops,” hostilities would have been averted. The fuller information contained in the Parliamentary Papers leaves no doubt on the subject. And that Meer Sobdar, if not also Meer Meer Mahommed, deprecated to the last even a passive resistance to the anticipated attack of Sir C. Napier, is shown by the eloquent writer of “*Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*,” in his 13th Chapter. It is generally understood that the additional papers called for in the House of Commons by Lord Jocelyn, and now in the press, will tend to throw much additional light on this subject.

officer present. To this Outram was only reconciled by the General's assurance that he would more effectually serve Conway, by reporting his gallantry, than by leaving him to report it himself. And to that fine officer, and his intrepid band, did Outram attribute the entire merit of the defence.*

To the defence of the Residency succeeded the battle of Meeanee; and in reporting that action to the Governor-General, on the 18th of February, 1843, Sir C. Napier thus alluded to Outram's performances:—

“On the 14th instant the whole body of the Ameers, assembled in full Durbar, formally affixed their seals to the draft-treaty. On leaving the Durbar Major Outram and his companions were in great peril; a plot had been laid to murder them all. They were saved by the guards of the Ameers; but the next day (the 15th) the residence of Major Outram was attacked by 8,000 of the Ameers' troops, headed by one or more of the Ameers. The report of this nefarious transaction I have the honour to inclose. I heard of it at Hala, at which place the fearless and distinguished Major Outram joined me with his brave companions in the stern and extraordinary defence of his Residency

* The officers present at the defence of the Residency were Captains Conway, of H. M's. 22nd, and Green, of the 21st N. I., both of whom received the rank of Brevet-Major, and the Companionship of the Bath; Brevet Captain Brown, of the Bengal Engineers, who subsequently became Secretary to the Government of Sind; Brevet Captain (now Major) Wells, of the 15th N. I., the able and gallant commandant of the Poonah Horse; Lieutenants Harding and Pennefather, of H.M's. 21st Regiment.

against so overwhelming a force, accompanied by six pieces of cannon. * * *

“I ought to have observed, in the body of this despatch, that I had, the night before the action, detached Major Outram in the steamers, with 200 sepoy, to set fire to the wood in which we understood the enemy’s left flank was posted. This was an operation of great difficulty and danger, but would have been most important to the result of the battle. However, the enemy had moved about eight miles to their right during the night, and Major Outram executed his task without difficulty at the hour appointed, viz., nine o’clock, and from the field we observed the smoke of the burning wood arise. I am strongly inclined to think that this circumstance had some effect on the enemy, but it deprived me of the able services of Major Outram, Captain Green, and Lieutenants Brown and Wells, &c., &c., &c.

“The defence of the Residency by Major Outram and the small force with him, against such numbers of the enemy, was so admirable, that I have scarcely mentioned it in the foregoing despatch, because I propose to send your Lordship a detailed account of it, as a brilliant example of defending a military post.” *

With the battle of Meeanee necessarily terminated Major Outram’s functions as Commissioner. And he

* It is to be regretted that Sir C. Napier never fulfilled the intention here expressed. In acknowledging Sir C. Napier’s despatch, the Secret Committee expressed their admiration of the defence of the Residency, and their sense of the peculiar appropriateness of the terms “*fearless and distinguished*,” as applied by the General to Major Outram.

returned to Bombay, where he was received with the most gratifying demonstrations of regard and respect by the Government, the Services, and the general community. A public meeting was called, to determine on the best mode of testifying the general sentiment, when it was unanimously resolved to present him with a sword, of the value of 300 guineas, and a costly piece of plate.*

* The following inscription appears on the sword presented to Major Outram :—

“ Presented to Major James Outram, 23rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the British Residency at Hyderabad, in Sind, on the 15th of February, 1843, against an army of 8,000 Beloochees, with six guns.—Bombay, April, 1843.”

Marked on one side of the blade,—

“ Major James Outram.”

On the other,—

“ Sans peur et sans reproche.”

There are many of Outram's friends who will derive pleasure from perusing the following letter, which he received on the same occasion from the universally respected Lord Bishop of Bombay.

“ *Bycullah, March 29th, 1843.*

“ My dear Sir,—Amongst the friends who assembled in the Town Hall on Saturday, in order to offer you a tribute of their respect, there probably was none who felt more admiration of your conduct in the late campaigns, and in your former situation when you were reducing the Bheel tribes to habits of order, than myself. I felt, however, that I could not consistently take part in the offering of a sword, as it is the object of my office and ministry to keep the sword in its scabbard, and to labour to promote peace. With these views, and with feelings of great respect for the intrepid bravery, ability, persevering activity, and I will add, forbearance towards the weak, which have marked your conduct, I venture to

For his military services during the conquest of Sind, Outram received the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and was made a Companion of the Bath; two distinctions “which”—to quote the words of the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone—“had been promised, and

offer you a small tribute of respect, and to request your acceptance of a Book, a blessed Book in which you may find support in the hour of trial, and consolation at that time when the sword must be laid aside, and when external things must cease to interest. In it, my dear sir, is to be found a peace which the world cannot disturb. I pray that this peace may be yours, and with sentiments of much admiration and respect, believe me to be, sir, very sincerely yours,

“THOMAS BOMBAY.”

The Books forwarded with the above letter were the Oxford editions of the “Book of Common Prayer” and of the “Holy Bible,” bearing the following inscription in the Bishop’s handwriting :—

“Thou hast covered my head in the day of battle.”—Ps. cxi. 7.

MAJOR OUTRAM,

As a mark of respect,

With the kindest and best wishes
of the Bishop of Bombay.

March, 1843.

“This is life eternal that they might know Thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.”—St. John xvii. 3.

It may not be uninteresting to many of the readers of this volume to be informed, that while Outram has earned for himself a wide circle of devoted friends and ardent admirers amongst the Protestant clergy and missionaries in India, the kindness and protection he has invariably afforded to the (too often) neglected members of the Latin communion, reached the ears, and obtained the formal thanks of the present Pope, who caused a gold medal to be struck, and transmitted to him, “*as a testimonial of gratitude for the kindness displayed by you to poor Catholics under your command, or stationed within your Residency.*”

more than promised long ago." "Had he," continues Mr. Elphinstone, "received these honours at the time (1840) he would now (on the principle which has been observed of advancing each officer one step) have been made a Colonel, Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, and K.C.B." Mr. Elphinstone then proceeds to notice Outram's "*political services, which it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy.*" And he observes that, "considering all these services, and the high station held by Major Outram when he performed them, the appearance of his name amongst crowds of subalterns, is rather a humiliation than an honour." And so think many. At all events, the oversight of 1840 has materially injured Colonel Outram; for if, as has been already stated, Major Outram had received the Lieut.-Colonelcy "*promised, and more than promised*" in that year, he would now have been entitled to command one of the Divisions of the Bombay Army.

On the 1st of April 1843, Colonel Outram proceeded to England, to avail himself of the Furlough for which he had applied in the preceding December. And, on his arrival in this country, he lost no time in pleading for a mitigation of the fate of the dethroned, despoiled, and exiled Ameers, whom he knew to be innocent of much that had been laid to their charge.

In support of his representations, he referred to his officially recorded "Notes" of the "Conferences" he had held with the Sindian Princes before the battle of Meeanee. These documents, containing the Ameers' version of the events which had preceded Outram's mission to Hyderabad, and the justification of their

conduct, he had forwarded to Sir C. Napier, on the 11th February, three days before the commencement of hostilities. Sir C. Napier had undertaken to transmit them "*at once*" to the Governor-General, "*because it is fair to the Ameers.*" And Outram never doubted that they had been received by his Lordship, and by him despatched to the authorities in England; but the authorities in England never even heard of them. Outram, therefore, furnished them with his own copies, and requested that, in justice to the Ameers, these should be published along with the other papers relative to Sind, which had been called for in Parliament. And, though fully aware that by pressing this request he would most probably (as he did) forfeit the token of Royal approbation which Her Majesty's Ministers were understood to contemplate bestowing on him, in recognition of his services during the Affghan reverses, he continued to urge, and eventually carried, his point. The "*Notes of Conference*" *were* published; and a peremptory demand was made on Lord Ellenborough for the reasons which had induced him to suppress the originals. His Lordship, innocent of all attempts at suppression, and amazed at the charge, made a reference to Sir C. Napier; and the missing "*Notes*" were eventually transmitted to the Government of India—not, however, till long after the Ameers had been dethroned, despoiled, and sent off captives to Calcutta and Poma.*

Nor were the "*Notes*" the only, or by any means the most important of the many documents—all essen-

* We have his Lordship's admission of the fact, that these Notes did not reach him until *four* months after the fatal battle of

tially requisite to enable the Governor-General, and Her Majesty's Ministers, to form a correct opinion regarding the Sind policy—that were withheld, until formally demanded from Sir Charles, months after the annexation of Sind. The supplementary volume of the Papers relating to Sind, containing these suppressed documents, affords painful evidence, that, when Lord Ellenborough annexed that country—denounced, dethroned, despoiled, and exiled its Princes, and in lofty panegyric eulogized and sanctioned the whole of Sir C. Napier's proceedings—he was in complete ignorance of the real merits of the case. He knew neither the extent of the exactions that had been forced on the Ameers, nor the nature and cogency of the remonstrances they had offered; the submission they had rendered, nor the efforts they had made to prove its sincerity. And equally devoid of correct information were Her Majesty's Ministers when they confirmed Lord Ellenborough's acts and proclamations in reference to Sind.

But these acts and proclamations *had* been ratified before Outram appeared before the authorities in England to plead for the Ameers. In political ethics such a consideration is held conclusive. Governors and Governors-General must be "*supported*," however foolish or censurable may be their measures. When the sanction of Downing-street has once been given to those measures, even under a misconception, the duty becomes still more imperative. And little favour is

Meeanee. "These notes" (observes Lord Ellenborough) "I never read until I saw them to-day,—June 13, 1853." See "Supplement to Sind Blue Book," No. 135.

generally shown to those whose inconvenient revelations are calculated to lead to discussions regarding the wisdom or justice of "accomplished facts." Outram's services during the Affghan disasters were allowed to pass without the recognition which was at one time in contemplation. Not even did the non-fulfilment of the promise made to him for his previous performances in 1838-39 obtrude itself on the official conscience of Her Majesty's advisers. And Lord Ellenborough solaced himself for the temporary annoyance and alarm he had experienced, by penning "Minutes," in which Outram was depicted as an easily beguiled simpleton, and in which was reproduced the absurd story of his having offered advice, which, if adopted, would have compromised the safety of Sir C. Napier's Army. For all this, Outram was fully prepared. When, alone and for awhile unsupported, he stood forth to implore clemency for the Ameers, he knew that he was sacrificing his personal interests. And it was not in his nature to shrink from the sacrifice. But he did not anticipate that he would be called upon to renounce the friendship of Sir C. Napier, for whom, at that time, he entertained feelings of strong personal attachment.

In pleading for the Ameers, he but gave effect to intentions of which he had long previously apprised Sir C. Napier, and in deprecation of which Sir Charles had never uttered a word. But the demand made on the latter for the suppressed documents, coupled with misapprehensions on his part as to the nature and extent of Outram's representations, led to angry feelings and harsh language. The misunderstanding became

mutual, complex, and insoluble. Serious imputations and irritating epithets were evoked on both sides ; and much unnecessary acerbity was thrown into the quarrel by the officious intermeddling of injudicious partizans.

The compiler of these "Memoranda" would not willingly indite a word calculated to resuscitate the strife. He therefore abstains from recapitulating and refuting the unwarrantable allegations which, in the fervour of partizanship, some of Sir Charles Napier's supporters were induced to make in reference to Colonel Outram. And he has struck from his manuscript the comments on Sir William Napier's "Conquest of Scinde," which at one time he had resolved on reproducing from the Reviews in which they appeared. Those who have a taste for controversy, and are desirous of ascertaining what the great military historian had to say respecting Colonel Outram, and what that officer had to advance regarding both Sir William and Sir Charles Napier, are referred to the two "Conquests of Scinde,"—the one by Sir W. Napier, professing to be an history, the other, by Colonel Outram, avowedly a commentary on that history.*

In the mean time, the Compiler deems it enough to conclude the present section with a brief quotation from the distinguished contributor to the *Calcutta*

* Or they may refer to the *Calcutta Review*, Vol. 6, p. 569 (No. 12, for Dec. 1846), in which Colonel Outram's Commentary was noticed ; or to the *Quarterly* for Oct. 1852, in which most of the facts adduced in the Commentary were reproduced in a review of the very able and interesting work entitled "Dry Leaves from Young Egypt."

Review, whom he has more than once had occasion to cite :—

“ The foregoing remarks were written before the appearance of Colonel Outram’s letter to General W. Napier—a letter that was not required to set the ‘ Bayard of the Indian Army’ (as Sir Charles Napier in an inspired moment happily designated him) right in the eyes of the Indian public. Still less do they require a further vindication of his conduct, though they will welcome every item of information he may feel justified in giving. We fearlessly assert that every right-minded man, acquainted with the progress of events during the year 1842, not only acquits Outram of the absurd and contradictory charges alleged against him by the Napiers, but recognizes in his conduct throughout the Scinde transactions the spirit of a soldier, a gentleman, and a Christian. . . . The Napiers accuse Outram of jeopardizing the British Army in Scinde; this is mere nonsense. His negotiations, followed up by Sir C. Napier’s acts, were indeed sufficient to endanger his own life. They did so; and nothing but his own brilliant gallantry, and that of his small escort, rescued him from the toils. The British Army was able to take care of itself. Had Outram, however, when deputed to Hyderabad, been permitted the fair discretion that his position demanded, his abilities . . . and character would have secured an honourable peace, &c., &c., &c.*

* Amongst the Appendices to this volume will be found a few remarks on the allegation made by Sir C. Napier’s partizans, that Colonel Outram on one occasion gave advice which, if followed, would have jeopardized the army.

The anticipated "further vindication" above alluded to was contained in "Colonel Outram's Commentary," which received a very cordial eulogium from the *Calcutta* as from other Reviews.

VIII.

SERVICES IN NIMAR AND IN THE SOUTHERN
MAHRATTA COUNTRY.

1844—1845.

COLONEL OUTRAM had been only six months in England, when (November, 1843) intelligence was received of a revolution at Lahore, and of the murder of the Maha-Rajah Shere Sing: events which, in the best informed circles, were considered but the prelude to others which must involve the Indian government in a war against the Sikhs. Ever on the alert, Outram made arrangements for an immediate return to India. And, early in January, he reached Bombay, bearing with him a letter from the Duke of Wellington to the Commander-in-Chief of India, in which he was recommended for employment in the anticipated Punjab campaign. But on reaching the Governor-General's camp, he learned that the storm had blown over; that there was no immediate prospect of hostilities. He had, therefore, to retrace his steps to Nimar, to the political charge and revenue management of which he had, in the mean time, been nominated by Lord Ellenborough.

This post was so vastly inferior in importance and emolument to those which he had recently held, and

in which he had acted so distinguished a part, that his first impulse was to decline it. But his friends represented to him that such a proceeding would be construed into a display of disrespect, both official and personal, to the Governor-General; and they reminded him that there was, at that time, no higher appointment at his lordship's disposal. He accordingly accepted the proffered office; but, at the same time, intimated to his friends his determination to resign it in six months, and to return to England, unless an opportunity of serving in the field should be intermediately afforded him.

No such opportunity occurred. And, on the 10th of September, 1844—the day on which he had completed his six months' service at Nimar—he resigned his appointment, and proceeded to Bombay for the purpose of embarking for England.

On his arrival at the Presidency, he found that an insurrection had broken out in the Southern Mahratta Country, which threatened a very unsatisfactory issue. He tendered his services to the Government. They were gladly accepted. And it was intimated to him that he would be nominated to the political control of the disturbed provinces, in supercession of the Commissioner, Mr. Reeves, who being a Civilian, was deemed less eligible than a military officer for such a post, while hostilities were in progress. To this arrangement Colonel Outram respectfully, but firmly, objected. He declined being made a source of humiliation to a gentleman for whose talents and character he entertained a high respect, and who was intimately acquainted with the disturbed country, and with the

condition, character, and feelings of the disaffected population. But he expressed his readiness to act in conjunction with Mr. Reeves till the termination of the war, after which, as he informed Government, it was his intention to return to England. Sir George Arthur, than whom no one was more capable of appreciating generous traits, expressed, in strong terms, his sense of Colonel Outram's moderation, and directed him to proceed "on special duty" to the seat of war.

On the 11th of October, Outram arrived in Brigadier Wallace's Camp before Samunghur. He was present at,^e and assisted in the storm of that Fortress, on the morning of the 13th. And he continued, in addition to the exercise of his diplomatic functions, to render active and important military services in the Field. For these he received the grateful acknowledgments of General Delamotte, Brigadier Wallace, and the other military officers to whom his aid was rendered, as well as the cordially rendered applause of his Government, who expressed their "great satisfaction that he had thereby an opportunity during the military operations that had been in progress, of displaying those high qualities as a soldier for which he had ever been distinguished."

The clemency displayed by Mr. Reeves and Colonel Outram to the vanquished garrison of Samunghur did not receive the entire approbation of Government. For they long continued to labour under the erroneous impression that the amnesty granted by these officers, after the capture of the Fortress, had been extended to the promoters of the rebellion. And there

is reason to believe that they were not altogether pleased with the apologetic and extenuatory pleas which the conjoint Commissioners continued to urge in behalf of the rebels, whom they regarded as, in many respects, aggrieved men. At all events it was deemed proper to renew to Colonel Outram the offer of sole and undivided political command. And when he declined the proffered distinction, on the plea that he contemplated returning to Europe as soon as the war was brought to a conclusion, it was bestowed on Colonel Ovans, the then Resident at Sattara. Had that able officer assumed the appointment thus tendered him, there is every reason to believe, from the nature of several of his subsequent representations that he would have pleaded in behalf of the rebels with even less reserve than Mr. Reeves or Colonel Outram. But he had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the enemy while proceeding from Sattara to enter on the discharge of his new duties. He remained a captive during the subsequent operations; and Mr. Reeves and Colonel Outram continued to act as conjoint Commissioners. Their "prudence and firmness" elicited the warm commendations of Government. And the Governor-General of India (Lord Hardinge) when expressing his "complete concurrence" in these praises, recorded "his entire approbation of Colonel Outram's conduct," and "his opinion of the temper, judgment, and discretion, which marked Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's proceedings on every occasion subsequent to the seizure of Colonel Ovans." The qualification thus implied of the praise due to Outram's proceedings prior to that event, had reference to the

amnesty which his Lordship, as well as the Bombay Government, at that time believed to have embraced the fomenters of the rebellion.

After the storm and fall of the Fortresses of Punalla and Pownaghur, both of which Outram had been amongst the first to enter, it was supposed by the military commanders that hostilities had been brought to a termination. And official intimation having been made by them to this effect, Outram proceeded to Bombay, in the middle of December, with the view of taking his passage to England.

But it soon became apparent that little had been achieved beyond the transference of the war from the Kolapoor country, situated *above* the Western Ghauts, to the Sawant Waree State, *below* them. Thither had fled the fugitive foes whom General Delamotte had dispersed. The disaffected Warree population readily joined them. Matters assumed a very serious appearance. And the Government were glad, once more, to avail themselves of Outram's services.

The nature and extent of these services may be best described in the words of the writer in the *Calcutta Review*, so often quoted in the preceding pages, one of the most distinguished political military functionaries in British India, the able administrator of one of its most important territorial divisions, and an officer for whom the present Governor-General of India, and the present Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, entertain much respect and warm personal esteem. That, to the uninformed, his testimony may appear tainted with the spirit of a partizan, the Reviewer deems

not improbable ; that such in reality is very far from the case he takes occasion to explain. “ The tone of our remarks upon Colonel Outram ”—thus he writes—“ may savour of partial panegyric to those of our readers who have not followed out Outram’s career as we have done ; ” “ but ”—he adds—“ no personal feelings can mingle in our praise of a man whom we have never seen, and whom we know only by his public acts.”

Referring to the insurrection in Sawunt Waree, he writes as follows :—

“ Fortunately for Government, the man they wanted was at hand. Colonel Outram, who was now, about the end of December, at Bombay, with the intention of proceeding to Europe, at once forgot past neglect and past injuries, and came forward to rescue the Government from their difficulties. He volunteered to return to the seat of war, and there organize and lead a light corps. Nobly did he fulfil the large expectations that were now centred in him. Within a fortnight he was again in the field, the soul of all active measures ; his very advanced guard driving before them the half-armed rabble that had kept three brigades at bay.

“ Never was the magic power of one man’s presence more striking than on Outram’s return to the seat of war. It might seem invidious, were we to dwell on the panic that then prevailed at Vingorla and Waree, but the slightest glance at the proceedings in those quarters will show that the insurgents had inspired a ridiculously formidable idea of their own importance. All communications had long been cut off ; the posts were brought *by long sea* from Malwan to Vingorla ;

and many of the inhabitants of this latter place nightly took refuge in boats in the harbour. The troops were harassed with patrolling duty, yet the neighbourhood was rife with murders and robberies, the perpetrators of which sent insulting messages to the authorities. On one occasion a religious meeting was dispersed by a wag suddenly calling out that the enemy were upon them. Vingorla, be it remembered, stands in an open country.

“At Waree, matters were, if possible, still worse; there the troops remained as in blockade, not a soul venturing beyond the lines. All outposts were called in, and the malcontents permitted to consider themselves masters of the field. When the garrison was reinforced by the arrival of the 10th and a part of the Bombay Native Infantry, the authorities determined to occupy the gorge of the valley of Sivapur, in which lay the villages of the insurgent Phund Sawunt, and thus cut off this focus of rebellion from the less disturbed districts. The scheme was a good one, but failed from the manner in which its execution was attempted. A detachment of 200 sepoy set out; they were *sniped* at from the jungle, and one man was wounded; when, instead of closing with the enemy, they took post in a sort of enclosure, and were soon beset by increased numbers. A reinforcement of 200 men joined them, but the combined force, after losing twenty killed and wounded, retreated to Waree. This success, of course, increased the confidence of the insurgents, whose insolence was not restrained even by the arrival, soon after, of Her Majesty's 2nd Regiment. They gave out that they were tired of

thrashing sepoy, and wished to try the mettle of the ‘Lambs.’ They soon obtained an opportunity of proving their mettle, but the sight of that fine corps was too much for their nerves. The Europeans were then kept idle, first at Waree, then at Dukhun-waree, and full scope was given to the activity of the enemy.

“At this juncture Outram landed at Vingorla; where, picking up two or three excellent officers, he pushed on to Waree, and thence towards Sivapur. From this date, the 14th January, matters took a turn; hitherto the three Brigades had been playing bo-peep with the enemy, and from the tops of the Ghats examining, through telescopes, the stockades below, which the Commanders did not think it prudent to attack. But now, at length, a decided movement was announced for hemming in the rebels in the valley of Sivapur. Twelve hundred men were placed under Outram, with orders to beat up the low ground from Waree towards the forts of Munohor and Munsuntosh; Colonel Carruthers, with a Brigade, was to occupy the Sivapur valley on the other side of the ridge on which those forts are situated; while Colonel Wallace was, on a given day, to descend the Ghats; and it was reckoned that his troops, dove-tailing with those under the immediate command of General Delamotte, would complete the encirclement of the rebels. * * *

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“To return to Colonel Outram. No communication was practicable between the troops above and below the Ghats, and he was left with his small band to his

own resources, without definite orders, and with very scanty supplies, to carry out the most difficult operation of the campaign. Merrily and confidently he advanced through the wild sylvan scenes never before trod by European foot. The ears of his people were now daily saluted by the echo of the Artillery on the overhanging Ghats; sounds which could only be supposed to indicate 'the tug of war' above, and loss of ribbons and laurels to those below. But such fears were soon relieved by finding that the firing was only Colonel Wallace's long practice with extra charges from the summit of the Elephant Rock at the village of Sivapur, some three miles distant in the Concan below.

"Each day Outram found points of his route stockaded by the enemy, but they never made a stand, the advanced guard and skirmishers being generally sufficient to disperse the wretched rabble. At length, on the 10th of January, a combined movement was ordered upon the high peak to the west of Munsuntosh. The main attack was to be made by Colonel Carruthers, who, supported by a portion of Colonel Wallace's brigade, was to carry some stockades in his front, and then move up the Dukhun-waree or Sivapur side of the ridge, while Colonel Outram was to make a diversion from the Shirsajee or Gotia valley. This last detachment performed their part, but on reaching the summit of the peak, from which an extensive view was commanded, no sign appeared of either brigade. They saw the stockades which Colonel Carruthers was to have attacked, but which, being now taken in flank, were abandoned—the enemy flying to Munsuntosh, within 1,800 yards of which fort Outram had estab-

lished a post. Colonel Carruthers' brigade had been prevented by the nature of the country from taking their full share in the operations of the day. The next morning another combined movement was made on the village of Gotia, immediately below the forts ; again the nature of the country favoured Outram, the advanced guard of whose detachment captured the village with all its stockades, though very strongly situated.

“From these brief details we may infer how easily the war might have been terminated, months sooner, by more decided measures. The enemy had only to be reached to be routed. The troops, both Bombay and Madras, were ready for their work, but a spirit of undue caution and delay prevailed at Head-quarters.

“We cannot understand how it happened, but Colonel Outram was now left, unsupported, to carry on operations against Munsuntosh. One of those accidents which no human foresight could obviate, frustrated his attempt to gain that fortress by a *coup de main*. He carried three stockades below the fort, attempted to blow open a gate, failed, and was driven back with considerable loss. He held his ground, however, high upon the ridge, retained possession of the stockades, and was on the eve of again storming the fortress, when the enemy evacuated not only Munsuntosh, but the adjoining fort of Munohur. Outram had skilfully thrown out parties to command the debouches from the south and south-west faces of the forts, leaving the remaining portions of the cordon to be filled up by the brigades. Colonel Wallace, however, failed on his part, and thus suffered the rebel chiefs, who had all been encaged, to escape over the Sisadrug ridge, close

to one of his posts, into the Goa territory. Outram followed hard upon their track, had several skirmishes, took many prisoners, and on one occasion nearly captured the Chiefs. Again, he scoured the wild country beneath the Ghats, encouraging the loyal, and beating up the disaffected villages. The nature and value of his services during the operations we have glanced at, are not to be measured by the actual opposition experienced or loss sustained, but by the estimate formed by other commanders of the obstacles and enemy to be encountered, and by the fact that the rapid and skilful movements of his small detachment terminated, in a few days, an organized opposition which had for six weeks kept at bay three brigades, differently handled. The total silence of Government, and the non-publication of any opinion regarding the Sawunt Waree operations, might, at first sight, lead to the inference that Outram's management gave as little satisfaction as did that of his fellow-commanders. But the promotion since bestowed on him amply proves that Government took the same view of his conduct throughout the campaign as did General Delamotte, Colonels Brough and Wallace, and, indeed, all his comrades. Outram's is an almost isolated instance of a man receiving not only civil promotion but brevet rank, without his good fortune exciting jealousy; a remarkable exception, only to be explained by his rare qualities as a soldier, and his conciliatory demeanour as a man. * * *

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“If our narrative has kept to Colonel Outram's detachment, it is for the simple reason that they appear to have had all the fighting to themselves. No dis-

credit thereby attaches to the troops under the other Commanders, who were always ready for action, and who, when opportunity offered, as at Samunghur and Panulla, behaved with the accustomed gallantry of the Madras and Bombay Armies.

“We must wind up this hasty, though perhaps prolix sketch of Sawunt-waree affairs. By the capture of Munohur and Munsuntosh the strength of the insurrection was broken. The strongholds of the rebels were taken, their boldest leaders slain or captured, and all others, to the number, as already stated, of forty, fled for shelter to Goa. Outram was then again called on to act the diplomatist. His parties still followed up the remaining small marauding bands, while he himself proceeded to Goa, and by the union of firmness and conciliation, induced the Portuguese authorities to remove their *sympathizers* from the frontier, and to substitute a cordon of such troops as would prevent the Goa territory being made the place of ambush from which the insurgents should at discretion devastate Sawunt-waree.” *

The Government, it is true, did not accord unmingled praise to *all* concerned in the Waree campaign, but they did not fail to bear public testimony to Outram's services. They declared that—

“The Light Field Detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, particularly distinguished itself.”

“The Governor in Council”—the Order proceeded to recite—“also experiences the highest gratification in recording his opinion that the energy, boldness, and military skill displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel

* *Calcutta Review*, No. 7, Sept. 1845.

Outram, and the rapidity and success which characterized all the movements of his detachment, in a particular manner entitle him, and the officers and men under his command, to the thanks and approbation of Government."

And the Commander-in-Chief (Sir T. McMahon) when expressing his entire concurrence in these eulogies, took occasion to communicate "the high sense he entertained of the zeal, ability and energy displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram throughout his services, both in the Southern Mahratta Country, and in the Sawunt Warree State."

Still further "to mark his approbation of the gallant and energetic spirit in which his late operations in the Sawunt Warree territory have been undertaken, and the ability with which they have been carried into execution," Sir G. Arthur, on the 26th February 1845, requested Colonel Outram's acceptance of the post of British Resident and Military Commandant at Sattara. Outram was induced to accept the appointment; and, on the 3rd of May, his negotiations with the Governor-General of Portuguese India having been brought to a satisfactory termination, and complete tranquillity having been restored to Sawunt Warree, he was directed to "proceed to assume charge of his appointment as Resident at Sattara, where his services were urgently required."

His delicate negotiations with the Portuguese authorities, in which he had been ably aided by Captain Frederick Arthur, and by his accomplished staff officer Major Stevens, received the approbation not only of the Bombay Government, and of Lord

Hardinge, but of Her Majesty's ministers, who felt that, but for the conciliatory policy adopted by Colonel Outram, they might have been involved in a disagreeable misunderstanding with the Government of Portugal. *

An impression exists amongst some of Col. Outram's friends that his appointment to Sattara was intended as an acknowledgment of the extraordinary services rendered by him during our Affghan reverses. It is a mistake. Those services remain to the present day unrewarded, and (officially) unrecognized. Sir George Arthur had it not in his power to confer any appointment, or distinction, commensurate with the merits of performances which, according to so high an authority as Mr. Elphinstone, "*it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian Diplomacy.*" And when he bestowed on Outram the highest diplomatic and military appointment at his disposal, he took especial care that this act of patronage should in no way prejudice that officer's hitherto unrequited claims, by expressly recording that the nomination was made *solely* in recognition of, and as a reward for, the services rendered by him in 1844-1845.

* Major Stevens, in recognition of the valuable services rendered by him during the Warree campaign, received from Sir G. Arthur the valuable appointment of Commissioner for the affairs of her Highness the Baiza Bhaee. Owing to the absence on sick-certificate of the senior officers, it was Major Stevens's good fortune, as a captain, to lead his regiment into action at the battle of Hydrabad. For his services on that memorable occasion, he was promoted to the rank of major, and received the decoration of the Bath.

IX.

SERVICES AS BRITISH RESIDENT AT THE COURTS
OF SATTARA AND BARODA.

1845—1851.

A sufficient commentary on the manner in which Colonel Outram acquitted himself of his duties at Sattara, is afforded by the fact that he was in May 1847 selected by Sir G. Clerk, the successor of Sir George Arthur, to fill the post of British Resident at Baroda—the highest diplomatic appointment in the gift of the Bombay Government.

The proffered office he accepted with peculiar satisfaction. It secured to him a renewed intercourse with the people for whose welfare he had laboured so earnestly and successfully in 1836-1838. It seemed to open to him a wide field of philanthropic usefulness. And he hastened to enter on its duties, cheered with bright visions of the lasting benefits which he hoped to confer on the Prince and people of Baroda.

But these visions were not destined to be realized. Before he could mature his plans, he was grieved to

discover that the corruption, which in former days he had helped to combat, was not extinct ; that the long cherished popular belief in the corruptibility of the Bombay Government still survived ; and that this belief was not less potent for mischief than he had found it to be in 1837. The further he carried his inquiries, the more forcibly was the conviction impressed on his mind. And he saw that till a more healthy moral tone could be introduced into the Native department of his diplomatic establishment, and a more elevated estimate of the integrity of Bombay functionaries forced on the Native community, vain must be his efforts to promote the mental or material improvement of the people.

Zealously and successfully did he apply himself to the important and difficult questions that presented themselves for investigation. And the excessive mental fatigue he underwent, co-operating with the proverbial unhealthiness of Baroda, developed symptoms of an alarming nature. His medical advisers deeming a change of climate indispensably necessary for his recovery, he proceeded on sick certificate to Egypt, in November 1848. And as is well known to her Majesty's Ministers and the Indian authorities, he was, while in that country, neither idle, nor, as regards the public interests, unprofitably engaged. The fatigue, hardships, and exposure involved in his Egyptian labours, so seriously aggravated his illness, that for many months his friends, both in India and England, dreaded lest each succeeding mail should bring them tidings of his death. But it was other-

wise ordered. There was yet work in store for him. His life was spared. And in the beginning of 1850 he returned to India.

On resuming his appointment at Baroda, he found it necessary to enter on a series of very arduous and painful investigations. For, during his absence, circumstances had occurred calculated to destroy all confidence, on the part of the natives of Baroda, in the integrity of the Bombay Government.

That body had promulgated decisions which the natives *knew* to be most grossly inequitable, and which subsequent investigations prove to have been so. Criminals whose extreme guiltiness was a matter of universal notoriety on the spot, had been treated, not with forbearance only, but with favour. Matters which to the native mind seemed imperatively to demand a stern and uncompromising scrutiny, had been allowed to pass without investigation. Redress had been withheld from oppressed individuals entitled by "guarantee" to British protection, while their oppressors had received signal marks of favour from the Government. A corrupt native functionary, who was well known by the natives of Baroda to have lent himself to the promotion of some nefarious acts—who had betrayed Colonel Outram's confidence—and who, on his treachery coming to light, had applied for permission to retire on the pension to which his past servitude entitled him—had, almost as soon as Colonel Outram left for Egypt, been reinvested by Government with the functions he had so foully pro-

stituted. Not satisfied with this extraordinary proceeding — for it *was* an extraordinary proceeding, viewed even in the most favourable light—the Government had in an elaborate despatch, full of gratuitous assumptions and baseless hypotheses, vindicated him from the charges made against him by Colonel Outram—*charges subsequently substantiated before a legal tribunal*. In doing so, they had passed on Colonel Outram himself severe and unmerited censures — censures to the present hour unrevoked, though their injustice has long since been demonstrated. And, in arriving at these startling results, they had seen fit to overlook revelations made to them after Outram had sailed for Egypt, which bore the strongest internal evidence of truth — which subsequent investigations prove to have been strictly true—which the natives of Baroda knew to be true when they were ignored by Government—and which, whether true or false, ought in common decency to have formed the subject of a rigorous inquiry.

These unhappy events, the natives of Baroda, who had long regarded the venality of the Bombay Government, or its functionaries, as an axiomatic truth, attributed (it is to be hoped the end will shew unjustly) to the corrupt influence of one of the members of Lord Falkland's Government, who had retired from the service prior to Outram's return from Egypt. And any one who takes the trouble to read from page 1400 to page 1484 of the Baroda Blue Books, will see that there were reasonable grounds for the conclusion at which they arrived. They were enabled to adduce a most imposing array of circumstantial evidence in

support of their belief. And the subsequent conduct of Lord Falkland's Government must have appeared to them (and it *did* appear to them) incompatible with any hypothesis, save that which assumed that his lordship, and his lordship's council, were determined to screen their late colleague.*

For this gentleman, "*whose name had come to be associated with the foulest of deeds and the vilest of men,*" Colonel Outram entertained a great respect. And believing him to be incapable of conduct unworthy of his high character and exalted position, he deemed it due no less to an upright Englishman than unable to defend himself, than to the Government he himself served, and the natives within his own jurisdiction, to do his utmost to unravel the tissue of intrigues which had so seriously compromised the prestige of British justice in Guzerat.

That artifices of a flagitious character had been practised, and that the Bombay Government had been betrayed into very serious errors, was painfully obvious. But the intrigues and treachery which had been in operation, he believed to have been confined to European and native subordinates. And, by dragging the real offenders to punishment, he aspired to vindicate the character of the functionary whose name had (as he supposed) been abused. He

* The Compiler has met with no notice of the Blue Books, in which one tithe of the circumstantial evidence to the prejudice of this gentleman (and therefore demanding full explanation at his hands) is adduced. The author of "Bombay Briberies" (Wilson, Royal Exchange) has collected but a few salient points—his limits apparently preventing him from entering into minute details.

hoped to satisfy the natives that, though the Government might, at times, err in judgment, it never swerved from rectitude; that the money, year after year, remitted to Bombay for purposes of bribery, reached other hands than those for which it was destined; and that though, on many occasions, incorrect decisions had undoubtedly been given in favour of those remitting bribes, the coincidence was a purely accidental one, and susceptible of satisfactory explanation.

He naturally, but as events proved very erroneously, believed that, in the prosecution of these great objects, he would receive effective aid and cordial encouragement from the Government. Pure themselves, conscious of their purity, and equally convinced of the incorruptibility of their late colleague, it was, he conceived, their obvious interest, as it clearly was their duty, to institute a searching investigation into imputations supported by *prima facie* evidence. The further the investigation went, the more clearly would their own impugned virtue become apparent, the more completely would the integrity of their late colleague be vindicated. Thus reasoned Outram, and he deemed himself justified in assuming that the wishes of the Government were coincident with their duty and their interests. For a few days after his resumption of his duties at Baroda, they had, under the pressure of strong representations, made from distant parts of the Presidency, issued a circular letter in the following terms. The italics are introduced by the Compiler to call the reader's attention to the prominent points of the circular.

“ Government has been led to believe that an impression prevails in some parts of the Mofussil that, by means of intrigues at the Presidency, the arrangements of the local officers can often be defeated or superseded by the parties interested secretly obtaining the friendship of persons in power ; who, it is expected, will, *irrespective of right and wrong*, interest themselves for the party soliciting their favour ; and that, by these means, objects are attainable which, if left to be sifted and reported on, in a deliberate and regular manner, could never be secured. This species of intriguing is termed, in the Mahrattee and Canarese dialects, ‘ *making KHUTPUT in Bombay ;*’ and is stated to be regarded *as a remedy under difficulties of whatever kind. It is even held to be considered as effectual in obtaining the restoration to place of official servants who, for incapacity or dishonesty, have been discharged from Government service ; and to be even capable of effecting the release from gaol of a convicted felon.* A belief in the existence of a system of this nature is calculated *greatly to embarrass the officers of Government, and to undermine the confidence of the Ryots in the system under which they are governed.* I am accordingly directed to request that you will have the goodness to REPORT, *after making any inquiries you may deem requisite,* WHETHER you have reasons for supposing that any such belief prevails, generally, or amongst any particular class of persons within the limits of your charge ; *and if so, that you will offer any suggestions that may occur to you as to the best means of ERADICATING the same.*”

Thus, specially invited—and an invitation of this kind is a command—to enter on a task which his own sense of duty had already prompted him to undertake, Outram applied himself with earnestness to the work before him.

As a preliminary measure, he entreated the Government to revise certain decisions, promulgated during his absence, in favour of men notoriously corrupt, to the prejudice of those who had suffered from the unrebuked misdeeds of the corruptionists, and in censure of measures he had adopted in his warfare against corruption. He showed that these decisions were eminently calculated to foster the prevalent belief in the efficacy of “*Khutput made in Bombay.*” And he tendered evidence and explanatory statements to prove that they were based on imperfect information, on erroneous assumptions, and on an oversight of facts, declarations, and offers of further elucidation, submitted by himself to Government, both orally and in writing.

But his entreaties were in vain. With the exception of the Hon. Mr. Willoughby, who recorded “Minutes” in favour of inquiry, and, and who, unfortunately for Lord Falkland, vacated his seat in Council while Outram’s investigations were in progress, the Government evinced a singular want of that zeal for inquiry which the terms of their circular letter, taken in their natural sense, appeared to denote. They would neither revise their decisions, nor assign a reason for refusing to do so.

The immediate effects of this policy, so difficult to reconcile with a belief that the *Khutput* letter had

any other object than to secure soothing replies for submittal to Parliament during the anticipated discussions on the Indian Charter Act, were most lamentable. Its indirect results calamitous.

Warned by the case of the corrupt head of his native establishment, whose honesty the Government had censured him for suspecting, and whom they had thrust back into the post which he had betrayed, Outram was compelled to submit to the continued presence in his office of several clerks, whom he knew to be in alliance with the criminals he was endeavouring to unmask; and who (as has now been proved) were in the habit of furnishing these criminals with copies of such documents, on the records of the Residency, as related to their affairs. While, owing to the lax system which obtained in the Government Secretariat at Bombay, copies could be surreptitiously obtained of all official papers, not even excepting the most recent and most secret "Minutes" of the Governor and his Council. Thus did the Baroda corruptionists become acquainted, not only with every representation made by Outram, but with the disheartening replies he received, and with the feelings with which the individual members of Government regarded inquiries designed for the vindication of their own honour. And as Colonel Outram was then engaged in unravelling conspiracies for the ruin of individuals entitled to British protection, in which the Durbar and the leading nobles and moneyed men of Baroda were implicated, it may be readily conceived that the want of support he received from Government, was turned

to good account by those who were directly interested in frustrating his inquiries.

Perjury is a venial offence in the eyes of the natives of Guzerat — bribery and intimidation recognized modes of securing evidence. And when to the influence of gold, and the alternative threat of loss of place and false accusations, is added the plausibly authenticated assurance, that by forswearing himself the perjurer will gratify the Government, a temptation is held out which few can resist. Such an assurance did the guilty individuals afford to all whom gold and intimidation were insufficient to influence. They had no need to dwell on the arguments which tended to substantiate their boast, that the decisions appealed against by Outram had been improperly obtained; for the cogency of these arguments had already found universal admission at Baroda. But they paraded exultingly, and with effect, the failure of Outram's urgent and reasonable appeals. And no one who takes the trouble to peruse the "Minutes" which his appeals elicited, will wonder that the conspirators should have obtained general credence, when they pointed to these as proving that the Government and themselves mutually understood each other, and as affording a guarantee that Outram's inquiries would be thwarted by the very functionaries whom, in the guileless simplicity of a confiding nature, he considered most interested in promoting them.

A succession of happy accidents enabled the Resident to prosecute his investigations, despite the intrigues by which their frustration was attempted. His progress, however, was slow; his difficulties vast;

his disappointments incessant. Over and over again did he represent to the Government the embarrassments he experienced; and oft and urgently did he implore them to afford some token of their sympathy and approbation, with a view to neutralize the mischievous effects of the popular belief, that "he was working against Government, or rather that they were working against him." But his representations were unheeded; many of his most important communications remained unanswered; and the countenance and support he so much required, in his arduous struggles with a monstrous system of corruption, were systematically withheld from him.

Lord Falkland, indeed, stoutly denies, in more than one of his despatches, that he and his Council failed to afford Colonel Outram ample aid and encouragement. But the Court of Directors have themselves given a sufficient reply to this denial. They distinctly state that the Government had "arrested, *in limine*, an inquiry which might have furnished a clue for the detection of malpractices, of the existence of which there can be no doubt." And, in another case, they censure the Government for having rejected, as "obscure indications, containing nothing susceptible of being followed out to any result," what, in the Court's estimation, "were amply sufficient to justify and require a further investigation." When the last of their despatches, as published in the Baroda Blue Book, was written, the Court conceived themselves prevented by official etiquette from pronouncing an opinion on the treatment Colonel Outram had received at the hands of Govern-

ment during the last two years of his tenure of office ; for his Report on Khutput had not come before them in what was considered a strictly official manner, the Bombay Government having detained the original for upwards of six months, on the ground that they would study it in connection with the other reports on the same subject, all of which had been in their hands very considerably upwards of a year ! But though the Directors were thus, as they believed, precluded from pronouncing on the Khutput Report, and on the damaging revelations it contained relative to the proceedings of the Bombay Government, that document is now in the hands of the public, and any one who will take the trouble to read from 1400 to 1484, may satisfy himself whether the two cases incidentally cited by the Court were the only instances in which Lord Falkland and his Council embarrassed Outram's investigations—facilitated the intrigues and evasive artifices of the criminals whom he sought to drag to justice—and inflicted further and undeserved injury on those victims of oppression in whose behalf he laboured.

The more earnest Outram's entreaties became, and the more his investigations prospered, the more curt and unsatisfactory continued to be the communications of his Government, and the more unkind the language they employed regarding him in " Minutes " destined for the perusal of the Court of Directors, but which there was then little prospect of Outram being ever permitted to see. In their later " Minutes " Lord Falkland's Council did not hesitate to hold their Baroda Resident up to ridicule, as " credulous,"

“Quixotic,” and “ignorant of human nature.” And, in estimating the exhilarating effects of such “Minutes” on the Baroda intriguers, to whom they were regularly transmitted by their agents in the Secretariat, it must be borne in mind that the alleged “credulity,” “Quixotism,” and “ignorance of human nature,” consisted in treating the circular letter on “Khutput” as a sincere exposition of the views and wishes of Government—in believing that the Government were really anxious to ascertain *if* a belief in Khutput actually existed—and in assuming, on the faith of their own assertions, that they fully recognized the gravity of those evils which they had themselves declared must arise from the existence of such a belief; that they truly wished inquiries to be carried out on the subject; that they sincerely desired to eradicate the belief, if found to exist; and that they honestly sought to be directed to the best modes of effecting so desirable an object.

Nor did the members of the Bombay Council confine themselves to charging Colonel Outram with the mental defects above enumerated. They attributed some of the most arduous, important, and successful of those labours which subsequently procured for him high eulogy from the Court of Directors to “*rancorous personal feelings.*” In one of their later “Minutes,” they pronounced him to be out of “his right mind,” and to be the victim of a “monomania;” and they persisted in accusing him of placing faith in the general belief entertained of the corruption of their late colleague, despite his assurances to the contrary. This they did, in apparent oblivion of the fact

that his investigations could only tend to vindicate that gentleman's character if he were wrongly aspersed, and that their own systematic efforts to embarrass these investigations, when viewed in connection with their Khutput Circular, could not possibly fail to impress the public with the belief that they dreaded inquiry as likely to prove ruinous, if not to their own reputation, at least to that of their late colleague. And when the personal hostility towards Colonel Outram, displayed in the "Minutes" of Messrs. Bell and Blane, is considered, the effect of these Minutes, surreptitiously obtained from the Bombay Secretariat by the Baroda corruptionists, may be conceived.*

While Lord Falkland and his colleagues turned a deaf ear to all Outram's remonstrances, they denied him the benefit of the appeals which he desired to make to the Court of Directors. And, thus, the Government practically excluded that body from all control over Baroda, though well known to have made incessant and troublesome, and even puerile references to it on matters of detail in other questions which it was their duty to have determined on their own responsibility. Whether by this arrangement they did or did not (as the Bombay correspondent of the *Times* reported to the leading journal) constitute themselves "*an instru-*

* The terms "personal hostility" are used advisedly. The Compiler defies any honest man, who has read these minutes, to lay his hand on his heart and deny that Mr. Bell and Mr. Blane do evince a systematic desire to place Colonel Outram in the wrong on every occasion, and that they seek for opportunities of thwarting and annoying him, and of prejudicing the Court of Directors against him.

ment of resistless tyranny,” the readers of the Baroda Blue Book must determine for themselves.

At page 24 of the Baroda Blue Book will be found—

“A memorandum of letters received from Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, subsequent to his resuming charge of his duties at Baroda (on his return from Egypt), on the 8th of May, 1850, in which he has appealed against the decisions of Government in the cases therein alluded to.”

In this document, seven appeals, or packets of appeals, are enumerated. An analysis of their contents—of the important matters hinging on the decisions in respect of them by the Court of Directors—and of the earnest and reiterated requests of Outram to have decisions propounded, would tend greatly to enlist the sympathy of the reader, and excite his astonishment. But the limits of this volume will admit of little more than a cursory glance at the periods of detention to which they were respectively subjected.

The first appeal is dated the 30th of July, 1850. It referred to a fraudulent transaction (on the part of a Bank enjoying the British guarantee during “good behaviour”) regarding which the conduct of the Bombay Government had been twice commented upon by the Court of Directors: on the first occasion, for ignoring an offence equivalent to forgery; and, on the second, for so wording their despatch as to imply that attempts had been made to investigate that offence, and that no proof of its commission could be obtained, whereas the Government well knew when they penned the despatch that *no* inquiry of any kind had been at-

tempted. It was a case which had powerfully tended to lower the character of the Bombay Government in the eyes of the natives. It was one to which in a great measure was due the fact that the name of one of Lord Falkland's Councillors had "*come to be associated with the foulest of deeds and the vilest of men.*" It was one on which Colonel Outram was particularly anxious to have an early decision. And it was one on which the Court had specially called for information. Yet the Appeal was not transmitted for thirteen and a half months—not till it had become a matter of general notoriety both at Bombay and at Baroda that the felony originally ignored by the Government, and which, in direct disobedience of the Court's orders, they had abstained from investigating and punishing, had been established before a legal tribunal.

The second packet of "Appeals" enumerated in the "Memorandum," contained letters written in April and June 1850. These, it is true, were forwarded in the following October; but care was taken that no benefit should be derived from the home reference. For, though the Court's reply was favourable to the view taken by Colonel Outram, the Bombay Government refused to modify their measures.

The third packet of documents, dated June and July 1850, remained untransmitted till the 3rd of December 1852—that is, until Colonel Outram had been removed from his appointment—and therefore placed in a position to make a direct appeal to the Court of Directors.

The fourth—a most earnest appeal—in which were

detailed many of the very startling and plausible reasons assigned by the natives for believing that decisions could be purchased through the influence of corrupt members of the Bombay Government, bore date the 7th September 1850. But it was detained till the 17th of February 1852, six weeks after Outram's removal from office.

The 6th, under date the 16th December 1850, was not transmitted till December 1852; and the letter accompanying it was not written till the day on which Outram's removal had been resolved on in Council.

The sixth, dated the 31st March 1851, was only forwarded on the 17th February 1852, by the steamer which bore Outram from Bombay, *en route* to England, to submit his grievances to the Court of Directors.

The seventh, containing the degraded Resident's final official protests against the treatment which he, and those natives who aided him, had received at the hands of his Government, was hardly likely to be detained. For Outram carried duplicates along with him. Government had, indeed, endeavoured to get possession of these, and thus to deprive him of the means of setting his conduct before the Directors in its true light without delay. But his remonstrance was so reasonable, and so just, that they could find no pretext for rejecting it.

The validity of the pleas on which the Government prevented their Honourable Masters in this country from obtaining any insight into their Baroda policy, is a matter on which Parliament has authorized the

public to form and make known their opinions. And considerable uniformity of opinion, in reference to this subject, will probably be found amongst the independent readers of the Blue Books.

Disheartening to the last degree had been Outram's position, since his return from Egypt : his representations unheeded at Bombay ; his appeals to the Directors untransmitted ; and the intrigues and insolence of the corruptionists, whose crimes he endeavoured to expose, daily acquiring vigour and development. For daily did the belief gain ground—and daily were fresh embarrassments arising from the belief—that the Government, enraged at the success with which he had unmasked a villain, in whose behalf they had penned the elaborate, ingenious, but unsatisfactory defence previously alluded to, and alarmed at the disclosures he contrived to effect without their assistance, and in spite of the obstacles they threw in his way—had resolved to disgust him into resignation of his appointment, or to goad him into some act of insubordination, which should afford a pretext for his removal. And so confident were the corruptionists on this point, that, as Outram himself, from time to time, reported to Government, they engaged in a systematic system of subornation, of perjury, to be made use of so soon as his removal was effected, with a view to injure his own reputation, to ruin those honest natives who had rendered him assistance, and to procure a reversal of the convictions which his labours had resulted in establishing. These conspiracies were commenced in the summer of 1850 ; they were continued with varying industry up to the hour of his

removal ; after that event, they were renewed with increased vigour ; and, as the Government was duly apprised, upwards of one full year before his removal, the conspiracies embraced clerks in his own office—men who bore him a deadly grudge for the honest zeal which interfered with their unhallowed gains, but whom he had no power to dismiss without the sanction of Government.

But discouraging as was Outram's position, during the events now hastily sketched, he lost not heart. He felt assured that justice would be done him by the Court of Directors, so soon as they should be made aware of the real merits of the case. And he resolved that they should have an opportunity of forming an impartial judgment.

Past experience had taught him the futility of ordinary " appeals ; " but, in common with all the heads of offices, he had received a copy of the circular letter adverted to in page 153. The replies it elicited must, he knew, be transmitted to the Honourable Court ; and, in the preparation of his own Report, he took care to introduce a detailed account of the investigations he had conducted, and of the obstructions he had encountered, since his return from Egypt.

But though satisfied that his Report must be, eventually, submitted to the Court of Directors, he was aware that great delay invariably occurred in the transmission of such documents. His papers, moreover, were voluminous ; and the tardiness with which briefer documents had been replied to by the Government, led him to fear that much time would elapse ere Lord Falkland and his Council pronounced even

an interim opinion on the subject of his appeal. Daily were fresh embarrassments arising from the increasing confidence and boldness of the corruptionists. And he accordingly deemed it his duty, when transmitting his Report, to represent once more the urgency of his position, and the painful necessity that existed for disabusing the minds of the people of Baroda of the conviction under which they laboured, that, by thwarting his investigations, screening villany, and harassing those who aided in its exposure, they gratified the Government, and promoted its views.

The reply to this communication was an order to resign his appointment; and, as those who will take the trouble to examine the Blue Books will discover, circumstances had occurred a few days prior to the transmission of that order eminently calculated to satisfy the public that the immediate cause of the Resident's summary removal was the fact of his having obtained something like a clue to the discovery of the conspiracy for buying over the Government—a conspiracy Outram's investigation of which the Government had already "*arrested* IN LIMINE." Nor was this belief likely to be shaken by the *intense* anxiety subsequently evinced by the Government to hasten his departure from Baroda, though his official resignation was not to take effect for some time after.

In notifying to him his removal from office, the Government entered into a long series of observations, justificatory of the step. To these Outram replied in a letter,* which most readers will deem tolerably

* Vide Appendix.

conclusive — and so conclusive did the Bombay Government consider it, that, in their subsequent communications to the Court of Directors, they saw fit to depart from much that they had originally stated.* The four charges on which they eventually justified Colonel Outram's removal, were—

1st.—That he had displayed such an absence of “respect” for, and “confidence” in, the Government he represented, as disqualified him for discharging the duties of his office.

2nd.—That he appeared to have formed a most erroneous idea of his rights and duties of his position as Resident.

3rd.—That he had shown he did not possess the tact, calmness of mind, and discretion, indispensable to the satisfactory maintenance of our political relations with the Guicowar.

4th.—That he had “persisted in proceedings dictated by the sentiments evinced in the letter attached to the Khutput Report, and not only solely by inditing that letter.”

To this last charge, the Court of Directors have replied as follows :—

“We do not perceive, in the papers sent to us, *any* instance of Lieut.-Colonel Outram having per-

* Vide Appendix, where will be found detailed the tissue of contradictions *and of inaccuracies in point of fact*, in which the Government involved itself when endeavouring to assign a valid reason for dismissing the Resident who had sent in an unanswerable appeal against themselves, and who was apparently on the eve of tracing out the conspiracies, his investigations into which they had endeavoured to “*arrest in limine!*”

sisted in proceedings which he had been instructed by his Government to discontinue."

As the whole of Outram's investigations are detailed in his Khutput Report, the reader must judge for himself whether the more appropriate reward of the proceedings which proved offensive to the Honourable Messrs. Blane and Bell, was his dismissal from office, or the eulogy bestowed by the Court of Directors on "the zeal, energy, ability, and success," with which his inquiries were conducted. And, in estimating the value of Lord Falkland's denial that he and his Council failed to give Outram every legitimate aid and support, let it be kept in mind, that the Council have put their seal of condemnation on the official proceedings for which aid and support were implored. To suppose that they intentionally rendered the slightest aid, encouragement, or support, to investigations of which they disapproved, is to suppose them to have been guilty of a dereliction of duty. That their doctrines and practice were in perfect harmony no reader of the Baroda Blue Books requires to be told.

The third charge the Court of Directors utterly ignored, in their reply to the Bombay Government. It is, therefore, only reasonable to infer that they recognized in Outram's conduct, through a trying period of two years, those qualities of which it is alleged he displayed an absence. And any one who may take the trouble to read the minute narrative, given in his Khutput Report, of his several investigations, and of his various communications with the Bombay and Guicowar Governments, will marvel

at "the tact" and "discretion" he manifested, under circumstances well calculated to betray him into haste. Nay, even the Bombay Government themselves were constrained to bear testimony to the fact, that in not one of his acts had he done aught capable of giving just umbrage to the Court at which he resided, though that Court was engaged in bringing dishonour on the British name. Thus, on the day of the receipt of the intelligence of Outram's removal, the Guicowar was induced, at the instance of the Minister who had attempted the bribery of high functionaries, to transmit a petition to Bombay, complaining of certain acts of the ex-Resident; yet the Government which recorded the censure now under notice, were compelled to reply, that the proceedings remonstrated against "appear to have been merely a request for the attendance of certain parties at the Residency for the purpose of inquiry, and that Government trusts that no deviation from the usual courtesy, in promptly complying with such requests, will ever be permitted by His Highness to occur."

The inquiry in question was one of those which the Bombay Government had "arrested, *in limine*." That it was so arrested, the guilty Minister obtained early and accurate intelligence. He had, on the strength of this arrest, determined to render nugatory the clue of which, despite the proceedings of Government, Outram had obtained possession. And, with this view, he had ventured to violate the "usual courtesy" observed on such occasions.

I shall cite but another testimony on the part of the Bombay Government to the "tact," "discretion,"

and “calmness of mind,” which Outram displayed while unravelling a foul conspiracy in which the courtiers, nobles, and leading merchants of Baroda were concerned, having for its object the ruin of a rich widow entitled to British protection. In his “Minutes” on this case, after taking many exceptions to the views, recommendations, and comments, contained in the Resident’s Report, Lord Falkland wrote thus :—

“I now turn to the case itself, which, the more it is studied, must more and more impress the mind with admiration of the extraordinary ability and patience displayed by Colonel Outram in investigating the obscure and secret conspiracies which are the subject of his Report, dated 30th March 1851, in baffling native intrigue on its own ground, and in unravelling with much ingenuity, if not always successfully, the frauds, perjuries, and mass of contradictory depositions, which have been taken and committed from the period when Lar Bhae’s first petition was presented to Government in 1847, up to the date of Baba Nafra’s trial and conviction in August 1850.

“The task he undertook to perform may, indeed, be termed an extraordinary one. Once persuaded that Joitoe Bhae’s tale was true, and that she was the victim of a foul conspiracy, he has *alone and unaided* stood by her ; has opposed the active machinations of her powerful enemy, deriving a strong support, as they must have done, from their success with the Acting Resident, and through him with this Government ; has openly met the secret hostility of the Baroda Durbar ; and finally he seems to have unveiled the do-

mestic treachery of the Native Agent, which would appear to be but too clearly established by the facts and reasoning of this report."

The "*minute*" from which the foregoing passages are extracted, bears date the 10th of November, upwards of a fortnight before Colonel Outram's removal had been resolved on. The "letter" based on it, and which it was Outram's duty to file in the records of the Residency, there to remain in perpetual testimony against himself, was not written for some days after the occurrence of that event. Though every expression of doubt or censure contained in the "*minute*," was incorporated in the letter, it was not deemed advisable that the outburst of admiration extorted from the Governor, even in the exercise of a severe criticism, should be placed on record. Contrary therefore to invariable usage it was suppressed. And but for the publication of the Blue Books, Colonel Outram would not have been in a position to adduce Lord Falkland's own testimony, when vindicating himself from his Lordship's charge of want of "tact," "calmness of mind," and "discretion."*

We have seen that one of the four charges on

* The magnanimity of Lord Falkland's Council may be judged of, when it is mentioned that very many paragraphs of the "*letter*" above alluded to, are devoted to show that Colonel Outram "*was himself responsible for much of the lady's sufferings!!!*" Colonel Outram vindicated himself from this monstrous and unjust charge in a document pronounced by the Court of Directors to be conclusive and triumphant. Yet in doing so he only mentioned *facts* as well known to the Government as to himself. And, in spite of this conclusive reply, the Government still adhered to their original accusations!

which the Bombay Government justified Colonel Outram's degradation is rejected by the Court of Directors, as inconsistent with the evidence before them ; and that while they utterly ignore a second of these charges, the body who preferred it have afforded testimony against it. Let us proceed to the third.

It is to the effect that Colonel Outram had formed an erroneous idea of his rights and duties as Resident. This charge the Court of Directors have admitted to be established in respect of one single instance. But in that instance they take care to show that not the slightest inconvenience was, or could have been experienced. And the reader will probably derive some amusement from an examination of the passage in which the admitted error was betrayed.

After detailing many of the difficulties of his position at Baroda—difficulties greatly enhanced by the proceedings of the Guicowar's unprincipled minister—Outram thus proceeded :—

“Had I been on those terms with my own superiors, to which, in former days, I had the honour to be admitted, as well by the local as by the Supreme Government, I should, at a very early period of my intercourse with the minister, have pointed out to His Highness (the Guicowar) the necessity—*for the honour of his own Raj*—of selecting another adviser. In doing this I should have done no more than any other Resident in India in a similar position would have deemed himself justified in doing ; I should have been rendering an essential service to the Guicowar ; and I should have diminished that intrigue and corruption which tend so much to compromise the character of

the British Government in the eyes of the natives. But I felt keenly that I was not admitted to that confidence, and friendly consideration on the part of Government, which it was once my honour to enjoy. I feared that my conduct might be censured, and my recommendations unsupported. And in such a case I was well aware that intrigues would multiply, and attempts be made to involve me in a dispute with the Durbar, with a view to my removal from a post where I am a source of inconvenience and alarm to the traders in corruption. I have, therefore, been constrained to meet the minister in his own fashion, and to assume his own cordial demeanour; to express satisfaction for such trifling aid as, for appearance sake, he has rendered me; and to appear ignorant of his secret opposition."

And after similar remarks—which of themselves would seem to be a sufficient reply to the allegations of the Bombay Government, that he was deficient in the tact and calmness requisite for maintaining our political relations with the Guicowar—Colonel Outram proceeded to express a hope that the Government would "authorize" him to request His Highness to select another minister.

The passage in which the Court of Directors admit that Colonel Outram evinced a misapprehension of his rights and duties as Resident, is that in which he intimates "*what he would have done*" if, "enjoying the confidence and kindly consideration of Government" accorded to him by previous Governments during the last thirty years, he could have relied on his conduct being approved, and his recommendations

being supported. On this passage the Directors observe :—

“To have taken so grave a step (as recommending the Guicowar to dismiss a corrupt minister who had aspired to bribe high British functionaries, and who had aided in the persecution of British subjects) would far exceed the powers of a Resident; and would require for its justification the probability that some great public evil would ensue from the short delay necessary for a reference to Government. In the present case there was no such necessity; and IF Colonel Outram HAD acted as he thought he had the power to act, he WOULD, *on that ground*, have merited a severe mark of our displeasure. For he must have been aware that the right vested by treaty in a British Resident, of giving advice to a Native Prince, is to be exercised by him in strict subordination to his own superiors, and that it is a breach of duty to take any step which can have the effect of committing Government to a particular course of policy, without having previously assured himself of their approbation.”*

* In the Appendix will be found a summary of the very extraordinary self-contradictions—transparent fallacies—incorrect assertions—illogical reasonings—and what to the Compiler appear most disingenuous quibblings by which the Government endeavoured to show, first, that nothing had been proved against the so-called minister, though they had before them evidence of his evil doings; and then that the same arguments which, *under less gross circumstances*, had by Sir G. Arthur been deemed sufficient to justify his calling the Guicowar to change his “agent,” did not exist in the present case. I have said the “*so-called minister*”—for, as Government knew, the Guicowar had resisted all their attempts to induce him to appoint a responsible minister. Bhow Tambekur was only, and is only, a “Carbarry,” or *head agent*.

But Colonel Outram had *not* so acted as to render himself obnoxious to the Court's censure. He had scrupulously abstained from exercising any of his rights as Resident, save in strict subordination to his immediate superiors. He had at no time, and in no manner or degree, committed his Government to a particular course of policy. And the formal acquiescence of the Court of Directors in the allegations of the Bombay Government, to the extent of admitting that, in one single instance, Colonel Outram did *theoretically* over-estimate his liberty of individual action, appears to have been intended to indicate that they regarded as invalid the plea for his degradation, derived from his assertion of what he *would* have done under circumstances the very reverse of those; the existence of which he deplored. The Court's sentence must, in fact, be regarded as a virtual acquittal.

The only charge on which they have really recorded a verdict of guilty against Colonel Outram, is that of having evinced a want of "respect" for, and "confidence" in his Government. And it is obvious, from the whole tenor of their despatch, that (as the Bombay Government could not fail to know) they would never have given their assent to the degradation of their Resident on these grounds, had the Government,

And though he is invested with powers which enable him to exercise, to the prejudice of British wards and subjects, all functions of a Prime Minister—and though the Government wrote of him as though he possessed the rank, dignity, and international claims and position of a Prime Minister—they are well aware that he possesses none of these; that he is exactly in the same position as the Carbarry whom Sir G. Arthur insisted on the Guicowar dismissing.

before adopting so strong and so unusual a measure, made a reference to England. Nay, further, it is a legitimate inference from the words of their despatch, that if Outram's Khutput Report had been before them *officially*—if it had been competent for them to enter into his long catalogue of complaints—they would have promulgated a decision much more gratifying to himself, and much less soothing to Lord Falkland in Council, than that which now stands on record. The Bombay Government, as has been already stated, had not in the end of June 1852, transmitted to the Court the replies given to their important circular of May 1850, though most of these replies had been considerably upwards of a year in their hands. And till the replies in question, with the comments of Government, were forwarded to the Court, that Honourable body deemed itself bound in official courtesy to assume that the Government had much to offer in their own justification in respect of Colonel Outram's complaints. But, while giving due weight to this consideration, the Directors clearly enough imply their belief, that if Colonel Outram's language evinced less respect and confidence than official usage prescribes, the treatment he had received had been calculated to provoke him. They thus write:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Outram appears to have laboured under the impression that he was not supported by Government, in his exertions for the detection of corrupt practices, and that the supposition that Government looked with disfavour on these exertions prevailed widely at Baroda, and had a tendency to defeat the object of his investigations. But in

communicating to you the impression made on his mind, Lieutenant-Colonel Outram ought to have expressed himself with the deference due from a subordinate officer to the Government which he serves. In this he failed. We are of opinion that the communications of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram were not conveyed in terms consistent with that respect for the Government he was serving which ought to be observed in all such representations."

It is in the power of all who wish to form an opinion for themselves, to judge of the nature of the language made use of by Colonel Outram in his latter communications; and of these only, is a complaint made. And, in judging of his language, they will not fail to bear in mind that he was addressing a Government who had turned a deaf ear to all his representations; refused him the aid he so earnestly entreated; arrested some of his most important inquiries; and prevented him receiving that support from their common masters, which the Blue Books satisfactorily prove he would have received, had his appeals been forwarded. They will bear in mind that those inquiries which were embarrassed by the proceedings of Government, were inquiries which the Directors truly pronounce to have been very important; that they had for their object the punishment of conspirators against British honour and British justice; the redress of foul and terrible wrongs endured for years by individuals entitled to British protection; the vindication of the impugned honour of the Government themselves; the erasure of reproaches reflected from the Bombay Government

in consequence of the acts of that Government, on the Court of Directors itself; the clearance of his own character from erroneous imputations cast on him in his absence, of which he had an *absolute indefeasible* right to claim an official withdrawal, on cause being shown, and which, to this hour, are not withdrawn, though their injustice has been demonstrated; and the exposure and reform of a system of treachery and corruption, in the most important department of the Secretariat, which had for years flourished under the very shadow of the Council Chamber.* They will not fail to notice that the language assigned as the reason for dismissing Colonel Outram, just as he appeared on the eve of successfully prosecuting inquiries, which the Government had “arrested *in limine*,” was far less strong than that employed by him in 1838, when the evils which he deplored were trifling, as compared with those which he sought to remedy in 1852; when he had not achieved those public services which he was enabled to render between 1839 and 1845; and when, consequently, he and his representations were entitled to less consideration and deference. They will keep in view the important fact, that while Colonel Outram’s proceedings, and the “zeal, energy, ability, and success,” with which they were conducted, are extolled by the Court of Directors, the

* That by exposing the shameful abuses existing in their departments, Colonel Outram incurred the ill-will of the Secretaries (who, as is well known, are *practically* members of the Government), must be very obvious to every careful reader of the Blue Books.

Government who dismissed him have been directly censured, in some respects—indirectly reprovèd in many—and commanded to resume those inquiries which they awhile arrested. They will reflect on the fact, that it was Outram's painful but undeniable duty, not to the Bombay Government only, but to the Court of Directors, the British nation, and, above all, the Natives under his protection, to explain to the Government the extent and origin of the universal and practically mischievous belief in their corruptibility that prevailed in his districts; and that, in pressing the unpalatable truth on his superiors, he over and over again protested his own convictions of their unblemished purity, and over and over again reiterated with much earnestness, that though he felt his Reports must give pain, he begged that he might not be supposed to be wanting in respect.

And bearing all these points in mind, they will cordially concur in the following sentiments expressed by the Court of Directors in their reply to the Bombay Government:—

“But,” add the Court, in continuation of the remarks above quoted, “we regret that you did not take an early opportunity of reprimanding him, and requiring him to withdraw any objectionable expressions which rendered him justly liable to your censure.”

That Colonel Outram did not contemplate disrespect, that his conscience acquitted him of intentional disrespect, are facts sufficiently proved by the care he took in framing his Report on Khutput, specially designed for the perusal of the Directors, to quote from

all his strongest and most earnest appeals. That he would have readily divested his reports of all offensive expressions, on their being pointed out to him, is clearly implied by the Court in the passage just quoted. It is equally implied in the previous declaration of the Court, that, in no instance, had Colonel Outram persisted in proceedings which he had been ordered to discontinue. And it was a conclusion which their past experience would have justified the Government in forming.

In April 1851, Colonel Outram had forwarded to Government a very strong Appeal, in which he showed them the strong mass of circumstantial evidence with which the Natives justified their belief in the corruptibility of Bombay functionaries, and the extent to which the recent proceedings of Government had strengthened that belief.

After forwarding this Appeal, Colonel Outram proceeded to Bombay, to endeavour, by personal solicitations, to effect those public measures which had been denied to his official entreaties. And he was (privately) informed by his friends in office that his Appeal had made a deep impression in Council; that the Government were now satisfied of the necessity of supporting him; but that there were some expressions in his letter which had been personally distasteful to the Governor; and that, by the very minuteness and amplitude of his proofs, he placed the Government, as it were, in the disagreeable position of standing on their defence, or of appearing to be driven into acts which ought to appear spontaneous. And it was suggested to him that a solution of the Baroda diffi-

culties—satisfactory to himself, and not humiliating to Government—might be secured by his offering to modify his Report. He accordingly waited on his Lordship, assured him of the respect he entertained for him, and declared his readiness to do so. Lord Falkland expressed himself gratified, and confident that the Baroda questions would be disposed of to the satisfaction of all parties. Outram, hastening to the Secretariat, called for his Reports, erased the words which he was told had annoyed the Governor, and struck out whole paragraphs and pages of its most cogent matter. He left nothing undone which was calculated to give to the change of policy he had been led to expect, the appearance of being the uncompelled and spontaneous act of Government. He had, however, barely returned his emasculated Report, when the Government adopted proceedings which were in direct opposition to those he had been led to anticipate, and which tended more and more to rivet on the Native mind at Baroda the belief which he was endeavouring to eradicate.

Thus, as we have seen, a theoretical mistake which led to no practical results, and required but to be pointed out; and the employment, under circumstances of unwonted difficulty, of strong language, which a reprimand would have prevented his repeating, are the only two faults on Colonel Outram's part conceded by his Honourable Masters. In making this concession, they take care to extol the "zeal, energy, ability, and success" of labours which were throughout unaided, and sometimes impeded, by his Government. And they vindicate him from cen-

tures and aspersions, cast on his proceedings and motives by the Government who dismissed him.

In addition to the indirect censure thus cast on the Government, they more than once pass open condemnation on that body for thwarting inquiries it was their duty to promote. And there are few readers of the Blue Books who will not feel assured that, had the Honourable Court been in a position to comment on Colonel Outram's Khutput Report, the condemnation would have been more severe, more extensive, and more emphatic.

In concluding their despatch, the Court addressed the Government in the following words:—

“Taking this view of the case, we express our hope that, when Lieutenant-Colonel Outram shall return to India, you will find a suitable opportunity of employing him where his talents and experience may prove useful to the public service.”

The Court were well aware that, with the exception of the Commissionership of Sind—which is not likely to be vacant for many years—the Baroda Residency is the only appointment in the gift of the Bombay Government which Colonel Outram could accept without official humiliation, and without such degradation in the eyes of the Native and European community as would seriously injure his usefulness. To have ordered Lord Falkland to replace Outram in the position he had filled with “zeal, energy, ability, and success,” and from which he had been removed on the pleas we have just investigated, might possibly have appeared tantamount to recalling his Lordship. There were reasons, both political and personal, why

so extreme a measure should be avoided. And, viewing the whole context of the case, it appears reasonable to suppose that the Court's language was adopted with a view to enable Lord Falkland to reinstate Colonel Outram in such a manner as to give the reinstatal the appearance of a voluntary act.

Had Colonel Outram's brevet lieut.-colonelcy taken place on the 2nd June 1840, as he had reason to expect from official and private communications, he would now have been in a position to claim a Divisional Command; and he might have returned to India, careless as to whether Lord Falkland chose to act on the intelligible hint given to him by the Court. But these expectations were not fulfilled; and every sincere friend of Outram strongly dissuaded him from placing himself in a position to be insulted by Lord Falkland's Government. There was no guarantee that the Governor would comply with the obvious wishes of the Directors. And though the known honourable sentiments and high spirit of his Lordship afforded a strong presumption that he would wish to restore Outram to the post in which he had rendered such signal services, he must have a high estimate of human nature, who would attribute similar inclinations to his Lordship's colleagues. Gentlemen who could pen such Minutes as have been noticed in the foregoing pages, were likely to form peculiar notions respecting the official post most "*suitable*" to a "*monomaniac*"—a man under the influence of "*rancorous personal feelings.*" And they were *not* likely to replace him in a position where he must be entrusted with the conduct of those inquiries

which they had deemed him worthy of disgrace for instituting, which they themselves had been reprimanded for “arresting *in limine*,” and to the reinvestigation of which they have, much to their annoyance and humiliation, been ordered to lend their best aid and energies.

It is not within the scope of these “Memoranda” to allude to the grave questions rendered moot-points by the publication of the Baroda Blue Books; to inquire if it be justice to the natives of India to maintain, on enormous salaries, European Residents whose functions (as recognized by the Bombay Government) might be adequately performed by subaltern officers, on salaries of £600 *per annum*; to ask whether the “support” of controlling bodies is more worthily due to the zealous executive officers who carry out their views, or to the administrative boards that thwart their wishes; to inquire what course the East India Directors deem open to a faithful public servant, whose efforts are frustrated, and whose appeals to themselves are suppressed by the local authorities; to raise a discussion on the degree to which the acts of the Bombay Government have tended to make the British name odious and contemptible in Western India; or to point to the many indignities with which Outram’s zeal has been rewarded—the unjust censures that still remain on record against the officer whose public services have been recorded in the preceding pages — or the improbability of any other servant of the Bombay Government being found likely to incur the humiliation and pecuniary losses which have, in his case, been the result of carrying

out the wishes of his honourable masters, despite the antagonistic influence of his more immediate superiors.

All these are grave points, which may, and probably will, be slurred over by the English public for the present; for they are points brought to issue in a controversy between, on the one hand, a body possessing powerful influence with those on whom the decision rests, headed by a nobleman having many alliances, both political and personal, and on the other, a soldier who has no weight save that which his own merits have achieved, and no friends save those whom his virtues have secured to him. But they are points which will one day claim and obtain elucidations, if not in time to avert, at all events to explain national calamities. They do not, however, bear directly on the subject of Colonel Outram's services; and they are, in the mean time, left to those publicists whose more immediate province it is to discuss them.

But it may not be uninteresting to the readers of this volume to be informed that, in addition to the anxiety and humiliations which Colonel Outram has had to undergo, in consequence of the not very heavy faults conceded to his accusers by the Court of Directors, he has been subjected to a pecuniary fine of upwards of £4,000. His salary, as Resident at Baroda, was of nearly that amount. Since the 1st of February, 1852, he has been placed on the allowances of a regimental Major. And the diminution of income thus incurred, is but a portion of the pecuniary mulct inflicted on him by the Bombay Government. For the loss sustained by the necessity of suddenly breaking up his establish-

ments, and proceeding to this country to plead his own cause, and that of the afflicted victims of Baroda corruption, cannot be estimated at a lower sum than £1,000.

To some, these may appear mere and vulgar trifles undeserving of notice. And as such they will probably be regarded by Outram himself, whose liberality, carelessness of self, and contempt of money, have kept him poor while controlling wealth, and whose conscience made him allot to a charity, the prize-money assigned to him for the conquest of Sind. But there are others who will note them with interest, as affording another illustration of the peculiar fate which has through life adhered to Outram. Not once, but many times, has he been called on to make grievous sacrifices for principles which others shrunk from enunciating — principles which were eventually destined to find public recognition and acceptance — but in the recognition and acceptance of which he, his merits and his sacrifices, have invariably been overlooked.*

* It will not fail to be observed that in all the documents and discussions relative to Colonel Outram (that have as yet been laid before the public), the utmost that has been urged in his favour is *in extenuation of his so-called offences, and in mitigation of the punishment supposed to be due to him for telling unpalatable but momentous truths in plain language*. It seems to have been overlooked by those who have treated of the matter, that not only the Court of Directors, but the British Parliament and the British Nation, owe no small debt of gratitude to the officer whose incredible labours, under most disheartening circumstances, in a deadly climate, have resulted in the exposure of astounding and melancholy abuses, and in the reformation of


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In conclusion, it is but just to a gallant officer to mention that though, in the Blue Books, Sir John Grey—the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, and nominally a member of Lord Falkland's Government—is represented as having "*concurred*" in the Minutes of the Council, such was not the case. Mr. Willoughby, in his evidence before the Commons' Committee on Indian Affairs, appointed in 1851, explained most satisfactorily that the real object in giving a seat in Council to the Commander-in-Chief is, not to secure the benefit of his advice, but to afford a pretext for increasing his already vast emoluments; that the Commander-in-Chief appends his signature as a mere matter of form to documents of which he cannot possibly have the slightest knowledge. In this way, Sir John Grey's signature was obtained to several "Minutes" condemnatory of Outram. But when he became aware that Outram's dismissal had been resolved on, he took especial care to record his ignorance of the grounds on which this measure was sought to be justified; and he reminded his colleagues that he had taken no part in their discussions.

sad and long-established evils. Hardly, if at all less, do they owe gratitude to Mr. Anstey, to whose "*irregular energies*" the publication of the Baroda papers is exclusively due—and in spite of an act of discourtesy and indiscretion on the part of Colonel Outram himself.

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